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"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE"

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Parameters is a journal of ideas, providing a forum for the expression of mature professional thought on the art and science of land warfare, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, military ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. It serves as a vehicle for continuing the education, and thus the professional development, of War College graduates and other military officers and civilians concerned with military affairs.

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America's World War II Leaders in Europe: Some Thoughts

MARTIN BLUMENSON

Our heroes in World War II are dear to us. We cherish them, applaud their exertions during the conflict, and feel lucky to have had such capable and sterling men leading our troops in battle. They brought us victory, performed their duties with conspicuous success, exhibited personal traits conforming to our expectations, became well and widely known, and took their places modestly in the pantheon of our military giants.

As a recent article makes plain, our World War II commanders, particularly those on the higher levels, had an abundance of "professional skills and abilities" learned along career paths preparing them well for their "successful performance of duty." The assumption throughout reflects the widespread belief in how superb their qualifications for war leadership were. Their aptitudes, both natural and acquired, enabled them to respond effectively to the challenges of the war in their time.[1]

Apparently, they were our brightest and our best. The system uncovering them and inserting them into their proper places appeared to work well. Until recently, no one has questioned the abilities of our high-ranking officers except to quibble over a few details, all essentially minor—lapses in judgment, errors in method, and the like.[2] It is difficult, almost un-American, even to raise the issue of their overall excellence because they are so likable, so admirable in our collective memories. They have become bright stars unalterably fixed in our military firmament.

Furthermore, they were the only leaders we had in the struggle. We had no others. To whom can we compare them and their performance? To rate them against leaders of our allies or of our enemies makes little sense, for the

historical and cultural differences are too great to permit reasonable matching. We are consequently stuck with the group who gained fame and our lasting gratitude. Upon reflection, it is not a bad group to be stuck with.

Yet the record of accomplishment—and I speak only of the European side of the war—is essentially bland and plodding. The commanders were generally workmanlike rather than bold, prudent rather than daring, George S. Patton, Jr., being of course a notable exception. They showed a decided tendency to stay within the odds, the safe way of operating, and refrained from opting for the imaginative and the unexpected. Very few of their operations were brilliant. Those that stand out—among them the thrusts to Palermo and Messina in Sicily, the breakout across France, the rescue at Bastogne—are exceptions to the rule, all too rare. The achievements can usually be traced to a single actor.

Our leaders, in addition, displayed serious flaws in conception and execution, as at Anzio, in the Hürtgen Forest, and during the reduction of the Bulge. The pattern emerged very early in the war at the battle of Kasserine Pass, the first hostile meeting between American and German ground troops. The confrontation was a disaster for us. The defeat was bad enough. What was worse was the shocking revelation of how ill-prepared our leaders were for combat and how poorly our system for producing war leaders had functioned.

To a large extent, personal deficiencies by commanders up and down the chain of command created the Kasserine setback. Far too many officers failed to realize that the time-and-space factors prevalent in World War I were now outmoded and irrelevant. They had no idea until too late of the accelerated reaction time and the extended battlefield space in effect in the 1940s. They were thus unable to adapt and adjust to the new requirements of leadership.

Who was responsible for putting this kind of officer into leadership positions? The military were not altogether at fault for the command deficiencies displayed during the actions around Kasserine Pass. Two factors in their defense come quickly to mind. First, the US Army started far too late to prepare seriously for World War II. As a result, the training program, the procurement of weapons, and virtually all else were hasty, largely improvised, almost chaotic, and painfully inadequate throughout the intensely short period

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Educated at Bucknell and Harvard Universities, Martin Blumenson served in Europe during World War II and in Korea during the Korean War and is a retired Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. He has held the King Chair at the Naval War College, the Johnson Chair at the Army War College, and the Mark Clark Chair at The Citadel. He was Visiting Professor of Military and Strategic Studies at Acadia University, Visiting Professor at Bucknell University, Professor at the National War College, and Professorial Lecturer in International Affairs at George Washington University. Professor Blumenson is the author of 15 books, including the two volumes of *The Patton Papers*; *Patton: The Man Behind the Legend*; and *Mark Clark*.

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of mobilization and organization immediately before and after Pearl Harbor, that is, before the battlefield commitment of units.[3] The military had repeatedly informed the political authorities of the needs for growth and modernization and had just as repeatedly requested funds to initiate the twin process. The villain in the case, accountable for our unpreparedness, was American society. The American people counted on the false security offered by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and preferred to dream of the low costs of isolationism. The Army suffered.[4]

Second, the comparatively easy sledding of the Army prior to Kasserine deferred the moment when it would finally have to winnow out the ineffective leaders. The combat around Kasserine Pass, like all the initial and early battles of our wars, proved out the real leaders and shook out the duds. The actuality itself, it is often said, determines who is suited to lead in combat and who is not. Furthermore, it is strongly asserted, there is no sure way of telling beforehand, that is, in advance of the experience, who is temperamentally fitted to lead men and who is going to fall apart at the sound of the guns. If pushed too far, however, such claims begin to sound like a cop-out and an excuse. The primary function of the professional military body between wars is to produce wartime leaders. The process of correctly bringing up officers and grooming them at every stage of their careers is supposed not only to turn up and push ahead the qualified but also to weed out the incapable. The system works overtly by promoting certain officers and by refusing promotion to others.

The selection of an officer for advancement in the Army actually fulfills two requirements. He is thereby deemed ready and able to discharge increased authority and responsibility in his duties. He is also regarded as possessing the personal characteristics cherished and sought in the profession of arms. Those who do the judging are the high-ranking leaders in the profession. They renew and perpetuate the professional body as well as its standards. They do so by choosing certain members for professional leadership in the present and also for the future. The unspoken and possibly unconscious wish of those, the existing leadership, who are doing the selecting is quite naturally to find their eventual replacements among those who most thoroughly resemble themselves. It follows, then, that a professional group of any sort in any society reflects the strengths and weaknesses of those who are at the head of it at any given time. Those who shape the continuities of a profession do so in their own image.

A healthy professional group seeks and chooses those who meet the best and most relevant criteria. Officers being judged try to show in the course of their careers attention to duty, serious study, dedication, hard work, a good mind, and other virtues—all in order to guarantee advancement, increasing responsibility, and eventual success, the last measured by the attainment of high rank and a proficient performance. The brightest and the best are thus

rewarded. But perhaps, like all conventional wisdom, this conclusion is altogether too neat.

We were fortunate to have George C. Marshall as the US Army Chief of Staff throughout World War II. His contributions to victory were legion, far too numerous to begin to mention here. His intellect, rectitude, and vision were beyond compare. One of his most significant activities was to institute a virtual one-man effort to find proper officers for our rapidly expanding war machine. Throughout his term of office as the top Army man in uniform, Marshall called upon those officers he had known during his years of service who had impressed him with their dedication and efficiency. He had, it seems, entered into his personal black notebook the names of those whom he had judged to be fit for eventual high command. These officers became Marshall's protégés, and they received choice assignments as well as concomitant advancement during the war.

Particularly lucky were those who had been with Marshall at the Infantry School at Fort Benning between 1927 and 1932, when he was Assistant Commandant. Outstanding students and faculty members were especially well-regarded and in his good graces. They had proved their potential for heavy responsibility, and Marshall looked after them during the war. They were generally excellent in discharging their duties, and they flourished and rose in rank and in authority.

Mark Clark missed Marshall at Fort Benning, but became acquainted with him at Fort Lewis, Washington. Clark was the 3d Division G-3 while Marshall commanded a brigade in the division. Their duties brought them together, and they worked closely with each other on training exercises and maneuvers. Marshall was impressed with Clark's abilities, and, as a consequence, Clark's standing in the profession rose like a rocket.

George S. Patton, Jr., a cavalryman, had no chance of meeting Marshall at the Infantry School, but he had already made the most of his contact with the future Chief of Staff during World War I. Both officers were closely associated with John J. Pershing. Both lectured at the Staff College established by Pershing at Langres in France. Patton too became a Marshall man, and he benefited from Marshall's interest and confidence in him.

The Marshall method of identifying and rewarding first-rate officers was a system within a system. It worked well so far as it went. For every person entered in Marshall's notebook, there were probably a dozen, perhaps more, who were every bit as good as the ones he listed. The others were simply unfortunate because they had failed to come within Marshall's orbit and ken. If Marshall did not know them, he could not write their names into his book. How many excellent individuals were slighted simply because of their bad luck of never meeting or working with Marshall is, of course, a matter of conjecture.

Marshall also made mistakes. Some of his choices failed to measure up to the demands of combat. Lloyd Fredendall, Ernest Dawley, and John Millikin, all three corps commanders, were Marshall's selections. All were relieved of command, the first in North Africa after Kasserine Pass, the second in Italy after the Salerno invasion, the third after the Rhine River crossing at Remagen. It was rather late and rather shocking to discover officers nurtured in the system and advanced with every expectation of success to be found deficient at so high a level of command. There were other mistakes. For years Marshall confused James Van Fleet, an outstanding soldier, with someone who had a similar name and was a well-known drunk. Van Fleet's career progression suffered until the error somehow came to Marshall's attention.

The active-duty career of Marshall himself came very close to being terminated before his appointment as Chief of Staff. If he had been retired before gaining the post, as almost came to pass, what would have happened to the exceptional Marshall men whom he had personally and idiosyncratically chosen for leadership roles? Most likely, some of our heroes of World War II would have had different names.

The Army as an institution traditionally carried the burden of selecting officers for advancement through the more systematic individual ratings of the periodic efficiency reports, usually submitted once a year, sometimes more often. The criteria by which superiors judged subordinates directly under them were revised from time to time during the interwar years, along with the format, to indicate more accurately and clearly the extent to which the subjects showed the desirable professional qualities. The reporting was not always entirely objective, but the cumulative papers in an officer's personal record file characterized with good accuracy his professional progress over the years.

Young officers wishing promotion had to be, first of all, ambitious. No other profession is more competitive, and no other so closely regulates the behavior of its members. Officers without ambition lack drive, and those who refuse to push rarely get ahead. It was ever so in the 1920s and 1930s, as it is today. Secondly, officers wanting advancement had to demonstrate their devotion to the service as well as their efficiency in meeting its demands. They had to be outstanding in their professional attainments and practices, and they needed to fulfill their duties with precision and élan. Finally, they had to have the knack of attracting the favorable notice of their superiors. To be excellent in duty was simply not enough. To be excellent and unremarked was worse than useless. The goal was to be outstanding and to be so noted by someone important, by someone who could enhance a junior's career strivings.

George S. Patton, Jr., then a young second lieutenant, in explaining to his skeptical father-in-law why he was participating so single-mindedly in horse races, horse shows, and polo matches, said, "What I am doing looks like

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General of the Army George C. Marshall; Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the 15th Army Group; and Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, salute during a ceremony in Florence, Italy, on 11 February 1945.

play to you but in my business it is the best sort of advertising. It makes people talk and that is a sign they are noticing. And . . . the notice of others has been the start of many successful men."[5] He was, of course, referring to efforts to draw attention to himself, to his bearing, dress, and soldierly aptitudes, and also to make his name well-known throughout the Army.

Throughout his long and distinguished career, Patton tried always to impress his superiors with his professional excellence. This took two forms. He endeavored to do in an outstanding manner more than was expected or required in his assigned duties and in those ancillary pursuits, like polo and other athletic engagements, that were closely allied to official Army service. He also practiced an outrageous flattery of those who could help him get ahead. In addition to his real soldierly achievements, he was a bootlicker par excellence. Perhaps he could get away with the flattery because his military professionalism was so obvious. Or were his superiors of that period so susceptible to blandishment?

Aside from the traditional efficiency reports already alluded to, two main methods of identifying and developing talent existed between the wars. One was the sponsorship exercised by mentors. A senior officer took several promising junior officers under his wing, looked after them, helped them get

into service schools, and sought to land them choice assignments leading to future advancement. The second way was through attendance at the various Army schools. Successful officers usually proceeded through a progression of educational institutions. First came the Military Academy at West Point or college work with the ROTC, both leading to a commission. Then arrived the advance branch schooling at Fort Benning for Infantry, Fort Sill for Artillery, Fort Belvoir for the Engineers, and the like. Next came the course variously titled but eventually called the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, which was regarded generally as the most important school assignment for all officers, the prerequisite, it was said, for promotion to high rank and major responsibility. Finally, the top of the educational pile was the Army War College.

How rich the substance of the learning was, how solid the instruction and pedagogy were, how stimulating the intellectual impact was, and how relevant the performance ratings at school were to future assignment—all these matters are still under rather intense discussion and disagreement among historians, soldiers, and educators. Most observers are in accord on one thing. The most noteworthy aspect of Leavenworth and its "school solution" type of teaching was the imposition of a homogenized view on the students. Graduates had a common method of approaching and solving military problems and, as a consequence, were comfortable and at home in any headquarters where they might be assigned.

The behavior in class of John Shirley Wood may be significant. Probably the most intelligent of all the armor disciples, Wood trained the 4th Armored Division to its high pitch of combat proficiency, then led it in combat

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John Shirley Wood, one of the Army's intellectuals, was nicknamed "P" for professor. He trained the 4th Armored Division to fighting trim, then led it in combat just as skillfully.

with distinction in Normandy. Wood was older and thought to be smarter than most of his contemporaries. His nickname was "P" for professor, attributable to the many hours he spent helping classmates in their studies. Wood was reported to have expressed his disdain for the intellectual content of the Leavenworth course by ostentatiously reading a newspaper while his instructors lectured.

Thus the problem of the Army in World War II is largely the problem of the Army between the World Wars. Our Army during that period, apart from the frenzied preparations in 1940 and 1941, was a provincial, somewhat backward society in the process of dozing. The working day was short, nothing much of consequence was happening, and the procedures were cut and dried. Such complacency was bound to have adverse effects when war finally came. Today's somewhat exaggerated view of our World War II leaders' martial prowess is probably the product of national pride and the warm glow of nostalgia—after all, we *did* win the war.

Many observers and historians have noted how "impotent" and "ineffective" the Army was in the prewar days.[6] Low pay and endless routine produced stagnation and futility. In these conditions, how well did the traditional means of identifying and developing talent function? If the context and framework of the Army provided little stimulus to learning, how did bright, ambitious, and dedicated officers prepare for what they all called "the next war"?

George Patton grew professionally through his reading, a "monumental self-study he charted for himself."[7] He was hardly alone. Quite a few officers who strove for knowledge and development gained professional competence by more or less systematic reading. They also interacted with like-minded officers of their generation, all "intelligent, stimulating men . . . studying their profession" individually and in small groups, off duty and at the service schools.[8]

It is sometimes said that the most productive function of the military school system was to gather together the most ambitious and successful officers for specific periods of time, the school term, thereby enabling them to be mentally stimulated through mutual discussions and bull sessions. Men of native intelligence thus overcame the handicaps and restrictions of a moribund military organization. They read, discussed, and, in some cases, responded to the challenge of writing articles and studies, thereby becoming the top-notch professionals we needed in the Second World War. This is the legend. And it may well be true. By compelling the brightest members to look beyond the Army's formal academic offerings, the Army forced them to learn on their own, which may have enhanced initiative and resourcefulness. Self-preparation was perhaps the key to later success.

How stifling was the prewar Army? Carson McCullers opened a novel, published in 1941 at the end of what were often called the Army's "lean

years," with these lines: "An Army post in peacetime is a dull place. Things happen, but then they happen over and over again." After using the word "monotony" and the term "rigid pattern" to describe military life, McCullers continued: "Perhaps the dullness of a post is caused most of all by insularity and by a surfeit of leisure and safety, for once a man enters the Army he is expected only to follow the heels ahead of him."[9]

If the description is entirely accurate, it is chilling. Was the prewar Army environment really as deadly as all that? If so, how could anyone, especially the leaders in World War II, have stayed and endured the boredom? Some officers had entered the Army during the Spanish-American War and during World War I, and they simply remained, perhaps mainly out of inertia and regard for the steady pay. The Great Depression of the 1930s lends credibility to this notion. Others stayed because they enjoyed the satisfactions of horses and polo or of regular routine. Still others were in uniform because they were disenchanted with and renounced civilian life.[10]

A few, perhaps many, ascribed their choice to continue in the service as motivated by the hope of commanding troops in war. They stayed despite the tide of civilian indifference to military preparedness. Noel F. Parrish, a cavalry trooper, later a flying officer, expressed the sentiment as follows:

> Ground and air officers alike stubbornly carried out their duties among a people hoping and trying to believe that all officers were as useless as their saber chains. It was a weird, almost furtive existence, like that of fireman trying to guard a wooden city whose occupants pretended it was fireproof. In such an atmosphere of unreality, officers sometimes felt a little ghostly and bewildered, and turned to the affectation of imported uniforms and mannerisms, the imitation of the well-to-do and horse culture. These psychic manifestations of a sense of social uselessness appeared in a surprisingly small number of officers. Most plodded grimly along, stubbornly reminding themselves and each other that they were real, after all, and that the things they were doing were necessary.[11]

What they were doing was not only necessary but, above all, important, certainly in the light of another world war looming on the horizon.

Herman Wouk made the same point in *The Caine Mutiny*. The regular officers, he said, who persevered during the bad times and kept the military alive made it possible for the services to rise from their ashes, regain their vitality, and perform in exemplary fashion and triumphantly in World War II.[12] The feelings put into words by Parrish and Wouk are thrilling. Unfortunately, they were postwar observations rather than bona fide observations of the prewar years. They seem to be rationalizations or justifications instead of accurate depictions of the times.

Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., who was one of our best commanders in World War II, has authentically depicted how the older Army lived.[13] His account

reveals as well how happy and well-adjusted Truscott himself was in the regimen. What would have been stultifying to some was evidently close to perfect for him. He enjoyed his service. His prior experience was as a young public school teacher in rural and primitive areas; the life was hard and the pay was erratic. In contrast, the Army offered all sorts of unexpected pleasures, steady employment, periodic travel, endlessly fascinating tours of duty, the joys of riding horses and playing polo, and the opportunity to meet lots of people in the service. If most of his contemporaries were very much the same as he, several were out of the ordinary, such as a talented pianist and a gifted linguistics expert. In addition, before World War II every outfit seemed to have its resident eccentric, a harmless individual who added salt and pepper to what was otherwise a diet of rather bland existence.

Many officers during the interwar years had offers of good jobs in civilian life, paying much more than what they earned in the military. Some, of course, inevitably left the service, but the majority refused to succumb to such temptation. Many of the latter rose to prominence and became well known in World War II. Their reasons for declining civilian employment were never terribly explicit. They were much like that of William H. Simpson, later the Ninth Army commander in Europe: "I said to hell with it. I am going to stay in the Army."[14]

Part of the failure to search for and elucidate the reasons for preferring Army life over civilian pursuits was in the nature of the officers themselves. Many were reticent, few articulate. Many wanted to appear less than thoughtful and expressive. Much of their motivation needed no expression. The military ethos was so ingrained and so strong among much of the officer corps that it required no definition. No one found it necessary to explain, for example, what the West Point motto--Duty, Honor, Country—meant. Everyone simply knew.

Whether they understood it on a conscious level or not, officers belonged to the aristocracy by virtue of their service. Harking back to medieval times, when only members of the nobility could be warriors, the American officer corps was patrician and socially privileged. Their commissions proclaimed and conferred upon them the status of gentlemen. As such, they were forbidden to carry an umbrella or a grocery package or to push a baby carriage. They were quite above such mundane matters as business and petty trade. They prided themselves on being oblivious to their salaries, anything but money-grubbing, so long, that is, as they could maintain a certain standard of living, along with a servant or two.

A mild snobbishness pervaded the establishment and molded the individual officers and their families into a close-knit association. The acculturation started as early as "Beast Barracks" for newly arrived cadets at West Point, the initial experience; and for those who entered the Army without

benefit of West Point the conventions and social nuances of the system quickly if subtly made themselves felt, requiring rapid learning and adjustment.

In this society, the environment stressed conformity. Officers lived in a world where seniority prevailed and ruled. Conservatism was a guiding principle, and rigidity flourished. Intellectual life, if it existed at all, was somewhat sterile, the give-and-take of wide-ranging argument largely absent except in very special circumstances, such as at school. As a whole, the profession fled from the image of braininess—"P" Wood being a notable exception. Henry Halleck, a markedly brilliant Civil War officer, was called "Old Brains," but it was pejorative, and officers shunned that sort of ticket. In the 1920s and 30s, officers were noted for their devotion to duty and sound judgment, however the latter was defined. Their intellectual capacities seemed hardly to matter at all.

This is perhaps the factor, the consistent downgrading of intellectual interest and activity, that in large part made the US Army unprepared conceptually for World War II. Even though the war resembled the earlier world war in many basic respects—that is, in the opposing line-ups, in the main instruments of warfare employed, and in the major battlefields fought over—we learned how to fight the second global war from others. We knew little from ourselves, from our own efforts, from our own teachings. Perhaps the strength of this tradition, the refusal to take intellect seriously, the failure to provide for the stretching of intellect, kept the Army from being ready, as well, for the Spanish-American War, World War I, Korea, and Vietnam.

Even more damning of the World War II generation of leaders was their inability to recognize the nature of future warfare. Although the struggle in the 1940s was mainly a conventional and linear war, the manifestations of the conflict to come in the 1950s and later were already present. Unconventional warfare and terrorism could be perceived in the various resistance movements and elsewhere on the far-flung fronts of the contest. Did our leaders notice them, take account of them, prepare to deal with them? They missed these phenomena completely.

The point is that academic excellence, attained and displayed at West Point and the service schools, has rarely been given much weight in later assignments and judgments about proficiency in the profession.[15] Our heroes have usually been those who have been less than brilliant intellectually or who have preferred to play dumb. But if the Army was a good bit alienated from the mainstream of American concerns during the 1920s and 30s, the military, at least in their mild-mannered anti-intellectualism, were together with their civilian counterparts.

My point is not to be construed as a yearning for all our military leaders to be intellectuals, however they are defined. Yet it bears stating that some of our practicing intellectuals, Maxwell Taylor and Jim Gavin, to name

but two, were conspicuously successful field commanders. Thus, in improving upon the past, what seems to be needed is a rigorous intellectual climate and context within which our outstanding commanders and staff officers alike can find encouragement to go beyond the limits of conventional thought in order to stimulate the entire profession.

How good were our military leaders in World War II? They looked good, did the job, and gained victory for us. Were they exceptional or merely adequate? Could we have won with almost any other group in command? It may well be that our top leadership was analogous to the elite forces that implemented the blitzkrieg for Germany. The panzers, the motorized infantry, the self-propelled artillery, the close support aircraft in the vanguard of the attack were actually in very short supply. Behind them, the bulk of the components were horse-drawn.

Was our leadership similarly stratified? Beyond the few really outstanding and visible leaders who made it to the top despite the handicaps of a barely functioning or badly functioning profession, were most of the others at best mediocre? I won't presume to say. But how our small interwar Army produced the leadership that got us successfully through the war remains in large part a miracle and, like most miracles, a mystery.

NOTES

1. Robert H. Berlin, "The United States Army World War II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography," *Journal of Military History* (formerly *Military Affairs*), 53 (April 1989), 147-67.

2. For three relatively recent departures from the customary blanket approbation of American arms and leadership in World War II, see Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1981); and Martin van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and US Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).

3. See Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., *America's First Battles, 1776-1965* (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1986), pp. 186-265.

4. For important qualifications to this view, however, see Thomas W. Collier, "The Army and the Great Depression," *Parameters*, 18 (September 1988), 102-08.

5. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers, 1885-1940* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 239.

6. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, "Filling the Gaps: Re-evaluating Officer Professional Educational in the Inter-War Army, 1920-1940," a paper presented at the American Military Institute Annual Conference, Virginia Military Institute, 14 April 1989.

7. Steve E. Dietrich, "The Professional Reading of General George S. Patton, Jr.," a paper presented at the American Military Institute Annual Convention, Virginia Military Institute, 14 April 1989.

8. Kirkpatrick.

9. *Reflections in a Golden Eye* (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1941), p. 1.

10. Edward M. Coffman and Peter F. Herrly, "The American Regular Army Officer Corps between the World Wars: A Collective Biography," *Armed Forces and Society*, 3 (November 1977), 70.

11. Quoted in Coffman and Herrly, p. 71.

12. Herman Wouk, *The Caine Mutiny* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1951), pp. 445-48.

13. *The Twilight of the US Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917-1942* (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989), *passim*.

14. Quoted by Coffman and Herrly, pp. 69-70.

15. Berlin.

Saving Face: Hackworth's Troubling Odyssey

A. J. BACEVICH

A Review Essay on **About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior**. By David H. Hackworth and Julie Sherman. Simon and Schuster, 1989.

There is much to dislike about this memoir, starting with the narcissistic photograph of the author that adorns the dust jacket. Granted, readers of *About Face* may decide that the photo strikes the right note: certainly the vanity it conveys matches the smugness of the text. And the anomalous image of a self-described warrior so splendidly coifed and manicured sets the stage nicely for the contradictions that pervade the narrative.

During a career spanning some 25 years and two wars, David Hackworth proved himself to be an inspired troop leader, a brilliant trainer, and a fighter of remarkable courage and tenacity. Such qualities do not guarantee that any would-be author can produce a book worth reading.

We should note up front that *About Face* is miserably written. As a prose stylist, Colonel Hackworth is unoriginal, his notion of vivid writing running toward sentences like "They were strange dudes, the Chinese . . . ." His penchant for dated Army slang and Vietnam-era clichés, contrived no doubt to provide a tone of authenticity, serves only to make a military reader wince. The truly curious will overlook these stylistic shortcomings and concentrate on substance. In this regard, we can evaluate the book from several points of view.

At its pettiest, *About Face* is a celebrity memoir in olive drab. Rule one of this kiss-and-tell genre projects retail sales in proportion to the nastiness of the author's judgments about former colleagues. Thus, among the reasons for Colonel Hackworth's decision to recount his career, one finds an evident desire to settle old scores. The author goes out of his way to take mean-spirited swipes at the "wimps" and "prancers" who failed to live up to his version of the warrior ethic. His victims include many notables of the post-Korean War Army: Goodpaster, Westmoreland, Haig, DePuy, Cushman, Ewell, and so on.

Hackworth saves his most venomous—and most effective—attack for S. L. A. Marshall. Hackworth had been one of Marshall's favorites and had prospered under his sponsorship. Now Hackworth lambastes the late journalist-historian as a hustler, phony, and "military ambulance chaser." Whether Marshall, in fact, was a "power-rapt little man who threw his weight around shamelessly" matters little. That he may have been an intellectual fraud, as Hackworth devastatingly maintains, matters a great deal to those who turn to Marshall's writings for insights into the behavior of soldiers in battle. Others had already begun to cast doubt upon Marshall's methods. Hackworth delivers the coup de grace.

At its most audacious, *About Face* represents an elaborate effort to claim the mantle that Hackworth believes to be rightly his—the one he would have worn had his career not ended ignominiously in Vietnam. Hackworth yearns to walk among those who adhered to the warrior's code yet rose to high rank: the Gavins, Ridgways, Bruce Clarkes, and others less well known. To bolster his claim of belonging in this circle, Hackworth refers to himself repeatedly as a "legend." Those who reserve that term for the likes of DiMaggio, Garbo, or Hemingway may consider Hackworth's use of it impertinent. Indeed, it is chutzpah of the highest order. Patton and Rommel are legendary soldiers—years after their last battles, they retain prominence in the popular memory. The public legend of David Hackworth, by comparison, traces back to an interview on network television in 1971, recalled in his book in reverential tones and reprinted verbatim. In that interview, the warrior broke with the Army and the war, winning the 15 minutes of fame that Andy Warhol promised each of us in the media age. Less than two decades later, the reputations of Patton and Rommel remain intact, the Hackworth interview lies forgotten (rightly so—no Rosetta Stone there on why we lost the war), and one doubts that even among serving officers more than one in a hundred could have identified Hackworth, at least before the splashy appearance of his book with its attendant publicity tour, cover story in *Parade* magazine, etc. And this notoriety too will be fleeting. So much for legend.

Colonel A. J. Bacevich is Chief of Staff of the 1st Armored Division in the Federal Republic of Germany, having assumed that position after serving as the Division G3. A graduate of the US Military Academy, he holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Princeton University in history and was a Senior Service College Fellow at Harvard University's JFK School of Government. In 1985-87, he commanded the 2d Squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. A former history instructor at West Point, Colonel Bacevich is the author of *The Pentomic Era: The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam* (1986), *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (coauthor; 1988), and *Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949* (1989). In the Vietnam War, he served as a cavalry platoon leader and as a cavalry squadron staff officer.

At its most presumptuous, *About Face* serves as a vehicle for promoting Hackworth's credentials as a trenchant critic of military affairs, someone to whom his fellow citizens might turn for counsel on complex issues of national security. Key to Hackworth's hopes of assuming the role of wise man is that he reaffirm the correctness of his views on Vietnam, the central episode of his career and the setting of his professional demise. Hackworth must convince his readers that he was justified as a serving officer in criticizing publicly both US policy in Vietnam and the US Army—"the rotten whore I'd been madly in love with." He argues his case on two levels, in both instances without success.

On the one hand, Hackworth depicts the American cause in Vietnam as not merely imperfect, but altogether evil. Thus he characterizes the Cambodian invasion of 1970, an undertaking that "violated all the principles" upon which the United States had been built, as no "different from the Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor." Hackworth equates American methods in Cambodia to those "the Nazis used to invade Poland." Having gorged himself on reckless analogies, Hackworth becomes abruptly and inexplicably timid, concluding that the Cambodian operation's *real* defect was that it was "five years too late in coming." The reader is left wondering whether Hackworth's critique rests on matters of principle or questions of timing.

Worse still, nowhere in his rendition of shoddy American motives, corrupt Vietnamese officials, and lazy ARVN officers does Hackworth contemplate the fate of Indochina since US involvement there ended. To assert that American efforts in Vietnam "had shown our Nazi side" while failing to note the consequences of communist victory—genocide in Cambodia and repression in Vietnam so severe as to create the phenomenon of the boat people—suggests a moral and historical shortsightedness that is positively breathtaking.

On another level, Hackworth attributes American failure in Vietnam not to flawed policy but to the Army's self-seeking, incompetent leadership—an indictment from which he excludes warriors such as himself. There is little new in his account of how the officer corps botched the war—the lack of consistent strategic vision, the penchant for large-unit operations, the excessive use of firepower, the meddling of senior commanders in small-unit actions, the reliance on false or misleading statistical indicators. Only in denouncing the quality of training provided to Vietnam-bound recruits does Hackworth add something fresh and important to the standard litany.

The secondhand character of his critique compels Hackworth to venture beyond simply bashing senior American leaders for their mishandling of Vietnam. Hackworth boldly asserts that *he* knew how to win the war, basing this claim on his five months as a battalion commander in the Mekong Delta in 1969.

Hackworth is at his best in describing how he turned around a listless, undisciplined unit and invested it with savvy and fighting spirit. He is less

persuasive in contending that the way he fought his battalion provided a blueprint for victory. Hackworth says that he taught his battalion to "out G the G," to beat the guerrilla at his own game, abandoning the wasteful, counter-productive practices of the apostles of firepower and centralized control. The proof? The author describes in proud detail an action in which his unit killed 143 of the enemy, thanks to 13 airstrikes that Hackworth himself directed from his orbiting command and control ship. According to Hackworth, this tactical success demonstrated that "our unbeatable firepower would always turn the tide of battle in our favor." Indeed, his battalion had shown how "our superior firepower could be used not just to destroy our foe but actually to preserve American lives." Readers with even a passing knowledge of the war will have understandable difficulty in determining how, if at all, Hackworth's methods in this instance differed from those of other units. As for his ostensibly profound conclusion, contemporary defenders of the Army's standard tactics in Vietnam were saying precisely the same thing throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Not content to rest his case on this single battle, Hackworth argues that his battalion's performance throughout his tenure in command proved that he had solved the riddle of counterinsurgency. His chosen measure of success? The much-maligned but ever-useful body count. During his months in command, Hackworth tells us, his unit's "body count figures were more than 2500 Viet Cong killed in action in exchange for 25 battalion lives. 100:1. *Even with a hefty rate of inflation taken into account* [emphasis added], these were damn good numbers." How would "damn good numbers" have led to victory? Hackworth explains that if other units had racked up comparable scores, the United States would eventually have pierced the enemy's threshold of pain. "And in that way, the war could have been won. . . ." Sounds good. Only we tried it. And we killed lots of people. And we lost. Can Hackworth not understand that?

In the book's closing chapter, Hackworth offers a sampling of the sage advice he hopes to share regarding defense issues generally and the Army in particular. It is an embarrassing effort—barely coherent, superficial, and marred by inaccuracies. An ungenerous reader might surmise that during his years of making money in Australian exile Hackworth relied solely on an occasional issue of *Time* magazine to keep up with the contemporary debate over American defense policy.

Reflecting his experience as an anti-nuclear activist in Australia (he modestly credits himself with helping to "illumine a nation to the most critical issue humankind has faced to this day"), Hackworth begins with the pronouncement that "the stakes of war have grown too high [for war] to be a viable problem solver." This banality has been kicking around at least since World War I with events disproving it just as routinely ever since—a fact that in no way affects the popularity of such sentiments among aspiring politicians, academics, artistic types, and their journalistic camp followers.

Hackworth *knows* that his claim is nonsense. So having paid obeisance to the "war is obsolete" school, he immediately disavows it. He declares that war lurks just over the horizon and fixes its likely location as Latin America. Convinced that "the United States remains fundamentally underdefended," Hackworth advocates a number of steps to prepare for this impending conflict. A few of Hackworth's recommendations have merit, though none are original. Too many of them suggest that Hackworth is out of touch. "Training exercises must not be controlled," he counsels, "but instead be completely free play [so that] soldiers can discover for themselves that war is not a series of canned problems." Anyone offering that as an innovative proposal is ignorant of the way the Army trains today. In criticizing the quality of modern weapons, Hackworth takes aim at the M1A1 Abrams tank. According to Hackworth, the M1A1 has a range of 56 miles on a load of fuel (wrong), is "battle-ready far less frequently" than the M60 tank it replaced (wrong), is kept running by civilians (wrong), and is out-gunned by the Soviet T-80 (wrong, unless diameter of the bore is the sole measure of a tank cannon's effectiveness).

Finally, some of Hackworth's suggestions are just downright goofy. He advocates an immediate return to the draft, not because the volunteer soldier is unsatisfactory but "to make every American aware and prepared to pay the price of admission to life in a land of freedom." Hackworth would offer his draftees an early chance to pay that price in Cuba. Although the United States has managed to accommodate itself to Cuba, albeit with clenched teeth, since the missile crisis of 1962, Castro has Hackworth in a tizzy. Hackworth insists that Cuban support of Latin American insurgents be stopped now. As "America's only chance of getting on top of a situation otherwise deteriorating day by day," Hackworth advocates an immediate air and naval blockade of Cuba. He does not explain why such a provocation would be decisive or what actions he would support if it were not.

Such views make it unlikely that Hackworth will make much of a dent in the world of consultants, pundits, and talk-show regulars. Yet withal, he remains in his way a compelling, if enigmatic figure. Despite its manifest deficiencies, some military readers will no doubt come away from *About Face* persuaded that Hackworth is heroic, noble, and worthy of emulation. Of all the potential baleful consequences of this book, this would be the most pernicious—that would-be warriors might view Hackworth as a role model.

Who in today's Army would deny the importance of nurturing the warrior spirit? Can anyone be unaware of the tide of factors threatening that spirit? As military life becomes progressively more bureaucratized, centralized, and standardized, traditional concepts of command responsibility and authority lose definition. Leaders satisfy themselves with process at the expense of outcome. ("It's on valid requisition." "I sent him to the counselling center.")

Officers worry excessively about negotiating the latest career "gates," most of them remote from the cutting edge. Opportunities to serve with troops and to wrestle first-hand with the challenges of preparation for war become rarer.

Those unhappy with such influences would normally welcome a book celebrating the primacy of the warrior ethic. Yet those concerned about the American Army's future will reject Hackworth's chest-thumping portrayal of what it takes to be a real soldier—in his idiom, a "stud." While few would dispute Hackworth's emphasis on sticking close to the troops and on marching to the sound of the guns, beyond that he has it all wrong.

Implicit in Hackworth's thesis is the proposition that warriors are not bound by the rules that guide the conduct of lesser mortals. *About Face* is laced with anecdotes boasting of Hackworth's propensity for flouting regulations, laws, and commonly accepted moral standards. While a young officer at Fort Benning, he shacks up with the wife of a brother officer fighting in Korea. As a commander, he recruits his sergeants to participate in a scheme to cover up the loss of a weapon. ("I'd stayed out of the whole operation.") In the late 1950s, he diverts "excess" training ammunition to an ex-Army buddy now running guns to an aspiring Cuban revolutionary named Castro. (According to Hackworth's version of history, Castro was a good guy in those days; "It was *American* policy that sent Castro into the Soviet camp.") Years later, in a similar gesture of goodwill, he supplies a truckload of cheap PX beer to an acquaintance running a Saigon bar. Hackworth's friend, in turn, sells the beer at a huge markup—mostly to GIs. ("Strictly speaking the transaction made me a black marketeer, too, but my conscience was clear.")

Hackworth also ran a lucrative whorehouse on the compound of his last command in Vietnam. (Since the French had maintained field brothels in Indochina, "There was no reason why we shouldn't. It was the regulations that were wrong.") Did he profit from the operation personally? He says not. Yet as his departure from active duty approached, he packed his own golden parachute at the expense of his soldiers. "I needed a grubstake and I needed it fast," he explains. To get it, Hackworth gambled with the troops, won big, and then cajoled subordinates into smuggling the cash illegally out of Vietnam. Hackworth also subverted the urinalysis required of his homeward-bound soldiers, condoned the use of marijuana by his officers and NCOs, and toward the end admitted to drug use himself.

Each of these escapades, indiscretions, and illegalities Hackworth justifies—at times, even celebrates—by virtue of his being a true warrior. He alleges that all warriors have voracious sexual appetites, for example, making it acceptable for Hackworth to sleep with another officer's wife or to cheat on his own without compunction or remorse. As a warrior, Hackworth responded to his own "Code of Conscience, the rules of which were based on the needs of my men versus regulations, or the desires of my higher ups." That

code made Hackworth the sole arbiter of right and wrong, a prerogative he exploited to the hilt. By the time of his final year in Vietnam, he would claim that "I *did* have my own Army. . . . And I *was* the law."

Those with the temerity to suggest that Hackworth occasionally trimmed the cloth of that conscience to suit himself simply didn't understand. Thus the soldier who accused Hackworth of using drugs "saw . . . what he saw, but without any perspective." The needed perspective? "I was . . . absolutely knee-knocking drunk at the time, and when that joint was passed to me, I probably would have taken it if it had been cow dung. So I had a few puffs." For warriors, being in an alcoholic stupor apparently suffices to excuse misconduct. (And why not? As Hackworth asserts elsewhere, drinking was like sex: "the more you could put away, the more macho you were among your buddies.")

Should readers conclude from Hackworth's chronicle that to be a warrior is to be a renegade? One might as well conclude from the evening news that all basketball stars use cocaine or that all congressmen are crooked. Apart from exposing his individual character, Hackworth's testimony proves nothing and means nothing.

For all its apparent candor, Hackworth's accounting of his life remains at root false. Absorbed by the trivial story of his own undoing and by the frustration of his ambitions, Hackworth is blind to the larger drama in which he played a modest but essential role—the drama of the Army's painful involvement in the long, brutal, and unwon conflicts of the Cold War. Historians may eventually conclude that America demanded more of her soldiers during this period than she ever had of earlier generations. Especially was this the case in Vietnam, where by the end simply to do your duty was to be labeled a fool and a cretin, at odds with the rest of society, or at least with its most vocal and self-righteous members. Soldiers who gave of themselves far less than did Hackworth had difficulty understanding the point of it all: enduring hardships about which few at home seemed to care; carrying on with meaningless operations in an atmosphere of decay and disintegration; suffocating under a blanket of moral anomie woven of hypocrisy, contradiction, sanctimonious posturing, and self-serving chatter.

To most soldiers of today's Army—by every outward measure confident and healthy—all of that may seem about as relevant as someone else's bad dream. Yet survivors of that period might justifiably wonder whether the Army has come to terms with its past or merely buried it. An attempt to answer that question might have saved *About Face* from the oblivion to which it is otherwise destined. And a warrior's warrior such as David Hackworth should have been the one to help the Army examine its long ordeal of Cold War from some useful perspective.

How regrettable that Hackworth once again has kicked away a golden opportunity. ❑

The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War

SCOTT R. McMICHAEL

The military situation that confronted the Soviet army in Afghanistan during its nine-plus years of occupation (December 1979 to February 1989) differed significantly from the Soviets' prewar expectations. Soviet forces were committed into Afghanistan on the false presumption that the the rapidly destabilizing situation could be put right by means of a quick, violent coup-de-main on the model of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Soviet planners were fully aware of the growing resistance movement in Afghanistan, yet the Soviet army entered the country expecting little opposition, prepared only to fight a few short, conventional actions if necessary.[1]

Afghanistan, the Soviets found, is not Czechoslovakia. Soviet forces became mired in an extended counterinsurgency campaign against a classic guerrilla force. This article will show how the Soviet army responded to the unexpected dilemma it met. Further, it will analyze how the Soviet ground forces adapted and failed to adapt to the peculiar conditions of counterinsurgency warfare in a large, dry, mountainous region, and it will draw conclusions on the suitability of the Soviet army for such operations.

The Doctrinal Dilemma

Aside from the airborne and elite striking forces employed by the Soviets in the initial coup-de-main in Kabul, the Soviet armed forces inserted into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were structured and trained for large-scale conventional warfare. Soviet military doctrine envisioned their employment on flat, rolling terrain like that of Europe. This latter kind of warfare is characterized doctrinally by deep offensive operations carried out by heavy tank-mechanized formations, massed and echeloned to conduct breaches of dense defenses, followed by rapid advance into the enemy rear to encircle

and destroy him. These ground operations are accompanied and supported by simultaneous attack of the enemy throughout his entire depth by aviation, missiles, long-range artillery, and coordinated airborne and airmobile assaults. The doctrine seeks a quick, decisive victory. The unsuitability of such a doctrine and such forces to the situation in Afghanistan is obvious, yet the Soviet army adjusted slowly and painfully to the unconventional tasks that confronted it.

Conventional Soviet doctrine ran aground in Afghanistan against two related obstacles: the physical environment and the threat. Instead of a moderate climate and the open terrain of Europe, Soviet forces found desert and highly restrictive mountainous terrain, with severe extremes of weather and temperature. In addition, the local logistical infrastructure and road and rail networks were quite undeveloped. Besides severely restricting the movement and fires of heavy forces, these factors created severe problems in command and control. Vehicles frequently broke down owing to inferior maintenance, deficient repair, driver inexperience, and general wear and tear. Further, the Soviet logistical organization for both the ground and air components initially was unequal to the task of supporting such an unwieldy force in such difficult terrain.

Soviet forces also were unprepared for the *mujaheddin* resistance. Instead of a coherent, conventional foe in prepared defenses, they found a hardy, resilient guerrilla force which generally refused to stand and fight. Numbering about 80,000 full-time fighters, the mujaheddin were organized into hundreds of small groups operating throughout the countryside and in all the major cities. These small groups of 20 to 50 men were loosely aggregated into *Jabhas*—a local organization approximating a battalion—and occasionally into regiments, regional commands, and even divisions.[2] Equipped primarily with light arms and a limited number of heavy weapons—such as machineguns, mortars, 107mm and 122mm rocket launchers, and short-range antitank rockets—the mujaheddin conducted a classic hit-and-run guerrilla war. The extremely decentralized nature of their activity precluded the mobilization of large forces and coordinated action on a large scale against the Soviets, but it also provided security through dispersion.

In several respects, it is difficult to understand why the Soviets were not better prepared to fight a counterinsurgency. After all, they have paid close

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Major Scott R. McMichael, Field Artillery, is a Research Associate at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, where he is working with Professor John Erickson. He holds a B.A. in history from Davidson College and an M.A. in international relations (Soviet concentration) from the University of Chicago, and is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute (Russian), the US Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, and the US Army Command and General Staff College. Major McMichael has commanded artillery batteries in both Alaska and the Federal Republic of Germany. His article on the tactical excellence of Colonel Charles N. Hunter in Burma appeared in the Summer 1986 issue of *Parameters*.

Map by Jim Kistler, USAWC

attention to the participation of Western powers in local wars.[3] The Soviets also have a rich experience themselves both in insurgent warfare (World War II partisan operations) and in suppressing insurgencies (in the Caucasus and central Asia in the 1920s and 30s and in the Ukraine and Baltic regions after World War II). Yet in Soviet doctrine development this experience clearly gave way to an emphasis on the great conventional campaigns of the Red Army against the Germans. When the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in the fall of 1979, it did so without any counterinsurgency military doctrine. With but a few isolated writings on the subject by some of the great military theoreticians in Soviet military history,[4] the Soviet army found itself sorely handicapped by the absence of a doctrine to guide its military operations.

In the absence of a formal counterinsurgency doctrine and with the belated realization that a quick military victory was not possible, the Soviet command developed an ad hoc counterinsurgency strategy. The Soviet army lacked sufficient forces to defeat the insurgency, and Moscow was unwilling to commit the forces necessary to obtain victory because of the unacceptably high political, ideological, economic, and military costs of such a course. On the other hand, the technological superiority of the Soviet army, particularly its advantages in firepower and mobility, prevented a mujaheddin victory. Soviet forces were able to extend temporary control into any part of the

country, but they were unable to maintain that control beyond a few weeks. When Soviet units were withdrawn, mujaheddin forces reappeared. This alternation of Soviet/Afghan control and mujaheddin control characterized the war throughout most of the country's provinces.

Under these conditions of military stalemate, the Soviet command shifted its emphasis from military operations to long-term political, social, and economic warfare against the insurgents. The several components of this widened effort—political indoctrination, exploitation of tribal differences, education of thousands of Afghan children in the Soviet Union, destruction of the rural economy, genocidal razing of villages, forced resettlement, and the resulting creation of millions of refugees—have been described at length in many publications. The military aspect of this approach to the Afghan counterinsurgency can be described as a *stronghold strategy*. Unable to subdue the country as a whole, the Soviets concentrated their efforts on control of Afghanistan's largest cities, key facilities, and the main transportation network, i.e. those elements vital to the general control of the country and to the support of military operations. In conjunction with this strategy, they established large garrisons in cities and near airports, as well as strongpoints along the major arteries. Thus, by 1981 Soviet military activity in Afghanistan evolved into three primary kinds of operations: static defense of key centers, securing lines of communications and supply (the so-called "highway war"), and direct operations against the mujaheddin.[5] We shall focus here on the latter category because it most directly applies to the question of Soviet adaptation to counterinsurgency warfare.

Periodic Conventional Offensives

For the first several years of the occupation, the Soviet approach to direct military operations reflected a fixed, conventional mind-set. Periodic conventional offensives, generally in division strength, were the early staple of Soviet and Afghan operations against the rebels. These offensives typically were launched after several weeks or months of planning and logistical preparation. They began with an extensive bombardment of the target area over the course of several days, perhaps a week, by fixed-wing aircraft, artillery, helicopters, and missiles. Then mechanized columns of tank and motorized rifle units moved along major roads into mountain valleys, under constant fire support. Soviet units often demonstrated dangerous tactical rigidity, inflexibility, and lack of aggressiveness.

The columns, finding comfort in technical superiority and obsessed with adherence to traditional firepower as the principal supporting means of advance, normally fired to the front and flanks, sometimes at random to suppress suspected mujaheddin positions and to force their advance. The Soviets failed to employ ground probes and tactical reconnaissance, nor did they position security elements to operate on the ridges and high ground, which often closely

DOD Still Media Records Center

Soviet troops return to their BMP-1 mechanized infantry combat vehicles. Early in the war Soviet motorized rifle units restricted their movement to valley floors such as this, refraining from dismounted operations in tougher terrain.

dominated the axis of advance. Accordingly, the Soviets contributed to the uncertainty of their own situation as their columns moved on.[6]

Such maneuver exposed Soviet units to surprise attacks at close quarters by the lightly armed rebels. Slow to react and unable to exploit their heavy direct fires, the Soviet troops were also quite reluctant to dismount and engage in close combat. Soviet motorized rifle units generally restricted their movement to valley floors, showing a reluctance to enter tougher terrain.

Beginning in 1980-81, the Soviets introduced some effective modifications to these offensives. They began to emplace light troops—airborne, air assault, and, sparingly, motorized rifle units—by helicopter along the high ground and in the passes that dominated movement along the axes of advance used by the ground troops. Use of these airmobile elements helped to preempt mujaheddin occupation of key terrain and reduced the number and effectiveness of their attacks on the ground columns. Later, growing use of heliborne elements evolved into a kind of blocking tactic aimed at fixing and destroying the mujaheddin.[7]

Still, the overall ineffectiveness of these conventional offensives is borne out by two significant facts. First, the Soviets had to conduct such operations over and over again in the same areas, even when the mujaheddin suffered considerable casualties.[8] Second, these large offensives received little attention in the Soviet military press; this void in self-analysis is tacit acknowledgement of the indecisiveness of the conventional offensives.

The Soviets' tardiness in implementing effective change does not mean they failed to realize the peculiarities of combat in Afghanistan. In fact, Soviet discussions in their military press of actual unit operations show a rather complete understanding that the specific and unusual characteristics of the Afghan counterinsurgency required correspondingly specific and unique tactical solutions.[9] To be more precise, the Soviets identified seven primary features of counterinsurgency warfare which have a strong influence on the conduct of tactical operations and which elicited specific responses.

The first of these features is a new *appreciation for the influence of terrain.*[10] Soviet doctrine for conventional war, even in a mountainous area, overwhelmingly stresses the destruction of the enemy as the primary goal of armed conflict. Terrain was judged important, but only one of many factors that influence the attainment of this goal. In Afghanistan, however, the Soviets came to realize that terrain—and climate—occupy first place above all other factors in terms of their influence on destroying the enemy. In Afghanistan terrain affected everything in combat: maneuver, effects of weapons, fields of fire and observation, physical readiness, logistics, communications, and the operating characteristics of weapons and equipment.

Mountainous terrain also leads to the compartmentalization of military activity. As described above, the Soviets discovered the futility of maneuvering with large units on valley floors. It became evident that the only way to close with the mujaheddin was to pursue them into the restricted gorges and canyons, through passes, and across ridgelines. This activity required a high level of *decentralization*, because the folds of the terrain naturally divide a large unit into small segments. The emphasis necessarily must be on company, platoon, and even at times squad operations. The important decisions, consequently, are those made by captains, lieutenants, and sergeants.

In such conditions, small units must be able to operate independently, often at a significant distance from their parent battalion or regiment. *Independent operations* by small units moving on separate axes with open flanks and an unsecured rear thus appeared as a second Soviet tactical response to the Afghan insurgency.

Decentralized, independent operations further meant that small units must be more self-supporting.[11] In Afghanistan, a company or platoon engaged with the rebels often was not in visual or radio contact with other Soviet units. In many cases, it would have been pracically impossible to support these engaged units with effective fires from supporting organizations. Accordingly, the Soviet command enhanced their capability for *self-support* through the practice of *attachments* at a very low level. These attachments consisted of sections or squads of engineers, mortarmen, grenadiers, retransmission specialists, and augmentation of radio operators and ground reconnaissance assets.[12] One interesting innovation was the attachment of artillery spotter and

adjustment teams.[13] Soviet doctrine provides for the organization of units with such combined arms attachments, but generally at a higher level or in units that have been assigned a special role, such as advance guard or forward detachment. What was new in Afghanistan was the attachment of these squads and sections on a regular basis to infantry platoons and companies so they did not have to depend on support from a higher level of command.

Another feature of the ground war was the necessity of fighting in *dismounted order* to achieve decisive tactical results. Soviet armored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles often were not able to negotiate the trails leading to mujaheddin positions and unit commanders could not rely on them for supporting fires from their on-board cannons and machineguns—another reason why dismounted attachments of mortars and grenadiers were needed. Thus, combat in the Afghan countryside demanded that Soviet personnel muscle their heavy weapons and ammunition loads into position on foot. This newfound stress on dismounted maneuver constituted a fundamental change from the standard Soviet approach to an infantry attack, wherein the infantrymen ride in their armored vehicles to an attack line quite close to the objective and dismount only for the final assault. In Afghanistan, both approach and assault had to be conducted on foot.

Owing to overwhelming Soviet air superiority and firepower advantages, the mujaheddin conducted most of their operations after dark, a practice that forced the Soviet army itself to increase stress on *night operations*. However, despite the heavy emphasis of Soviet writings and training programs on night operations, it is clear that the mujaheddin ruled the night in Afghanistan.[14] Analysis of the Soviet military press shows that the preponderance of Soviet night operations were carried out by the specially trained light troops mentioned earlier. Even these units, it seems, often ceased movement at night and assumed a stationary defensive posture until morning, unless they were charged with conducting a night ambush or attack.

The last of the seven earmarks of counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan was that the conflict belonged to the *light infantrymen*. The conflict required light infantry skills on both individual and unit levels. The mujaheddin, like all guerrilla forces, constituted a light infantry force. To defeat them in close terrain, the Soviets also needed to be able to fight as light infantry. Thus, the war caused the Soviet army to take a new interest in light infantry skills and tactics.[15]

It is also clear that this kind of war requires very capable unit commanders who can exercise initiative and who possess imagination. These commanders must be able to make quick decisions on their own in the face of unexpected developments, discarding textbook solutions that do not apply. Tactical flexibility, not rigidity, is a prerequisite. Numerous studies by Western analysts have concluded that these are not qualities routinely developed in

Soviet motorized rifle unit commanders, especially at the noncommissioned and junior officer level, the weakest link in the Soviet chain of command.[16]

The Soviet military press also has identified deficiencies in the Soviet tactical military leadership in Afghanistan. The shortcomings most often cited have been lack of initiative, inability to use supporting weapons effectively, lack of trust up and down the chain of command, poor relations between officers and NCOs, and lack of necessary technical skills. The military press also has called for Soviet officers and NCOs to obtain proficiency in certain skills that they are normally not required to possess, such as the ability to operate and do minor repairs on radios, the ability to call for artillery support, the ability to direct fire support from helicopters, and increased familiarity with vehicles and support equipment. These functions are normally performed by specialists, but the Afghan War demanded that commanders and NCOs perform them.[17]

The inability of Soviet commanders to cope with the special characteristics of the light infantry war in Afghanistan is reflected as well in the comments of mujaheddin leaders and other observers. An Afghan army colonel described the Soviets as "oversupervised, lacking initiative, and addicted to cookbook warfare." David Isby, writing in *Jane's Defence Review*, cites reports by eyewitnesses that the Russians were "tactical zeros" and "decidedly third rate."[18]

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn is that the standard Soviet motorized rifle unit and commander were unable to adapt to the tactical situation. The unconventional features of the war, and the nonstandard tactical tasks that had to be performed, simply exceeded the capability of these conventionally oriented and trained units. It is equally clear that these units could not be trained to effective standards in light infantry skills. The quality of the troops and junior commanders which form the backbone of the Soviet army is apparently so low, and their training programs so rigid and conventionally oriented, that these troops have little utility in a counterinsurgency—except in handling the most basic activities, such as static defense of fixed sites.

The Creation of a Soviet Counterinsurgency Force

In response to these serious deficiencies, the Soviet command developed a novel approach, which began to characterize their operations as early as 1983. Motorized rifle units were for the most part withdrawn from direct operations against the mujaheddin, except when the large conventional offensives were conducted. Instead, the motorized rifle divisions were used to defend cities, airports, highway outposts, logistic centers, and garrisons. They accompanied and protected convoys. They were also employed to carry out the Soviet programs of economic warfare, such as burning crops, destroying the rural

irrigation system, bombarding villages, etc. But analysis of Soviet military press notices demonstrates beyond doubt that these units rarely conducted heliborne assaults, raids, ambushes, pursuit, or dismounted night operations against the mujaheddin.

The Soviets turned to their elite units to create what amounted to a direct-action counterinsurgency force. This force was composed of four kinds of units: airborne, air assault, designated reconnaissance, and special operations (*spetsnaz*) units. Although these kinds of units had been involved in the conflict since its start, their number and missions changed over time; from 1983 to the withdrawal of Soviet troops, they bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered most of the casualties. These units numbered from 18,000 to 23,000 soldiers.[19]

Most of these soldiers were in airborne units: approximately 10,000 troops from three airborne divisions (the 104th and 105th Guards Divisions and the 103d Division). The air assault troops, numbering from 5000 to 7000, came from fairly new Soviet organizations, the air assault and airmobile brigades. In the Soviet Union these formations are usually trained for battalion- to division-level deployment into the enemy rear in support of front offensive operations. In Afghanistan, however, they were generally deployed by helicopter, BMD (airborne combat vehicle), or on foot, in battalion, company, and platoon packets in independent operations.[20]

With respect to the use of reconnaissance units in a counterinsurgency role, each motorized rifle division and regiment in the Soviet force structure includes a specially trained reconnaissance battalion and company, respectively. In conventional conditions, these units operate as mounted advance guards and as security detachments to the flanks and rear of the parent organization. Thus, they are accustomed to the kind of decentralized, independent operations seen in Afghanistan. Approximately 5000 reconnaissance troops (*razvedchiki*) were maintained in the country during the war.

The Soviet military press frequently refers to the operations carried out by the airborne, air assault, and reconnaissance units. Quite a bit less is known, however, about the contributions made by spetsnaz troops; it is thought that they were engaged in some limited small-unit combat as well as special operations such as sabotage, deep reconnaissance, espionage, reprisals, and assassinations.[21]

Employment of the Soviet Counterinsurgency Force

Airborne, air assault, and reconnaissance forces were employed in typical light infantry operations: long-range reconnaissance patrolling; ambushes, mostly at night, along infiltration routes; heliborne raids; combat patrolling to clear areas around sensitive installations; support of conventional offensives as described earlier; and heliborne convoy escort and reaction.

In the attack, Soviet light units first conducted very thorough reconnaissance in greater depth and breadth than normally done by Soviet infantry. Once the best approach routes were selected, commanders typically directed simultaneous attack from two or more directions. Great stress was placed on the use of enveloping detachments sent on concealed, round-about routes to attack the objective from the rear. The attacking units were strongly reinforced by attachments. Particularly important were engineer detachments to clear routes of mines and obstacles, mortars—preferred because of their mobility and trajectory—and the new AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers.[22]

Soviet units assumed the defensive in Afghanistan under various conditions.[23] Defensive positions had to be organized on a multilayered, 360-degree basis, providing fall-back positions, intersecting fires, and coverage of all dead spaces by observation, fires, or mines. Early warning was achieved by means of listening posts, dogs, flares, and minefields, but rarely through local patrols.[24]

In general, the counterinsurgency units were far more effective than the motorized rifle troops. Near the border, operations by light troops and spetsnaz, combined with bombing and aerial mining, cramped the ability of the mujaheddin to bring supplies into the country in truck caravans. The rebels were forced to spend more time and effort on their own security.

The Soviets also started ambushing resistance groups. These operations were carried out not by ordinary soldiers but by groups of specially trained troops. In one instance, because a more direct route had been closed, mujaheddin going to the north were taking a longer route through the mountains in an area where the special units were active. In the ensuing Soviet ambush, more than 40 mujaheddin were killed.[25] All in all, the improved performance of the Soviet counterinsurgency forces kept the rebels off balance, restricted their initiative, complicated their resupply, and caused them to be more cautious.

On the other hand, the Soviet elite troops had weaknesses of their own. Soviet literature and mujaheddin reports indicate that they remained quite vulnerable to ambush. Asked how he countered the enemy's action, mujaheddin leader Abdul Haq responded:

> In order to discourage the enemy we simply ambush the ambushers. With reliable information about the time and place of the ambush, we took position before the arrival of the enemy. We carried out five operations of this kind, and each time we killed 10 to 15 Russians, all the elite commandos whom the Russians were not very eager to lose.[26]

Many articles in the Soviet military press lauding the performance of their light units start out by describing how they managed to extricate themselves from rebel ambushes and then drove the rebels off.[27] It also

appears that these units were not able to match the mujaheddin in dismounted tactical mobility, speed, and terrain negotiation. Further, they often did not achieve surprise and they limited themselves by refusing to venture out of range of artillery support. Use of light forces in the conventional offensives did not measurably increase their decisiveness, nor did night patrols lead to a significant reduction in rebel mortar and rocket attacks against fixed sites.

No discussion of the counterinsurgency warfare in Afghanistan would be complete without mention of the Soviet use of helicopters. Like the US Army in Vietnam, the Soviet army discovered in Afghanistan that helicopters are exceptionally well-suited for use in counterinsurgency warfare owing to their range, mobility, armament, and multiple capabilities. Given the decentralization of operations and vast territory to be covered, the Soviets could not have maintained pressure on the mujaheddin without the helicopter. Helicopter employment was the most dynamic feature of Soviet tactical operations during the war. Helicopters provided a mobility of combat power that the rebels in no way could match, enhanced surprise, reduced rebel reaction time, enabled Soviet units to respond to guerrilla threats rapidly, and provided Soviet forces their best means of exercising initiative. Moreover, the low air-defense threat enabled the Soviet command to test its pilots and helicopters thoroughly and allowed them to engage in relatively danger-free tactical trial and error. The experience in helicopter employment obtained in Afghanistan was probably the most important military benefit achieved there by the Soviets.[28]

However, Soviet employment of helicopters also had many negative aspects. Maintenance was poor, and mechanical breakdowns and accidents were frequent. Attack helicopters sometimes attacked designated objectives even when it was clear that no enemy forces were present. Air-ground coordination suffered from imperfect communications, poor target identification, and untimely response.[29]

Moreover, Soviet helicopters remained vulnerable to mujaheddin air defenses—initially heavy machineguns and the SA-7 missile—often because of failure to identify the threat or to take effective evasive action. Hundreds of helicopters were destroyed on the ground and in the air, perhaps as many as 700 through 1985.[30] The introduction of the Stinger missile in the spring of 1987 sharply increased the threat to Soviet aircraft, owing to its superior range and performance. However, the limited number of Stingers, restrictions on reloads, and the uneven territorial distribution of the missiles reduced the effect they might have had.

Conclusions

Overall, the Soviet army in Afghanistan adapted slowly to the unexpected conditions that confronted it. In time, the Soviet command developed a counterinsurgency strategy that included a military component tailored to

the particular conditions of anti-guerrilla warfare in a large, underdeveloped, mountainous region. But neither the counterinsurgency strategy as a whole nor the military response produced decisive results.

At the tactical level, Soviet military performance was subpar. The conventional orientation, tactical rigidity, and generally poor quality of Soviet motorized rifle troops and their commanders prevented them from being used effectively in a direct counterinsurgency role. Although Soviet doctrine describes the functions performed by light infantry troops as legitimate functions for mechanized units, these units could not be converted into light infantry. To speak bluntly, they were not capable of being trained in the skills and to the standard necessary to defeat the mujaheddin. Strangely, however, there are no indications that the Soviets intend to develop and maintain a separate counterinsurgency force. They obviously view counterinsurgency operations as an anomaly not likely to be repeated, and they appear content to rely once again on the use of their elite troops in this role should it be necessary.

Even so, these higher-quality units did not adapt perfectly to the Afghan tactical situation. They were not able to match the mujaheddin in many light infantry skills. They continued to rely overmuch on technical superiority and not enough on tactical superiority. In their defense, however, one must note that the limited number of these units probably precluded them from achieving a decisive victory over the resistance.[31]

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan also demonstrated that there is a wide gap between what is prescribed in Soviet tactical writings and what their units can actually perform, including the elite units. All military units, of course, lack proficiency in certain areas; it is impossible for any unit to be constantly ready for every potential mission. That is, indeed, why units train. What is surprising about the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is the *breadth* and *longevity* of the gap between tactical doctrine and tactical proficiency, particularly in regard to motorized rifle units. Even after years of fighting the mujaheddin, Soviet units continued to fall short of the standards demanded for tactical success. It must be remembered that the rebels also had to maintain tactical proficiency despite losses in manpower and the absence of a formal training system. Why were they able to maintain a high level of tactical performance while the Soviets were not?

There is no reason to believe that this deficiency, an inability to adapt to nonstandard battlefield conditions, is peculiar only to those Soviet units deployed to Afghanistan. In fact, recent articles in the Soviet military press indicate that the Soviet high command has taken note of an endemic, debilitating, parade-ground approach to training, which causes units to tackle all tactical problems in the same way, regardless of complicating conditions.[32] Undoubtedly, analysis of unit performance in Afghanistan is contributing to a fuller Soviet understanding of the nature of this deficiency.

It is clear that the Soviet army is trying to transfer the lessons learned in Afghanistan to the army as a whole, particularly for units training in or expected to operate in mountain theaters. Nevertheless, a close reading of the Soviet literature shows that the conventional context prevails. Dismounted maneuver is still rarely performed by motorized rifle troops. In Soviet exercises, guerrilla groups like the mujaheddin are never played. The enemy is always conventionally armed and disposed. Major air and air-defense operations are conducted by both sides, and nuclear, biological, and chemical conditions are occasionally invoked.[33]

The units that appear to have benefited most from the Afghan War are Soviet special troops; the Soviet military press shows a concerted effort to pass the lessons learned by the engineer, communications, and reconnaissance troops to like units. Some lessons learned, however, are not taking hold in the rest of the Soviet army. There is little evidence, for example, that the experiences of Soviet forces in Afghanistan have led to significant improvements in the exercise of initiative, the decentralization of decisionmaking to lower levels, or the use of imagination in training programs. Frequent articles in the military newspaper *Red Star* and the journal *Military Herald* reflect the alarm felt by many Afghan-veteran officers about the lack of realism and the rigidity they find in the training programs of the units they have joined after leaving Afghanistan. However, the new high-level interest in Soviet training problems mentioned above may mean that the protests of the Soviet veterans of the Afghan War are having an effect.

On the positive side, the Soviet army has undoubtedly benefited and will continue to benefit from its technical and tactical experimentation in Afghanistan with new weapon systems and organizations—including the Mi-24 Hind gunship, the AGS-17 grenade launcher, new types of mines, and the use of air assault units.[34]

All things considered, the Soviet command cannot be much encouraged by the performance of its units in Afghanistan. Over the course of more than nine years, the Soviet army was not able to pacify a single Afghan province on a permanent basis, nor to stop the flow of arms to the rebels. The performance of its motorized rifle units, the foundation of the Soviet force structure, remained consistently low, and that poor performance was matched by the units' leadership. The conclusion is inescapable that given these many revealed deficiencies, the Soviet army is ill-suited for employment in counterinsurgency warfare—and will remain so.

NOTES

1. The Soviet army did, in fact, have to fight two stiff battles in 1980 to subdue mutinies by two Afghan divisions, the 8th Infantry and the 14th Armored divisions (*Afghanistan: A Country Study* [Washington: The American University, Foreign Area Studies, 1986; produced for the US government], p. 306).

2. Ali Jalali, "The Soviet Military Operation in Afghanistan and the Role of Light and Heavy Forces at Tactical and Operational Level," *Report of Proceedings, Light Infantry Conference, 1985* (Seattle: Boeing, 1985), pp. 165-67.

3. Extensive reading of Soviet analyses of local wars clearly reveals the flawed tendency to pay attention only to those features that are applicable to conventional, large-scale warfare. For example, the Soviets have virtually ignored guerrilla tactics in such writings. They noted that American reliance on firepower and technology in Vietnam did not achieve decisive results, yet they themselves made the same mistake in Afghanistan. Few writings in the open Soviet press discuss counterinsurgency warfare in meaningful detail. The prime Soviet text on local wars is I. Shavrov, *Local Wars* (Moscow: Military Press, Ministry of Defense, 1981), and it is fully illustrative of this defect.

4. A major stumbling block to the development of a Soviet counterinsurgency doctrine is the Marxist-Leninist idea that only traditionalist and capitalist regimes will have to deal with insurgencies. The Soviet Union, as the world's most progressive socialist country—so the theory goes—may have to suppress counter-revolutionary "bandits," but a counterinsurgency per se will not occur in a developed socialist regime. Thus, a counterinsurgency doctrine is not needed. Soviet military theoreticians have written sparingly on the subject. One example is Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii's "Battle of the Bedbugs," published in *M. N. Tukhachevskii. Collected Works* (Moscow: Military Press, Ministry of Defense, 1964), pp. 106-08.

5. It should be noted that Soviet military formations also participated in certain aspects of the economic warfare against the mujaheddin and their supporters. Examples of such activity are indiscriminate bombing of rebel population centers by artillery, air, and missiles; mining operations; burning of crops; destruction of the rural irrigation system; and forced resettlement of villagers.

6. Jalali, p. 174.

7. Ibid., 175. Colonel Jalali, a former Afghan army officer and mujaheddin leader, describes how heliborne detachments were "landed deep in the rear and flanks" of mujaheddin areas with a tactical mission to isolate the resistance strongholds, destroy mujaheddin bases, and cut their supply and infiltration routes. These heliborne desants were coordinated with the approach of ground columns.

8. The Panjshir Valley, for example, was the object of at least eight such offensives, yet it remained almost continuously under rebel control. The relatively small size of the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan, the ineffectiveness of the Afghan army and militia, and the indecisive results of the offensives combined to prohibit permanent pacification of strong rebel territories.

9. This article is based on an analysis of more than 60 such articles from a number of different publications. However, primary attention has been given to the Soviet military publication *Military Herald*, because it is generally considered to be the most comprehensive and professional journal of those reasonably available in the West. Most of the sources are Russian-language; citations are in English to aid the reader.

10. G. Shevchuk, "Maneuver in Mountains," *Military Herald* (No. 12, 1985), pp. 29-31; General of the Army I. Tretiak, "Organization and Conduct of Offensive Battle in Mountain-Taiga Terrain," *Military History Journal* (No. 7, 1980), pp. 42- 49; General-Lieutenant V. Kozhbakhteev, "Development of Combat Tactics in Forested-Mountain Terrain," *Military History Journal* (No. 2, 1981), pp. 36-37.

11. The Soviet term used to denote self-sustainment and self-support is *samostoyatel'nost*, meaning, in general, independence.

12. N. Stepanov, "Grenadiers in the Mountains," *Military Herald* (No. 9, 1985), p. 23; A. Fel'dt, "Motorized Rifle Troops Attack in the Mountains," *Military Herald* (No. 11, 1985), pp. 25-28; General of the Army Yu. Maximov, "Mountain Training," *Soviet Military Review* (No. 12, 1984), p. 6.

13. Yu. Churkin, "Come up on the Air," *Military Herald* (No. 5, 1988), p. 76; V. Kurochkin, "In the Green Zone," *Military Herald* (No. 3, 1988), p. 36; Maximov, p. 7.

14. Soviet units supposedly conduct 30 percent of their field training at night. However, in Afghanistan the common practice of motorized rifle troops was to take shelter at night in prepared garrisons and strongpoints. Virtually every account of a Soviet night operation in Afghanistan, as reported in *Military Herald* from 1983 to 1988, involved airborne or air assault troops, not motorized rifle units. Accounts of motorized rifle units conducting night operations in mountains appear almost exclusively in connection with training exercises in the USSR.

15. What kind of light infantry skills are needed? The most important are rapid and quiet negotiation of difficult terrain, stealth, use of the terrain for protection and concealment, individual field-craft, tracking, expert marksmanship, skillful siting of heavy weapons, controlled expenditure of ammunition, technical skill with mountain gear, coordinated dismounted maneuver by individuals and units, and a high level of physical fitness.

16. In regard to the question of preparing NCOs for service in Afghanistan, a report in *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 307, indicates that some NCOs were sent to a training division for six months before being posted to Afghanistan. In addition, a large number of the NCOs in the occupation force, plus some enlisted men, were trained in Ashkabad in the Turkestan Military District before assignment.

17. See, for example, N. Zaitsevskii, "Not by the Numbers, but with Imagination," *Military Herald* (No. 4, 1986), pp. 28-29; R. Aushev, "Without Communications, Reliable Command and Control Is Not

Possible," *Military Herald* (No. 8, 1986), pp. 79-81; N. Goryachev, "Don't Chew Out Sergeants, Teach Them," *Military Herald* (No. 5, 1988), pp. 33-35; Kurochkin, p. 36; Maximov, pp. 7-8.

18. The Afghan colonel is quoted in Joseph J. Collins, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1986), p. 149; for the David C. Isby citations, see his article "Soviet Tactics in the War in Afghanistan," *Jane's Defence Review*, 4 (No. 7, 1983), 689.

19. Steve Sego, "US Experts Discuss Soviet Army in Afghanistan," *Radio Liberty Report 302/87*, 24 July 1987.

20. Sometimes these units deployed directly from bases in the Soviet Union into immediate action in Afghanistan (David C. Isby, "Soviet Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, 1979-1985," *Report of Proceedings, Light Infantry Conference, 1985* [Seattle: Boeing, 1985], p. 187).

21. Ibid., pp. 185, 187.

22. See, for example, C. Korobka, "Reconnaissance in Mountains," *Military Herald* (No. 10, 1985), pp. 13-15; G. Ivanov, "Reconnaissance of a Mountain Pass," *Military Herald* (No. 1, 1985), pp. 25-27; M. Shepilov, "In a Mobile Security Detachment," *Military Herald* (No. 3, 1986), pp. 34-36. Engineers accompanied the main attack force as well as recon and security detachments, and they sometimes were the first to land in heliborne desants in order to clear the landing zones of mines. With regard to the AGS-17, this new weapon exhibited outstanding utility in the mountains because of its range (beyond 1000 meters), high rate of fire, potent explosive force (30mm grenade from a 30-round drum), and trajectory, which permitted it to be fired into dead spaces.

23. The defensive was assumed when Soviet units established a blocking position, took up a night defensive position, preemptively occupied dominating terrain, defended key facilities through a system of strongpoints, or halted for any lengthy period of time.

24. It has not been reported that the Soviet army in Afghanistan used remote sensors for early warning such as were used by US forces in Vietnam. The lack of aggressive patrolling at night is another indication that Soviet units generally ceded control of the night to the mujaheddin; it is also an indication of the Soviets' absence of proficiency in this basic dismounted infantry skill.

25. Isby, "Soviet Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan," p. 189. See also, Charles Dunbar, "Afghanistan in 1986: The Balance Endures," *Asian Survey*, 27 (February 1987), 132-33.

26. Isby, "Soviet Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan," p. 189.

27. For example: Yu. Konobritskii, "Sergeants—Reliable Assistants to Officers," *Military Herald* (No. 9, 1985), p. 30; Yu. Protasov, "Battalion Commander Litenov," *Military Herald* (No. 8, 1985), p. 39; Yu. Protasov, "That is the Very Person," *Military Herald* (No. 7, 1985), p. 53; N. Kravchenko, "On Internationalist Duty," *Military Herald* (No. 4, 1985), p. 81.

28. The number of helicopters deployed in Afghanistan ranged over time from 500 to 650, with approximately 250 of these being the heavily armored Mi-24 Hind gunship. Other helicopters used by the Soviets included the Mi-4 Hound, Mi-6 Hip, Mi-8 Hook. Soviet helicopter operations during the war fell into six main categories: logistical support and resupply (consuming the bulk of the sorties), reconnaissance, convoy escort, tactical lift, medevac, and fire support.

29. Isby, "Soviet Tactics," p. 683; "Firing on Abandoned Trenches," *Red Star*, 16 July 1982.

30. Jalali, p. 167, cites 700 as the number of aircraft losses by 1985. Collins, p. 147, cites 600 by that time.

31. Could the Soviet elite units have increased their effectiveness by adopting a "pure" guerrilla approach? Tactically, of course, the light infantry style practiced by the Soviet counterinsurgency force did resemble guerrilla tactics to a certain degree. However, the limited numbers of the Soviet counterinsurgency troops (18,000 to 23,000, compared to 80,000 mujaheddin), the vast expanse of territory, and the inability of Soviet units for security reasons (i.e. the hostility of the populace) to disperse and base out of the countryside eliminated this option.

32. On 7 January 1988, the editors of *Red Star*, the newspaper of the Soviet armed forces, opened a dialogue on the question of the military readiness of the forces. They invited their readership to correspond with the newspaper in order to identify deficiencies in training programs and tactics and to share ideas on the solutions to these problems. The introductory article for this dialogue, "Revival (of Tactics) as Art," was written by General-Lieutenant B. Khazikov, Deputy Chief of the Main Administration of Combat Training of the Ground Forces. This article was quite pointed in its criticism of unimaginative training, slavish adherence to textbook tactics, and incompetent commanders.

33. A good example of Soviet adaptation of lessons learned in Afghanistan to a conventional context was the exercise, *Kavkaz* (Caucasus) 85, as described in Yu. Protasov, "In a Tactical Air Desant," *Military Herald* (No. 11, 1985), pp. 10-14; Jalali, p. 174.

34. *Afghanistan: A Country Study*, p. 315; Collins, p. 147; J. Bruce Amstutz, *Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Occupation* (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1986), p. 172. In addition to those cited in the text, the Soviets also fielded or tested many other items in Afghanistan including chemical weapons, fuel-air explosives, the Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft, the BMP-2 infantry combat vehicle, the new AK-74 rifle, a new 81mm mortar, and liquid-pressure-sensitive mines.

Affirmative Action and Combat Exclusion: Gender Roles in the US Army

RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR.

"Come now, and let us reason together."
—Isaiah 1:18

The issue of women in combat, thought to be resolved by the demise of the Equal Rights Amendment and the conservatism of successive presidential administrations in this decade, is riding the crest of continuously evolving social mores and changing views of sexual politics. Changes in definitions of sex roles and the removal of many traditional barriers to women in the US Army and the other military services insures that this emotional and confrontational issue will not go away soon.

This article contrasts the Army's commitment to affirmative action with the exclusion of women from combat roles. Current policies may provide grounds for challenges to the combat exclusion rule, while some evidence suggests that combat readiness and full gender integration may not be fully compatible goals. A reassessment of current policies may be needed to clarify the relationship between the twin priorities of maximum combat readiness and maximum opportunity for women. The answers to these and related questions may profoundly affect not only the long-term nature of military service in the United States, but the civil-military relationship itself.

Current Policy

Current Army assignment policies for women are based on Title 10 of the US Code, Section 3012, which gives the Secretary of the Army the authority to set personnel assignment and utilization policies for all soldiers.

Unlike the Navy and Air Force, there are no statutory restrictions that prohibit the employment of female soldiers in combat. However, in an effort to ensure a measure of consistency with sister services, Army assignment policies parallel those in the rest of the Department of Defense by restricting women from serving in positions requiring routine exposure to direct combat.[1]

Current policies concerning women in the Army are a product of the rapid expansion of women in the force beginning in the early 1970s. Two significant events were primarily responsible. The first was congressional approval of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in March 1972. The second was the end of the draft in 1973, which caused an immediate decline in the number of qualified males joining the force.[2] Though ratification of the ERA ultimately foundered,[3] legislation was passed in 1975 opening the service academies to women, and soon after the Women's Army Corps was disestablished and women were integrated into male promotion lists.[4]

In 1977 the Secretary of the Army issued a combat exclusion policy prohibiting assignment of women to the combat arms. Problems were quickly identified, since women in some other specialties often collocated with combat units and were exposed to virtually identical measures of risk:

> The rapid growth of women in the Army took place without adequate planning and analysis. . . . There was no established policy of putting the right soldiers in the right jobs based on physical capacity to meet the job requirements. Also, the Army had not made a thorough analysis of where women should serve on the battlefield.[5]

In May 1981 the Army implemented a temporary leveling-off of female accessions at 65,000—the so-called "Woman Pause"—"to permit a review of policies and programs and to determine the effect use of women may have on combat effectiveness and force readiness."[6] A policy review group was established to study these issues. Its report was issued on 12 November 1982, establishing the Direct Combat Probability Coding system that is still in use. Many of the assumptions and conclusions[7] outlined in the 1982 Women in the Army Policy Review continue to guide Army policy today.

Captain Richard D. Hooker, Jr., is an instructor in the Social Sciences Department at the US Military Academy. Following graduation from the Academy in 1981, he was assigned to the 82d Airborne Division and participated in the Grenada operation in 1983. He later commanded Company C (Pathfinder/Airborne), 509th Parachute Infantry, at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Captain Hooker has M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia. His article "NATO's Northern Flank: A Critique of the Maritime Strategy," appeared in the June 1989 issue of *Parameters*.

US Army policy in 1989 is that "women will be assigned in all skills and positions except those which, by doctrine, mission, duties of the job, or battlefield location involve the highest probability of direct combat with enemy forces."[8] Direct Combat Probability Coding (DCPC) is the mechanism used to assess and identify those positions closed to women. The DCPC process assigns each position in the Army a ranking from P1 to P7 based on the probability of *routine* engagement in direct combat. Only those positions coded P1 are closed to women. This policy, which is periodically reviewed and updated,[9] is referred to informally as the "combat exclusion" rule. In 1988 the DCPC process was amplified through the "risk rule":

> The risk rule states that *noncombat* units should be open to women unless the risk of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture is equal to or greater than that experienced by associated *combat* units in the same theater of operations.[10]

At the present time, approximately 750,000 positions in the Total Army[11] can be filled by either sex.[12] Eighty-seven percent of enlisted military occupational specialties (MOSs), 91 percent of warrant officer positions, and 96 percent of officer specialties are open to women.[13] As of the end of the third quarter of FY 1989, females comprise 11 percent of the active force, filling 11,110 officer positions out of 91,443 overall, 435 warrant officer positions out of 14,971, and 72,389 enlisted positions out of 654,537.[14] Today, women are represented in every career management field except infantry, armor, and special operations.

The promulgation of a unified promotion system has been accompanied since its inception by an affirmative action program designed to compensate for the effects of "past personal and institutional discrimination" which may have operated to the disadvantage of female soldiers. This program encompasses minority as well as female-specific promotion and assignment issues. It is intended to counteract the effects of latent or residual discrimination by ensuring that female soldiers enjoy promotion and assignment potential commensurate with their representation in the force. Board instructions include the following guidance to panel members:

> [Discrimination] may manifest itself in disproportionately lower evaluation reports, assignments of lesser importance or responsibility, etc. Take these factors into consideration in evaluating these [soldiers'] potential to make continued significant contributions to the Army. . . . The goal is to achieve a percentage of minority and female selections not less than the selection rate for the number of [soldiers] in the promotion zone (first time considered category) . . . . [P]rior to adjournment, the board must review the extent to which it met this goal and explain reasons for any failure to meet this goal in the report of [soldiers] recommended for promotion.[15]

But what exactly is meant by "affirmative action"? The concept is both an outgrowth and a response to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. Affirmative action goes well beyond the establishment of equality of opportunity to insure equality of *result*. In the interest of vigorously moving to correct past injustices, the federal government in general and the armed forces in particular have embraced the *preferment* of insular groups which in the past have suffered from institutional discrimination.[16]

As a group, women in the Army have enjoyed greater promotion success than men for almost a decade.[17] Individually, some less-well-qualified candidates have inevitably been selected for promotion and command—an unavoidable price, perhaps, of a necessary and just commitment to the achievement of parity, but one with unpleasant side-effects just the same. It is this phenomenon that gives rise to the charge of reverse discrimination, most keenly felt by individuals who believe they possess equal or superior qualifications but nevertheless lose out to female or minority peers for promotion or command selection. Although personnel managers avoid using the term "quota" in favor of "goal" or "objective," board results consistently confirm that promotion rates for women meet or exceed the targets set by Department of the Army.[18] At least from an institutional perspective, the Army has lived up to its promise to provide equal promotion opportunities for women by implementing an aggressive and comprehensive affirmative action agenda.

Affirmative action has generated a momentum all its own. While some advocates are critical of policies that inhibit career opportunities for women in *any* way, expansion of career fields and access to previously closed opportunities and positions in the last decade has been impressive by any standard. Few Western military establishments come close to matching the level of participation of American women in the armed forces, as the figures cited above demonstrate. Pressures continue to build, nevertheless, for realization of a gender-neutral Army in the near future.

Judicial Intervention

The courts have led the way in recasting traditional approaches to employment of women in the Army. Case law that arose in the 1970s in the areas of equal protection and gender discrimination provided much of the language and rationale later used to advance the cause of expanded participation for women in the military. It was only in 1971 that the Supreme Court for the first time invalidated a state law on grounds of sex discrimination.[19] In this early phase, gender discrimination cases employed a relatively lenient standard of review. A "rationality" test was made to determine whether the statute in question had been applied in an "arbitrary or irrational" manner. If a reasonable relationship could be demonstrated between a state interest and the statute intended to effect it, intervention by the federal courts was unlikely.

> The two sexes are not fungible. . . . [I]t is only the "invidious discrimination" or the classification which is "patently arbitrary [and] utterly lacking in rational justification" which is barred by either the "due process" or "equal protection" clauses.[20]

In *Frontiero* v. *Richardson*,[21] a landmark eight-to-one ruling with implications that ranged far outside its immediate military compass, the Supreme Court invalidated federal statutes allowing married Air Force males to draw quarters allowances for their wives but requiring service females to prove dependency on the part of their husbands. Although the Court in *Frontiero* narrowly avoided granting "suspect" classification to gender discrimination cases (which would have justified the highest and most searching review[22]), the legal status of military women as equal partners to their male counterparts was firmly established.

Frontiero was quickly followed in 1974 by a series of class action suits filed in California challenging all-male policies at the service academies.[23] Charging sex discrimination and denial of equal protection of the laws by preventing access for women to training, educational and career opportunities in the military, the plaintiffs (the aspiring candidates were joined in the action by their congressmen) sued to open the Naval and Air Force Academies to women the following year.[24] The case was decided against the plaintiffs in the US District Court for the District of Columbia in June 1974, but moved on appeal to the US Circuit Court of Appeals.

The appellate court moved slowly, probably in the knowledge that legislation was brewing in the Congress which could decide the issue without embroiling the courts in such a heavily political matter. Despite Department of Defense testimony strongly opposing the proposed legislation,[25] resolutions in the House and Senate calling for open admission to the academies passed easily. On 8 October 1975, President Ford signed Public Law 94-106, mooting the legal challenges still pending in the courts. The following July, women for the first time joined the entering classes at the Air Force, Naval, and Military Academies.

As if to further demonstrate its commitment to the principles of affirmative action for women in the military, the Court in 1975 upheld a federal statute that allowed female naval officers twice passed over for promotion to remain on active duty through the 13th year of service. Male officers under the same conditions were involuntarily released from service following the second nonselection for promotion.[26] Although patently establishing a different standard for women in the Navy, the Court felt strongly that service women were operating under reduced opportunities for promotion and that judicial intervention was needed to correct what it saw as inherently biased personnel policies.

The mid-1970s saw the Court move toward a more stringent standard of review with *Craig* v. *Boren*.[27] Though the case did not arise in a military context (at issue were Oklahoma statutes governing legal drinking ages for 3.2 beer), *Craig* raised the threshold of acceptable government action in gender-related cases by requiring the government to prove a *substantial* relationship to an *important* state interest to justify a gender classification—a much more difficult and exacting task for legislators and policymakers.[28] Henceforth, a *reasonable* connection between means and ends would not suffice. Court deference to congressional and presidential autonomy in areas relating to the military began to decline. Throughout this period and in the years since, federal courts in a series of decisions continued to broaden the rights of women in the military, often setting aside (although not completely abandoning) the traditional deference to Congress and the Executive Branch in areas of military policy.[29]

In *Crawford* v. *Cushman*[30] the courts held that substantive constitutional claims against the military were justiciable and struck down mandatory discharge regulations for pregnancy. *Owens* et al. v. *Brown*[31] eliminated blanket restrictions against sea duty for women in the Navy. In *Dillard* v. *Brown* et al.[32] challenges to regulations governing sole parents in the service were ruled reviewable by the courts. And as recently as 1986, the courts in *Hill* v. *Berkman* et al. asserted the right of the judiciary to exercise "jurisdiction to review the classification of a position as combat or combat-supported."[33] Where earlier government claims that pregnancy, sole parent status, and other similar factors degraded readiness had been accepted as "rational," the courts now moved boldly to substitute their own judgment in determining the effects of gender-related phenomena on military efficiency.

Against this backdrop, *Rostker* v. *Goldberg*[34] surfaced in the federal courts. The case involved a 14th Amendment equal protection challenge to selective service legislation exempting females from registration for the draft. Originally introduced in 1968 by males opposed to the draft, the issue had been rejected by the courts 11 times.[35] Goldberg's challenge had languished in the courts since 1973 owing to the end of the draft and draft registration in the Ford Administration, only to be resurrected by Carter's call for registration. On 18 July 1980, the Third US Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Goldberg's arguments and invalidated federal draft registration, scheduled to begin days later. However, the court did not order the government to amend its registration policy to include women as a remedy. Instead, it ordered cancellation of registration for both sexes![36]

Rostker moved quickly to the Supreme Court following an injunction blocking the lower court's ruling. Some felt that the creation of a gender-neutral military establishment was imminent. One Carter official testified before the Congress that he saw no more difference between men and women in terms of military service than he did between blue-eyed and brown-eyed people.[37]

Drawing back from the precipice opening before it, the Court accepted the contention of the Congress that female registration was unnecessary as long as the purpose of the draft was to create a pool of combatants:

> [Congress] determined that any future draft . . . would be characterized by a need for combat troops. [The] purpose of registration, therefore, was to prepare for a draft of *combat troops*. Women as a group, however, are not eligible for combat.[38]

Citing Congress's greater expertise in matters of national defense as well as the government's compelling interest in raising and supporting armies, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs in upholding the constitutionality of female exemption from registration and the draft. At this critical juncture, deference to Congress returned as a guide to judicial resolution of a crucial and controversial civil-military issue.

How can we interpret these seemingly contradictory signals from the courts? A steady succession of court victories has validated the transfer of private-sector women's rights into the military sphere. Many barriers long thought to be relevant to the efficiency and readiness of the armed forces have fallen or are under increasingly heavy challenge through direct or indirect judicial intervention.[39] For the fundamental issues of direct participation of women in combat and registration and conscription of women, the courts have continued to defer to the legislative and executive branches as the ultimate guardians of the war-making power. Yet even here the courts have asserted their right to review and, ultimately, to intervene.

Normative Approaches

Few issues in the areas of civil rights and civil-military relations are as value-laden or as controversial as those involving the role of women in the armed forces. Advocates on both sides find it difficult to address these issues calmly and without emotion. Nevertheless, objectivity and balance are needed to maintain an appropriate perspective on this most difficult of issues. What are the dominant arguments defining the continuum of debate on gender roles in the US Army and in the military as a whole?

Proponents of a gender-neutral military establishment envision the participation of women in all phases of military life, to include membership in and command of "combat" organizations such as maneuver battalions and brigades, naval warships, and fighter and bomber squadrons. They rely heavily on legal arguments borrowed from the civil rights and feminist movements to attack gender distinctions as inherently discriminatory or violative of fundamental constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. One central tenet is lack of opportunity for promotion to the highest grades, traditionally reserved for officers possessing combat specialties. Another is a



USMA

In the summer of 1989 Cadet Kristin Baker became the first woman to be named First Captain at West Point, famed for its production of combat leaders.

declining pool of eligible male volunteers, which can be offset by recruiting larger numbers of females into previously closed specialties.

Because expanded roles for women in the military have been accompanied by defensive weapons training as well as doctrinal requirements for transient exposure in forward areas, it is often argued that traditional distinctions between combat and non-combat or combat support roles have become blurred or are no longer meaningful. Technological advances in nuclear and conventional weaponry, accompanied by a proliferation of rear area threats, buttress this claim. Integrated military training in precommissioning schools, in officer and enlisted initial entry or basic courses, and in many service schools is often cited as proof that no practical distinctions exist between male and female performance in basic combat tasks.

Although these individuals and organizations do not always claim to represent the views of the majority of women in the United States, they insist that the right of *individual* women to pursue fulfilling and rewarding careers in the military cannot be abridged by "traditional" views of sexual roles which

overstate sex differences and devalue female strengths and capabilities. Differences in physical capacity or behavior patterns are believed to be largely irrelevant or distorted by bias in the structure of test instruments or interpretation of test data.[40] Sexual issues[41] that do not lend themselves easily to this interpretation can be solved, it is argued, by the application of better, more equitable leadership and training programs.[42] Finally, advocates for gender neutrality in the military posit an irrebuttable presumption that opposition to their views is proof of sexual bias.[43] Thus they can frequently seize the moral high ground and force their opponents to respond reactively and defensively.

It is important to note that this perspective is not confined to fringe elements or to small but vocal groups operating on the periphery of the policy-making apparatus. Many women (and not a few men) in each service support a more gender-neutral approach, a point of view that tends to dominate service literature on the subject.[44] Their views enjoy widespread currency and support in the academic, media, and legal communities. This movement is no mere exercise in advocacy. It represents a powerful and broad-based constituency with considerable prospects for eventual implementation of its views.

Opponents of combat roles for women focus on two essential themes. The first is the effect on readiness and efficiency of sexually integrated combat units and the impact of a female presence in the "fighting" components. The second is the social impact of female mass casualties which would surely follow commitment of a fully integrated military force to combat under modern conditions.[45]

For "traditionalists," the argument that physical, psychological, or social/cultural differences are irrelevant to military efficiency is risible. They cite medical evidence that documents male advantages in upper body strength, cardiovascular capacity, lean muscle mass, and leg strength to demonstrate significant differences in physical capacity.[46] Physiological research suggesting a higher incidence of injury in training for women augments this thesis.[47] Emphasis on the *aggregate* effect of women in the force is stressed, for while the physical capacity of individual females may equal or exceed that of the male mean, they are sparsely represented among the population. Reduced physical capacity, primarily a factor in tasks requiring heavy lifting or stamina, is predictable when females are compared to males according to this view.

For this school, psychological, social, and cultural factors are inextricably embedded in the physical differences between the sexes. They are much harder to quantify, but it is argued that their influence is nonetheless profound. While sexual roles have been greatly redefined in the last 25 years, sexual role differentiation remains central to our way of life. Combat exclusion proponents insist that sexual behavior traits, whether genetic (inherited) or environmental (learned), cannot be wished away. Their potential impact on the performance of combat units must be factored into the equation.

Crime statistics are often used to demonstrate that female participation in violent crime is dwarfed by that of males—implying much higher levels of aggression for men. Biomedical and genetic research supports the hypothesis that sex role characteristics are by no means purely environmental or social/cultural products.[48] These and other studies are believed to complement what is perhaps the most strongly held normative assumption of all: that in the aggregate, females lack the aggressiveness and psychological resistance to combat-generated stress of males and are therefore less suited for the rigors and demands of extended combat.

An important factor, not to be overlooked according to advocates of more traditional roles for female soldiers, is the effect of female presence on the fragile psychological basis that is the foundation of cohesion and esprit in traditionally all-male combat units. Thus it is argued that sexual integration of these units, even with females screened for physical capacity, would destroy or impair fighting efficiency by introducing elements such as protectiveness, sexual attraction, social role inversion, and leader/follower conflict based on gender stereotypes, among others.[49]

While this assumption is dismissed by combat exclusion opponents as sexist, or at most curable with good leadership and proper training, it is frequently asserted by combat veterans familiar with the unique psychological stresses and demands of the battlefield.[50] They insist that the psychological "chemistry" of combat units is regulated and defined by adherence to and reinforcement of the traditional sex roles of warrior and protector. To dilute this crucial but delicate balance by adding females merely to promote feminist values of full equality—values that do not reflect the aspirations of women as a group—would destroy the sexual identity that lies at the root of the combat ethos.

Observations

Affirmative action in its broadest sense commits the armed forces to policies that ultimately collide with the combat exclusion rule. Because no official attempt is made to articulate the basis for excluding women from combat beyond vague references to "the implied will of Congress," it is difficult from an institutional perspective to mount a reasoned defense against those who move for full sexual integration of the military. Indeed, evolving policies on women in the Army already embrace most of the arguments of those who advocate a gender-neutral force.

For example, current policy does not restrict females from any career field or position because of physical requirements. Although the 1982 Policy Review recommended "matching the soldier to the job" on a gender-neutral basis using physical demands analysis during medical screening, such testing

is conducted on an "advisory" basis only—leaving final determination of acceptability to recruiters already pressed to fill recruiting quotas:[51]

> [Physical capacity] testing is done at the MEPS (Military Entrance and Processing Station) and we don't even get involved. The same test is given regardless of the MOS . . . [and] in two years I've never had a recommendation for a rejection yet. The bottom line is, if they have the minimum smarts and can pass the physical, I sign them up. That's what I get paid for.[52]

In 1976, the General Accounting Office notified Congress of emerging concerns that women were being assigned to positions "without regard to their ability to satisfy the specialties' strength, stamina, and operational requirements."[53] Company-grade commanders of integrated units report identical problems in the force today—13 years later:[54]

> Although I had upwards of seventy women in my unit I could not employ many in the MOSs they held due to their inability to perform the heavy physical tasks required. So I used them in headquarters or administrative jobs.... Complaining to higher headquarters wasn't really an option. These things were considered "leadership" problems.[55]

Assignment of female soldiers without regard to their physical ability to do the job can only degrade unit readiness and damage both self-esteem and successful integration of the female soldiers affected.

Current policy also admits of no potential impact on readiness or efficiency because of other gender-related factors. Of 19 areas identified as possible areas of concern, only pregnancy made the cut as a female-specific issue. The rest, which included fraternization, assignment and management of military couples, sole parenting, sexual harassment, professional development, attrition and retention, and privacy and field hygiene issues, among others, were classified as "institutional" matters and referred to appropriate Army staff agencies for resolution.[56] In short, they were dismissed as having

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Expanded opportunities for women have enhanced the quality of the service, binding it closer to the people and society it serves. The contributions and professional dedication of female soldiers have made sex-based distinctions in many areas unsustainable....

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little relevance to the formulation of over-arching policies governing utilization of women in the Army.

It would be unfair as well as inaccurate to say that all of these factors pose insurmountable problems that cannot be coped with in many, if not most, unit environments. It is just as inaccurate, however, to say that they are irrelevant to combat readiness and efficiency. Perhaps no bright line exists to show where fairness and equity should give way to prudence and necessity. Still, the question must be asked—and, more important, answered.

Conclusions

In the military as elsewhere, resolution of completing claims involving constitutionally protected rights is an exercise in line-drawing. Here the first imperative for any armed force—the maximum possible level of combat readiness and efficiency—stands in potential conflict with bona fide institutional desires for equal opportunity. Evolving policies have predictably attempted to define these twin imperatives as mutually supportive, not mutually exclusive. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the US Army has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to the fullest possible range of opportunities for women in the force. Yet nagging contradictions persist.

If, for example, it is the implied will of Congress that women not serve in direct combat, then doctrinal proliferation of females in forward areas[57] in the absence of a clear delineation between combat roles and support roles confuses the issue. Congress and the courts may find it impossible to sustain what may *appear* to be an increasingly artificial distinction. Risk of death or capture is, after all, a function of position on the battlefield as well as unit mission.

Despite judicial support for ever-broadening female participation in the military, a healthy deference to the leading role of the executive and legislative in military matters still exists. By dismissing most gender-related factors as irrelevant to military efficiency, defense policymakers have reduced

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. . . Yet sexual differentiation remains a fact of life. The differences between men and women can be muted and even exploited to enhance military performance—to a point. It is dangerous to assume, however, that distinctions rooted in gender are meaningless on the battlefield.

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the arguments against total gender-neutrality to one: popular opinion. As the record shows, popular opinion often carries little weight with federal judges concerned to protect individual freedom and opportunity. There must be substance to the combat exclusion rule or it will surely fall.

The organizational structure of military units is highly flexible and can adapt to many of the changes that necessarily accompany the expansion of women in the Army. This should not be confused with a priori assumptions equating equal opportunity with gender-irrelevancy in terms of battlefield performance. The price of error, however well-intentioned, could be fatal.[58]

Expanded opportunities for women have enhanced the quality of the service, binding it closer to the lives of the people and aspirations of the society it serves. The contributions and professional dedication of female soldiers serving throughout the force now make sex-based distinctions in many areas unsustainable. Many barriers have fallen, revealed as discriminatory obstacles without a rational basis. To the extent that sexual integration and overall combat efficiency are found to be in harmony, there can be little excuse for restricting female participation.

Sexual differentiation nevertheless remains a fact of life. The differences between men and women can be muted, compensated for, and even exploited to enhance military performance—up to a point. It is dangerous to assume, however, that physiological, psychological, cultural, and social distinctions rooted in gender are meaningless on the battlefield.

There is a substantive and important difference between those units whose primary purpose is direct, sustained ground combat and those which support them. In combat, ground maneuver units will continue to suffer the heaviest casualties, place the heaviest demands on the physical abilities of soldiers, and endure the highest levels of psychological trauma and stress. At the sharp end of the force, sexual differentiation may matter very much indeed. The combat exclusion rule reflects this basic premise as a matter of policy. Without a clear articulation of its basis in logic and fact, a task of important and immediate consequence, a gender-neutral Army could be imminent.

NOTES

1. Army policies are, however, more liberal in permitting women to serve in combat zones and forward areas of the battlefield. Information paper provided by representatives of the Human Resources Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 10 March 1989, hereinafter cited as "HRD/ODCSPER."

2. In the decade of the 1970s the number of women in the American military increased by 350 percent. Jean Yarbrough, "The Feminist Mistake: Sexual Equality and the Decline of the American Military," *Policy Review* (Summer 1985), 48.

3. Despite a congressional extension of the ratification deadline, the amendment fell three states short of ratification. See Jo Freeman, "Women and Public Policy: An Overview," in *Women, Power and Policy*, ed. Ellen Boneparth (New York: Pergamon, 1982), p. 55.

4. Jeanne Holm, *Women In the Military* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 276.

5. Discussion paper, "Assimilation of Women in the Army: Problems and Lessons Learned," 17 February 1988, HRD/ODCSPER.

6. HQDA Letter 616-81-1, Office of the Adjutant General, Subject: "Women in the Army Policy Review," dated 11 May 1981.

7. A significant exception is the Review Group's recommendation that "all soldiers [be] matched to their job through demonstrated physical capability at least equivalent to that required of the job" through gender-neutral physical demand analysis (also known as MEPSCAT) administered at the reception station. See US Department of the Army, *Women in the Army Policy Review*, ODCSPER, 12 November 1982, p. 5-6 (hereinafter cited as *WITA Policy Review*). MEPSCAT evaluation is conducted as an "advisory" exercise only. In practice it is not used solely to deny a recruit entrance into a career management field for which he or she is otherwise fully qualified.

8. Ibid.

9. The latest such review, a Secretary of Defense-directed study of women in the military released in January 1988, approved the opening of a further 11,138 positions to both male and female soldiers on a gender-neutral basis. Tom O'Brien, "New Jobs Open to Women," *Soldiers*, February 1989, p. 10.

10. Emphasis in the original. *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress On the 1990/1991 Biennial Budget* (Washington: GPO, 9 January 1989), p. 104.

11. "Total Force" includes the Army Reserve and National Guard units and positions as well as the active force.

12. O'Brien, p. 10.

13. Ibid.

14. Data provided by Major Karen Habitzreuther, Women in the Army Policy Action Officer, HRD/ODCSPER, 29 September 1989.

15. Representative sample of guidance for Army promotion boards, provided by representatives of Promotions Branch, US Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), ODCSPER, March 1989.

16. Henry J. Abraham, *Freedom and the Court*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), p. 517.

17. Carolyn H. Becraft, "Personnel Puzzle," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1989, p. 44.

18. Female representation in grades above 07 remains very limited due to the dominance of the combat arms at those levels and because expansion of female soldiers throughout the rest of the force is still a relatively recent phenomenon.

19. *Reed* v. *Reed*, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

20. *Gutierrez* v. *Laird*, 346 F. Supp. 289 (1972).

21. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).

22. To date, suspect classification remains solely reserved for cases involving alienage or race. In practical terms, governmental action imposing important distinctions between identifiable groups can be "fatally" compromised by the heightened standard of judicial review applied to suspect classifications. See Gerald Gunther, *Individual Rights in Constitutional Law*, 4th ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1985), p. 254.

23. *Edwards* et al. v. *Schlesinger*, 377 F. Supp. 1091 (1974) and *Waldie* et al. v. *Schlesinger*, 377 F. Supp. 1091 (1974).

24. Albert P. Clark, "Women At the Service Academies and Combat Leadership," *Strategic Review*, 5 (Fall 1977), 66.

25. A high percentage of academy graduates were commissioned into naval warfare specialties, combat flying positions, and maneuver combat arms closed to women. Clark, p. 67.

26. *Schlesinger* v. *Ballard*, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).

27. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

28. Abraham, p. 507.

29. See Yarbrough, p. 48.

30. 531 F. 2d 1114 (1976).

31. 455 F. Supp. 291 (1978).

32. 625 F. 2d 316 (1981).

33. 635 F. Supp 1228 (1986).

34. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

35. Holm, p. 373.

36. Registration had been revived as part of the government's reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan and was to begin in a matter of days. Interestingly, the Carter Administration had vigorously opposed congressional initiatives to resurrect registration only the year before. Holm, p. 348.

37. Yarbrough, p. 49.

38. Emphasis in the original. Mr. Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority, cited in Gunther, p. 321.

39. In some cases policies have been changed through statute or by executive decree in anticipation of their eventual invalidation by the courts. Previous restrictive policies in areas such as pregnancy, fraternization, sole parenting, commissioning programs, promotion and retention, assignment, and service benefits have felt the impact, directly or indirectly, of judicial reach.

40. "We question the validity of much of the research on women conducted by the military. We believe there is a clear bias against women. . . . The assumption was made that women cannot withstand stress, are not ready for awesome responsibility, and that they cause problems. Can an institution with these biases be trusted to do objective research?" (Carol C. Parr, National Organization for Women, speaking in testimony before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 1 September 1977.)

41. Such as higher incidence of training injuries, for example.

42. "The Army must objectively analyze female capabilities . . . and avoid irrelevant comparisons with male soldiers. I strongly believe that healthy women properly led, trained, equipped, and motivated are capable of filling any Army position, including those from which they are presently excluded." (Robert L. Nabors, "Women in the Army: Do They Measure Up?" *Military Review*, 62 [October 1982], 60).

43. One such example is James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy and author of a controversial article based on his personal experiences in ground combat and critical of expanded roles for women in combat units. In the wake of controversy following publication of the article, Webb was quickly fired from the faculty of the US Naval Academy. See James H. Webb, "Women Can't Fight," *Washingtonian* (Spring 1979).

44. This is not, however, to say that most males in the armed forces support combat roles for women. For examples of military literature sympathetic to combat roles for women see Barry J. Coyle, "Women On the Front Lines," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1989, pp. 37-40, and Michael A. Andrews, "Women in Combat?" *Military Review*, 59 (July 1979), 28-34.

45. It is true that under current policy many female casualties would be incurred in a mid- or high-intensity conflict. Modern estimates continue to project, however, that just as in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the overwhelming majority of casualties would be sustained in the combat arms, specifically in the ground maneuver arms of infantry and armor/cavalry. The difference in potential impact on society between the two scenarios is highly significant and should not be viewed as one and the same.

46. The 1982 *WITA* study reported the following measurements of median physical capacity for women as compared to men: leg extensor strength—65 percent; upper body strength—58 percent; trunk flexor strength—68 percent; aerobic capacity—78 percent; lean body mass—75 percent. See *WITA Policy Review*, p. 2-15.

47. One study reported a 54-percent incidence of injury sustained by females in an eight-week basic training cycle, with an average training loss of 13 days. See Dennis M. Kowal, "Nature and Causes of Injuries in Women Resulting From an Endurance Training Program," *The American Journal of Sports Medicine*, 8 (Number 4, 1980), 265-68.

48. In virtually all societies where statistics are kept, male participation in violent crime exceeds that of females on the order of 9:1. Sex role differentiation is reflected in differences in brain configuration between the sexes in all mammals (including humans) while laboratory experimentation confirms that artificial variation in hormone levels produces profound behavioral changes in "normal" sexual and social behavior. "The Sexual Brain," *Science Journal*, Public Broadcasting Service, 13 April 1989.

49. The point here is not so much whether concepts such as sex role identification or protectiveness are legitimate. It is whether they predominate in the society from which soldiers are drawn. Clearly this appears to be so. To eliminate such behavioral distinctions, particularly in the compressed training cycles common in wartime, would appear to be a truly daunting task—particularly if they have physiological and psycho-chemical determinants as well as strictly social ones.

50. See Webb, *Women Can't Fight*.

51. Telephone interview with then-Captain Karen Habitzreuther (see n. 14), 5 April 1989.

52. Interview with USAREC (US Army Recruiting Command) company commander, 13 April 1989.

53. GAO Report FPCD-76-26, "Job Opportunities for Women in the Military; Progress and Problems," cited in *WITA Policy Review*, p. 1-6.

54. Interview with a recent commander of a 280-member logistics unit in the United States.

55. Interview with a company-grade logistics commander.

56. *WITA Policy Review*, p. 1-14.

57. While female pilots cannot be assigned to attack helicopter units, they may, for example, fly troops forward of friendly lines in assault helicopters such as the UH-60 Blackhawk (Habitzreuther interview, 5 April 1989).

58. It is difficult to see how unrestricted female participation in the military can be reconciled with current laws regarding conscription. In a national crisis it would be hard to argue that women should be exempted from involuntary combat service if they were already serving on a volunteer basis, without granting males the same legal protections.

Proliferation of Chemical Warfare: Challenge to Traditional Restraints

TERRY M. WEEKLY

Ypres, Belgium, 22 April 1915: It was late afternoon and the setting sun cast long shadows over the battle-scarred terrain. In the distance could be heard the faint sounds of large-caliber artillery. Suddenly, at 1724 hours, three flares rose from an observation balloon and German artillery commenced a fierce bombardment of the areas to the rear of French and British trenches. At 1800 hours, the shelling ceased and an eerie silence fell over the area.

Chancing to rise and peer across the battlefield, the men of the French and Algerian divisions saw a thin blue-white haze rising from the German trenches. It swirled about, gathered into a greenish cloud, and began to slowly drift across the terrain at a height of about six feet. Settling into every depression as it went, the cloud finally came spilling into the French trenches, silently enveloping the occupants in an acrid green cloud so thick they could not see their neighbors. Seconds later they were clutching their throats, fighting for air.[1] In an effort to escape, some attempted to bury their mouth and nose in the earth. Others panicked and ran, which only resulted in deeper breaths and more acute poisoning. Faces turned blue and some suffered ruptured lungs from coughing.[2] To the north and south of the cloud-enshrouded French positions, British and Canadian troops watched in amazement as soldiers emerged from the cloud, staggering about and running wildly for the rear. Soldiers streamed by, "blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple color, lips speechless with agony." Surprise was complete. The two French divisions collapsed, leaving a gap four miles wide in the Ypres front.[3]

Thus, the specter of large-scale toxic chemical warfare was unleashed upon the world. That this was a clear violation of international treaty, codified by the Hague Convention of 1899, did not stop the major powers from embarking on a course of action consisting of increasingly lethal chemical agents and the unrestricted use of toxic gas on all significant war fronts.

As a direct result, nearly 1.3 million military gas casualties were to be suffered by the seven primary belligerents by the end of the war.[4]

Following World War I, the global revulsion at the horrors of chemical warfare caused it to be banned by international protocol. World War II was fought on an unlimited scale, including the introduction of nuclear warfare, without resort to the battlefield use of chemical weapons (with a few exceptions). Later, the prolonged Korean and Vietnam conflicts were also fought without resort to toxic chemical warfare. The last decade, however, has seen a dramatic proliferation of chemical warfare capability among Third World nations with an accompanying escalation in the use of lethal chemical agents both on the battlefield and against civilian population centers, the most notable being the events of the recent Iran-Iraq War.

This article surveys the circumstances surrounding the initiation of chemical warfare in World War I and the subsequent international response. It then views the restraints that worked successfully against chemical warfare during World War II in relation to the current world situation to determine how and why these restraints have been challenged in recent years.

World War I

The agent used to initiate chemical warfare at Ypres was chlorine, a gas released from metal cylinders emplaced in the German trenches. Chlorine poisons not by suffocation, but by stripping the lining of the bronchial tubes and lungs, producing severe inflammation. This in turn results in the production of massive amounts of yellow fluid which fills the lungs, blocks the windpipe, and froths from the mouth. Death actually results from the victim's drowning in his own fluids. A correspondent visiting a French medical facility shortly after the chlorine attack reported seeing hundreds of wounded with "faces, arms, and hands of a shiny grey-black color" sitting "with mouths open and lead-glazed eyes, all swaying slightly backwards and forwards trying to get breath." In this surprise initiation of chemical warfare, French casualties were 5000 dead and 10,000 wounded. Thirty-six hours later, a second German gas attack, this time on Canadian forces, produced another 5000 dead.[5]

The introduction of chemical warfare by the Germans resulted in an immediate scramble by both sides to develop not only defensive measures,

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Colonel Terry M. Weekly is Chief of Staff of the US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He is a graduate of the Army War College, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Army Command and General Staff College. Colonel Weekly holds a B.S. degree from Purdue University and an M.B.A. from Fairleigh Dickinson University. In 1969-70 he served as an explosive ordnance disposal officer with the 3d Ordnance Battalion in Long Binh, Vietnam. From June 1985 to June 1987 he commanded the 70th Ordnance Battalion, Fort Bliss, Texas.

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but also more deadly offensive chemical agents and techniques. By September 1915, the Western Allies had responded with their own use of chlorine gas. The race was on.

The next toxic agent introduced by the Germans, in December 1915, was phosgene, a gas attacking the respiratory system and producing effects similar to chlorine, but estimated as 18 times more powerful. Then, on 12 July 1917, once again at Ypres, the Germans unleashed mustard agent, which dwarfed the horror of anything that had gone before. Initially, its victims could see or feel no ill effects. But even the slightest contact with this seeming innocuous, garlic-smelling liquid could, in a few hours, produce intolerable pain in the eyes, vomiting, massive yellow blisters up to a foot long, and havoc on the respiratory system. Dying was a slow and agonizing process marked by incessant and useless coughing as the windpipe became totally clogged. The agent was persistent, remaining in the soil over long periods of time.[6] Worst of all, a respirator or gas mask was no longer adequate by itself to provide protection because the liquid mustard could contaminate and penetrate clothing. The powerful impact of this new agent is graphically demonstrated by British gas casualty statistics. During the 27 months from the initiation of chemical warfare in April 1915 to the introduction of mustard in July 1917, the British suffered approximately 20,000 gas casualties. From the point when mustard was first used to the end of the war, a period of only 16 months, over 160,000 gas casualties were sustained.[7]

The horror of chemical warfare, however, was not limited just to front-line troops. Massive chlorine gas attacks could generate dense clouds capable of producing significant casualties as far back as 30 kilometers from front-line trenches.[8] Gas attacks caused panic among troops billeted in towns and villages many miles behind the lines. When the approach of a gas cloud was detected, alarm bells rang and soldiers and civilians alike, clutching respirators, made their way to the top rooms of houses. All doors and windows were tightly closed as the gas cloud drifted by below.[9]

Nor were the effects limited to humans. The gas clouds wiped out horses and wild game, rats and mice, birds, insects, and vegetation. A German phosgene cloud is said to have reached a height of 60 feet in one location, killing thousands of birds nesting in trees. In Monchy Woods, an area subjected to repeated gas attacks, all the leaves fell from the trees three months before autumn. Chlorine gas also tarnished metal, turning buttons, watches, and coins a dull green. Rifles rusted and looked as if left out in the weather for months. Breech blocks on cannons became unusable.[10]

By the time of the Armistice ending World War I, development of the airplane had raised gas warfare to the threshold of becoming a strategic as well as tactical weapon. Whether this forbidding prospect would be realized in future war depended on the reaction of world opinion and national decision-makers.[11]

The International Response

By the end of World War I, strain and exhaustion were universally evident. The enthusiasm and hope for a more perfect world order which had characterized many nations' approach to the war gave way to disillusionment. The war seemed to have solved little.[12] And worst of all, with the introduction of chemical warfare, existing international law and protocol concerning the rules of war had failed to prevent the elevation of warfare to new levels of horror.

Before World War I there was already a considerable body of widely accepted international law prohibiting chemical warfare. As early as 1868, the St. Petersburg Declaration had stated that no weapon could be used that created superfluous suffering or made death inevitable.[13] The First Hague Convention in 1899, which deliberated the laws of warfare, declared in Article 23: "The contracting powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating gases." The same article also forbade the use of weapons causing "unnecessary suffering." In 1907, the Second Hague Convention validated the declarations of the first and added: "It is especially forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons."[14] Both protocols were signed and ratified by all 1915 World War I participants except Serbia and Turkey.[15]

The failure of international law to prevent initiation of chemical warfare did not deter continued efforts toward that goal. In fact, owing to the

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A French soldier stands guard in World War I. The place and date of the photo are unknown.

repugnant nature of gas warfare, efforts toward its prohibition were redoubled. The Versailles Treaty imposed on the Central Powers at the end of the war stated: "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden." A few years later, participants in the Washington Armament Conference of 1921-1922 (Britain, France, Japan, Italy, and the United States) drafted an article that essentially restated the Versailles Treaty and Hague Conventions. The article declared that chemical warfare, "having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world, and a prohibition to such use having been declared in treaties, . . . the Signatory Powers . . . declare their assent to prohibition." To be valid, however, the treaty had to be signed by all five participants. Because of disagreement over another article concerning submarine warfare, France refused to sign, thereby rendering the protocol invalid.[16]

It is significant to note that some national leaders were already starting to question the value of international treaties on the prohibition of chemical warfare. Britain and France pointed out that previous treaties had been violated with impunity and that since there were no sanctions involved, compliance could only be ensured by national readiness. This was a conclusion that many in the United States were also reaching.[17]

In 1925, the premier international agreement concerning chemical and biological warfare was negotiated in Geneva. Known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, it is still in force today—though it has proven ineffective. While the protocol prohibits the *use* of chemicals of all kinds, it does not prohibit the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Further, it provides for no means of verification and no formal sanctions should the treaty be violated. When the protocol was ratified, some 30 nations entered reservations that permitted retaliatory use of chemical weapons if first used against them, thus making the protocol at best a "no first use" agreement rather than a total prohibition.[18] While until recently the promise of "no first use" has generally been observed, this has resulted not so much from the prohibition embodied in the protocol, but from mutual fear of retaliation.[19] It should be noted that while the United States has continuously declared a "no first use" policy, it did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1975, 50 years after the treaty's birth. This delay primarily centered on chemical readiness issues and the feeling that the protocol was not enforceable. At the time of ratification in 1975, the United States also entered a "right to retaliation" clause.

While there have since been numerous international forums concerning prohibition of chemical warfare, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is the last substantial effort to be universally recognized and ratified (by 123 countries to date). It remains today, even with its inherent weaknesses, the touchstone for discussions of chemical disarmament.

World War II

As the international tension and military muscle-flexing leading up to World War II increased, there was little confidence that international bans against chemical warfare would work in any future conflict. Prominent observers such as H. G. Wells and Bertrand Russell warned their countrymen on the eve of World War II that they could expect to be showered with poison gas in the event of another world war.[20]

Happenings on the world scene certainly did nothing to dispel such fears. In late 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia), a backward country with a highly outnumbered army. Italy needed a quick victory. The Abyssinians were mostly barefoot and lacked protective clothing. The use of mustard, therefore, could produce a significant military advantage.[21] The Italians used mustard bombs first, followed by aerial spraying by groups of 9 to 15 aircraft. Soldiers, women, children, cattle, rivers, and pastures were drenched with this deadly rain. The result was appalling death and suffering by the defenseless natives. In effect, Abyssinia was little more than a proving ground for the Italians. The general public sentiment in the Western World was expressed by British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin: "If a great European power, in spite of having given its signature to the Geneva Protocol against the use of such gases, employs them in Africa, what guarantee have we that they may not be used in Europe?"[22]

In the eyes of many world leaders, Italian defiance of the Geneva Protocol only confirmed the obvious—"A major power could get away with limited violations of the [Protocol's anti-gas provisions] provided these did not threaten the interests of other major powers. . . . The Protocol's 'no-gas' rule in fact meant 'only a limited amount of gas,' provided there is no threat of escalation."[23]

Meanwhile, on the other side of the world the Japanese were at war with China, another poorly trained and backward opponent. The Japanese had been party to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, but had not ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Although they had not participated in gas warfare in World War I, they nonetheless believed that they must be ready for it. This required knowledge of the effects of using chemicals in combat, and China provided the perfect opportunity for field testing with no fear of retaliation. From 1937 onward, the Japanese made extensive use of poison gas (frequently mustard) against the Chinese. By 1939, the Chinese claimed that chemical agents had been used against them in 886 separate instances. Formal protests to the League of Nations brought no relief or assistance.[24]

At the same time, the Germans in the mid-1930s were struggling to recover from the anti-chemical restraints placed upon them by the Versailles Peace Treaty and to rebuild their chemical arsenal. In December 1936, they made a discovery with the potential to provide a significant swing in the military balance of power. Conducting research in insecticides, a German

scientist, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, recognized the military potential of Tabun (GA), a nerve agent. When used on dogs or monkeys the agent produced loss of muscular control, shrinking of the eye pupils, frothing at the mouth, vomiting, diarrhea, twitching and jerking, convulsions, and—in 10 to 15 minutes—death. Dr. Schrader was summoned to Berlin for a demonstration, and the value of Tabun as a war gas was quickly recognized. It was colorless, practically odorless, and could poison either by inhalation or penetration through the skin. Plans for production began immediately. Later, in 1938, the Germans discovered Sarin (GB), a nerve agent ten times as toxic as Tabun, and then in 1944, Soman (GD), which was even more toxic. (The existence of these agents was a well-kept German secret throughout the entire war. It was not revealed until April 1945, when the Allies overran stocks of nerve agent munitions and were shocked to discover their existence.)

By the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the stage had been set. All major powers had adopted the position that chemical readiness was the best deterrent and all had at least some offensive chemical capability. Chemical munitions had already been used on a large scale by two major powers between the wars. It seemed certain that World War II would see the resumption of gas warfare where World War I had left off, but with a quantum and frightening difference. The airplane made chemical warfare a genuine strategic threat with the associated specter of long-range gas bombing of cities and industrial centers.

Yet, surprisingly, and despite the war's unlimited scale—including mass casualties caused by conventional bombardment of cities, the overrunning and unparalleled destruction of whole countries, and the introduction of nuclear weapons—World War II would run its course without resort to gas warfare.[25] The system of restraints that had evolved between the wars to discourage gas warfare will be discussed later. It was not, however, for lack of tempting opportunity or capability on either side that chemicals were not used. While initial capabilities were indeed limited, both sides engaged in a rapid buildup of chemical agent stockpiles and delivery means. Once started, production never slackened. For nearly six years, the initiation of gas warfare was regarded as a day-to-day possibility, and by 1945 over a half million tons of chemical weapons had been readie

Germany initially possessed only limited toxic stocks. They began an immediate buildup, however, starting construction in January 1940 on a massive nerve agent factory located in the forests of Silesia in western Poland. This facility was fully operational by early 1942, capable of producing 3000 tons of nerve agent per month. By mid-1943, the Germans had a score of factories producing up to 12,000 tons of various toxic agents each month, and had accumulated a vast arsenal of chemical munitions.[26] They had also built an extensive shelter system and issued over 28 million gas masks to the German people.[27]

Among the Allies, both Britain and the United States also entered the war with only sparse chemical warfare capability. At the outbreak, the British stockpile was limited to a small quantity of mustard. Intensive production was initiated immediately, however, and by December 1941 the British possessed sufficient stocks on hand or in production to conduct effective ground and air retaliation. The strongest element of British gas warfare readiness was its emphasis on civil defense. By 1939, over 38 million gas masks had been issued to the civilian populace.[28] In the United States a similar buildup of toxic stocks occurred, with 13 new chemical agent plants opened within three years of the start of war.[29]

Not only were toxic munitions being hurriedly produced, they were also made available at the battle front. Throughout the entire war, the Axis and Allies secretly moved chemical weapons and protective equipment into strategic locations for rapid access in case they were needed.[30] This led to at least two recorded instances of accidental release of chemical agents by the United States. In the first and worst case, an Allied supply ship loaded with 100 tons of mustard gas bombs was hit by a German JU-88 bomber while anchored in the harbor at Bari, Italy. The ship blew up, contaminating the harbor and causing severe casualties to sailors and local civilians. Reported casualties from the mustard were 83 dead and 617 injured.[31] In the second instance, a German projectile hit a gas-shell dump in the Anzio bridgehead and the gas drifted toward German lines. By quickly communicating with his German counterpart, the US commander was able to convince the enemy that he hadn't intended to use gas, thus defusing a potentially disastrous situation.[32]

In reviewing the history of World War II, one finds numerous opportunities when the initiation of chemical warfare might have been decisive in an operation or campaign, if not the war itself. The outcome of the Dunkirk evacuation might have been different if chemical weapons had been unleashed by the Germans. Shortly thereafter, faced with a possible German invasion (Operation Sea Lion), the British seriously debated the use of toxic gas. Later, in mid-1942, Churchill was so sure that the Germans were about to employ gas on the Eastern Front that he offered to send Stalin 1000 tons of mustard for retaliation purposes.[33] In the Pacific, the island-hopping campaigns against the Japanese could well have benefited from use of toxic chemicals. Such use was, in fact, discussed and then rejected in the planning for the invasions of both Iwo Jima and the Japanese homeland.[34]

In July 1944, the British again seriously considered using chemical warfare in retaliation for the German V-1 attacks against London. The British Joint Planning Staff recommended against this action primarily because it would likely bring about widespread chemical warfare in Europe. (Recall that they had no knowledge of German nerve gas.) Churchill strongly opposed the recommended position and in a bluntly worded minute to his staff on 6 July

1944, directed them to restudy the situation. A feel for just how close the world came to chemical warfare in World War II is reflected in the following excerpt from the Churchill minute:

> I want you to think very seriously over this question of using poison gas. I would not use it unless it could be shown either that (a) it was life or death for us or (b) that it would shorten the war by one year. . . . I want a cold-blooded calculation made as to how it would pay us to use poison gas . . . principally mustard. . . . I should be prepared to do anything that would hit the enemy in a murderous place. We could *drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany* in such a way that most of the population would be requiring constant medical attention. . . . I want the matter studied in cold blood by sensible people and not by that particular set of *psalm-singing uniformed defeatists* which one runs across now here, now there.[35] (Emphasis added.)

While the world came within a hairbreadth of the reinitiation of gas warfare, it did not happen. For the first time in history, a telling weapon employed with devastating effect in one conflict was not carried forward to the next.[36] It seemed to many that the inhibitions against the use of chemical weapons contained in the Geneva Protocol had been reaffirmed and that a functional set of traditional restraints had been established. But these inhibitions and restraints were already starting to be undermined by world events and technical advances such as the further development of nerve agents, toxins, and the new possibilities presented by biological warfare.[37]

Erosion of Post-World War I Restraints

The restraints against gas warfare that evolved after the First World War proved generally effective for nearly 50 years. Such restraints can be grouped under the following categories, arranged in descending order of effectiveness:

- *Psychological.* Simple fear of retaliation, born of the mutual desire of all parties to the conflict not to have the horrors of chemical warfare visited upon themselves.
- *Military.* Belief by the professional military that the use of gas was an affront to the art, science, and honor of the profession, and that the overall effectiveness of chemical operations on the battlefield was itself questionable.
- *Political.* Inhibitions felt by national leaders stemming from their personal repugnance or that of their people for chemical warfare; limitations upon unilateral action by nations fighting as part of coalitions.
- *Moral.* Recognition by all parties of the brutal, barbaric nature of the effects of poisonous chemicals upon soldiers and civilians alike.
- *Legal.* Realization that resort to chemical warfare violated the letter and spirit of international law.

Unfortunately, as events of the last few years have shown, the restraints listed above have begun to weaken. Let us examine what changes have occurred to reduce their effectiveness today.

Psychological. Not surprisingly, psychological restraints—embodied mainly in the power of retaliation—have been little affected by recent events, remaining the dominant bar to chemical warfare. In wars between belligerents of approximately equal strength or retaliatory capability, the threat of chemical warfare seems no more likely today than during World War II. At the same time, recognition of the value of potential retaliation as a deterrent has itself contributed to the proliferation problem, especially among turbulent Third World countries perceiving external threats to their security. The roster of countries that have either recently acquired or are seeking chemical weapons is growing and now includes such small or developing nations as Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, Israel, Burma, Thailand, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Cuba, Vietnam, China, and South Africa.[38] The perception exists that even a relatively weak country may be able to raise the cost of a threatened invasion to an unacceptable level through the threat of chemical response.[39] Additionally, this concept has been elevated to a new plateau in NATO, where it is widely understood that a chemical attack by the Warsaw Pact might well be considered such a grave escalation as to compel a nuclear response.[40]

In short, the effectiveness of fear of retaliation as a restraint remains unchallenged. Since World War I, there has yet to be an instance of poison gas being used against a country possessing a credible chemical response capability.

Military. While fear of retaliation remains an effective restraint, the military aspect of restraint has undergone a significant evolutionary change that has greatly diminished its influence in preventing chemical warfare. The evolution started with the strategic fire-bombing of cities in World War II; it was stimulated by the unleashing of atomic warfare on Japan; and it continues today, as evidenced by the extensive use of poison gas in the Iran-Iraq War.

The use of the atomic bomb to end World War II was a significant event affecting worldwide attitudes concerning weapons of mass destruction. For the first time, such a weapon was used effectively to force a nation to its knees. More important, it was employed by the United States, looked upon in the eyes of the world as a highly moralistic society. Thus, the advent of atomic warfare significantly lowered the threshold for employment of weapons of mass destruction. Some would argue that the US use of riot control agents, napalm, and defoliants in Vietnam also worked to lower the chemical threshold.[41] Coupled with recent Third World uses of toxic agents, the ultimate result is a greatly increased assimilation of chemical warfare by military leaders and planners, especially in the Third World.

Militarily, there are sound reasons why this assimilation has occurred. First of all, in every instance of use in recent years, chemical weapons

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This photo of US troops in a training area in France during World War I was posed to illustrate the effects of phosgene.

have proven quite effective.[42] They cause minimal property damage and can reach the occupants of even heavily fortified structures.[43] Their utility has been reinforced by the advent of nerve agents that are highly suited to mobile warfare.[44] With nuclear capability beyond the reach of many nations, chemical weapons have become the "poor man's atomic bomb."[45] They are relatively cheap, easy to produce, and provide a significant multiplier of combat power. When coupled with a ballistic missile, chemical agents also present a potent strategic threat. (Consider, for example, the Chinese CSS2 missile. Widely marketed in the Middle East, it has a range of 1500 miles and can easily accommodate a chemical warhead.)[46] Even among nuclear powers today, chemical munitions are sometimes viewed as another available step in escalation before resort to nuclear weaponry.[47]

Political. If the extent of the changes to military restraints can be described as evolutionary, the changes in political restraints have been revolutionary. The shifting balance of world power, changing norms of acceptable political behavior, and the emergence of terrorism as a tool of diplomacy have all worked to dramatically weaken the effect of traditional political restraints on chemical warfare.

First, the balance of world power has undergone a significant change since World War II, the result of a number of factors such as shifting economic

power, oil politics, and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism. Where power was once divided primarily between Eastern and Western spheres of influence, the world is now multipolar. The influence of the big powers has been greatly reduced as economic clout has become nearly as important as military might. Emerging Third World countries are more independent and less responsive to outside influence. Further, Islamic fundamentalism has brought a whole new set of non-Western values into the world arena.

A second change reducing the impact of political factors on chemical restraint is the willingness of many Western nations to provide Third World countries with the technology necessary to produce toxic chemical agents. Countries such as Japan, West Germany, and even overseas subsidiaries of some US companies have been implicated in either helping to build facilities or providing constituent materials for toxic agents.[48] Furthermore, it is not always an easy task to ascertain the final product of a planned facility. The same factory that produces pesticides or fertilizer can easily be converted to manufacture poison gas, and the same chemicals that go into textiles, paint, plastic, and ink can also be used for toxic agents. It is estimated that over 100 countries now have the industrial base necessary to produce chemical weapons.[49]

A case in point is the existing Iraqi nerve gas production facility. After chemical engineering firms in the United States, Britain, and Italy refused to design or build a "pesticide" plant in Iraq because it seemed suspicious, a West German firm, Karl Kolb, obliged in the early 1980s. As a result of the recent Iran-Iraq War, it came to light that the "pesticide" plant had been diverted to production of nerve gas since 1984.[50]

A final turn of events with the frightening potential to influence political aspects of chemical restraint is chemical terrorism. Former Senator John Tower here sums up the possibilities:

> What distinguishes the present era from previous periods is the coincidence between vastly greater means available to terrorists and an increase in the number of targets, especially in urban, industrialized . . . societies in a world of political turmoil. In the late twentieth century, terrorism has . . . become a global problem of expanding proportions.

While an incident of chemical terrorism has yet to occur, the potential evokes the disturbing picture of a terrorist organization unleashing toxic chemical agents against a city for purposes of political blackmail or revenge. The idea, however heinous, is not so far-fetched as terrorist organizations continually strive for greater heights of brutality and sensationalism in order to capture headlines and television exposure.[51]

The upshot of all such developments is the increasing difficulty experienced today in attempting to bring political pressure to bear on violators of accepted norms of international behavior, such as the users of chemical

weapons. An entangling web of political and economic interests, coupled with the reduced influence wielded by the major powers, make consensus on any issue extremely difficult.

Moral. For many years following World War II, the moral aspect of chemical restraint remained little changed, with a general undercurrent of world opinion against chemical weapons. Over time, however, public feelings became desensitized by several factors, including the threat of nuclear holocaust, the ever more lethal conventional weapons being deployed on the modern battlefield, and a general increase in the ambient level of violence around the world.[52]

Very recently, however, the publicity given the rapid proliferation of chemical weapons in the Third World, coupled with the events of the Iran-Iraq War, seem to have mobilized world opinion once again. Gas warfare is no longer looked upon as just another aspect of remote Third World conflicts. The issues of indiscriminate mass killing and genocide have come to the forefront. Many government leaders around the world are now calling for international negotiations to ban chemical weapons.

Legal. As with moral restraints, until a recent flurry of activity little of substance had occurred with legal constraints since the Geneva Protocol of 1925. While there has been debate and posturing in the United Nations over various allegations of poison gas usage, no sanctions stronger than condemnation by the Security Council have ever been imposed.[53]

The recent concern generated by the Iran-Iraq War, however, has elevated chemical warfare to top priority on the international agenda. The United States and Soviet Union are conducting bilateral negotiations over chemical reductions. The long-running Geneva Conference on Disarmament, involving 40 nations, is considering a ban on both possession and production of chemical munitions.[54] Former President Reagan, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September 1988, called for "all civilized nations to ban, once and for all, and on a verifiable and global basis, the use of chemical and gas warfare."[55] A few days later, French President Mitterand urged the United Nations to endorse an international embargo of "products, technologies and . . . weapons" against any nation using poison gas.[56] On 25 September 1989, President Bush, in his first speech to the United Nations as US President, pledged his support to the Geneva Conference and called for a world ban on chemical weapons. "Let us act together," he said, "to rid the Earth of this scourge." More specifically, President Bush proposed that the United States and Soviet Union take a step together toward that goal by agreeing to cut their chemical arsenals drastically, to an interim level equal to 20 percent of the current US stockpile. He further said the United States would destroy 98 percent of its chemical weapons within eight years of the signing of a Geneva treaty, if the Soviet Union also signs the agreement. The

remaining two percent would be destroyed only after all nations possessing chemical weapons agreed to the ban.[57] On the very next day, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, from the same UN podium, not only generally accepted President Bush's proposals but indeed proposed initiatives that went even further.[58]

In January 1989, France sponsored the highly publicized 149-nation conference in Paris designed to galvanize world opinion against chemical weapons and extend coverage of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The results of the conference, while not all that was hoped for, were nevertheless encouraging in many respects. Through compromise, a "no-use" declaration was forged and unanimously endorsed by all nations represented. The communiqué stated that the parties to the conference "solemnly affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemn such use." In recognizing the urgency of the current situation, the communiqué declared: "The states participating in the conference are gravely concerned by the growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread." Support for a UN role in investigating future charges of poison gas use was also included in the declaration, as was an exhortation for early completion of the total-ban treaty under discussion at the Geneva Conference. An additional achievement of the week-long conference was that ten more nations, including North and South Korea, signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol, bringing total signatories to 123.[59]

It was disappointing that US-proposed export controls and economic sanctions against users of poison gas were omitted from the final document. "The Third World sees an issue like sanctions as a red flag," stated one senior American official. "They believe it is aimed at preventing their economic growth."[60]

Also of significance is the opposition to use of the word "proliferation" in the final communiqué. Failure to include this word in effect puts possession of chemical weapons by the United States and other developed nations on the same level as acquisition by Libya or similar nations in highly unstable areas.[61] This action further emphasizes how important it is for the United States and Soviet Union to take the lead in chemical disarmament and to reach an early bilateral agreement.

While the conference did not accomplish all that was hoped for, it did achieve a conspicuous success with the unanimous "no-first-use" endorsement, which should make it more difficult for a nation to employ chemical weapons in the future. Major General William F. Burns (USA Ret.), who headed the US delegation, stated that the conference "forged a powerful global consensus" against further poison gas use.[62] Unfortunately, however, the questions of verification and tough international sanctions remain troubling, unresolved issues.

In Sum

Out of the perceived horrors of gas warfare in World War I emerged a worldwide revulsion manifesting itself in a system of restraints that proved largely effective for nearly 50 years in preventing a repeat of massive chemical warfare. During this period, World War II was fought on an unlimited scale, including the introduction of nuclear warfare, without resort to the battlefield use of toxic chemical agents.

The past two decades, however, have witnessed a near-total erosion of the traditional restraint system, as evidenced by widespread proliferation and the use of chemical weapons in Third World conflicts. The result is that fear of retaliation remains the dominant and only effective restraint today. Relatively cheap yet potent chemical agents, coupled with modern delivery systems, provide a significant combat power multiplier which has essentially eliminated both political and military aversion to the use of chemical weaponry. Moral restraint is subject to public opinion shifts and has proven ineffective in the crucible of war. Similarly, such legal restraints as protocols, treaties, and bans are impotent, as currently structured, in preventing the use of toxic weapons in warfare. Because these legal instruments are the basis for regulating international affairs, however, it is essential that a realistic mechanism be found to put teeth into legal restraints by coupling them to stiff sanctions and punishment for offenders. Without such sanctions, protocols and treaties will never play an effective role in preventing chemical warfare.

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Conventional Deterrence After Arms Control

GARY L. GUERTNER

The credibility of NATO's conventional forces will be determined by its weapon modernization programs in combination with the outcome of the Conventional Forces in Europe Negotiations (CFE) which began in March 1989. Despite Gorbachev's unilateral reductions which preceded the formal negotiations and despite the general conciliatory tone of Soviet diplomacy, difficult negotiations lay ahead in Vienna for the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact assembled to test the Soviet commitment to "new military thinking."

As Americans undertake conventional arms control negotiations with their NATO allies, two "centers of gravity," one political and one military, will be critical. The political center of gravity is the cohesion of the NATO alliance. This has been a primary target of Soviet diplomacy. Arms control and conventional modernization decisions must be made within the broader objective of maintaining alliance cohesion. Without a united Western front, there is no possibility for credible conventional deterrence in Europe.

NATO's political center of gravity is the foundation on which the alliance has fielded military power sufficient to threaten the Soviet military center of gravity in Europe, that is, the ability of the Soviet army to maintain offensive momentum on the battlefield. War or political intimidation as a means to attain Soviet political objectives requires the potential for surprise attack and rapid military victory. Protracted conflict or stalemate on the battlefield poses serious threats to the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. Unreliable allies may begin to question the cost-benefits of war, just as the Romanians did during World War II. Their divisions fought with the Germans as

far as Stalingrad. But when the fortunes of war turned and the Red Army reached Romanian soil, they joined with it to crush the Nazis. Similarly, in a stalemate, Soviet leaders have good reason to fear that national strategies for survival among their East European allies would prevail over Soviet political objectives.

There are other risks. Long and vulnerable supply lines between the West European front and Soviet industrial centers would be difficult to maintain at levels required to meet the rapacious logistical appetites of mechanized divisions and their supporting firepower. There is also the risk that protracted war may set off the centrifugal forces of nationalism among Soviet minorities, especially those in the politically strategic union republics contiguous to Eastern Europe. These are the intertwined political-military dimensions of strategy that contribute to Soviet self-deterrence if confronted by credible NATO conventional defenses.

Conventional arms control and modernization programs can shape a strategic environment that further degrades Soviet capacity for momentum and quick military victory. The inherent advantage of the attacker in gaining the initiative over the defender must be reversed before Western interests are secure. The growing lethality of NATO's conventional forces and Gorbachev's new military thinking in the form of nonoffensive defense make this possible for the first time in postwar Europe.

NATO's broad objective is to achieve stable deterrence by denying Warsaw Pact capabilities for short-warning attack; the embodiment of that threat is, of course, the Soviet armored divisions and artillery. These, Philip Karber has argued, are "the root of military instability in Europe."[1]

This broad objective can be pursued through a two-front arms control strategy; one to reduce offensive structure and a second to restrict operational capabilities. Structure and capabilities are distinct components of conventional forces. They are the critical variables of conventional arms control. Operational capabilities are the activities of military forces in the field, including training exercises and troop concentrations that can be observed and monitored. On-site observations of training exercises are already in practice as the

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Dr. Gary L. Guertner is the Director of Studies in the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. He is a former Professor of Strategy in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the War College. He holds B.A. and M.A. degrees in political science from the University of Arizona and a Ph.D. in international relations from the Claremont Graduate School. A former Marine Corps officer and veteran of Vietnam, Dr. Guertner has also served as a resident scholar at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as a professor of political science at the University of California, Fullerton. His latest book is *Deterrence and Defense in a Post-Nuclear World* (St. Martin's, 1989).

result of the Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE).[2] Under its provisions, the exchange of military observers provides the framework for an expanded conventional arms control verification regime. Supported by national technical means for monitoring Soviet troop movements, on-site observers promote the transparency of Warsaw Pact territory that is required to decrease the probability of a successful surprise attack. On-site observations and inspections require equal progress in reductions and modifications of Soviet forces in Europe. Several Western negotiating strategies have been proposed:

- Disproportionate reductions in primary weapon systems where one side has a numerical advantage;
- Equal percentage reductions of total forces;
- Reductions in nonequivalent systems (for example, Soviet tanks for NATO aircraft);
- Creation of weapon-free zones or partially demilitarized zones; and
- Redeployment of forces.[3]

The immediate obstacle common to all negotiating strategies is disagreement over the data base from which negotiators begin their efforts to reshape the military balance in Europe. On the eve of the negotiations, *Pravda* published the Soviet Union's most detailed estimates of the conventional balance in Europe. Soviet data reinforce their claim that a rough parity exists between East and West.[4] Discrepancies between NATO and Warsaw Pact data are explained by different weapon aggregations and counting rules which threaten to deadlock negotiations if either side insists on a narrow bean-counting approach. Several key examples are summarized in Figure 1.

There is virtually no prospect for conventional arms control if negotiations become mired in disputes and mutual recriminations over the military balance. A treaty does not require meticulous calibration of opposing forces to achieve mutual security. Domestic political factions and public opinion may be reassured by the appearance of balance and equality, but no historical data exist to support a relationship between military parity and the absence of aggression.[5] Other factors are more important in achieving credible conventional deterrence against the primary Soviet center of gravity in Europe—capability for surprise attack and momentum on the battlefield culminating in a quick victory.

This article makes no attempt to summarize the burgeoning literature on conventional arms control. There are, however, two critical questions being discussed within the literature that demand answers: What is conventional stability? and How should it be linked to nuclear weapons and NATO's strategy of flexible response?

In the broadest sense, conventional stability like deterrence in general is a political-military posture that preserves NATO's political cohesion while

Figure 1. The Conflicting Data Base for NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

Ground Forces:

Soviet figures claim rough parity with 3.5 million Warsaw Pact soldiers facing 3.6 million NATO troops. Soviet data include naval forces, but exclude most support or construction units. NATO excludes naval forces, but counts most Soviet construction troops and claims a Warsaw Pact advantage of 3.1 million to 2.2 million troops.

Tanks:

Soviet data concede a Warsaw Pact advantage of 2:1 in total number of tanks (59,470 to 30,699). NATO claims a 3:1 Soviet advantage (51,500 to 16,424). The Soviets count all tanks—heavy, light, light amphibious. NATO figures include only heavy, main battle tanks.

Artillery:

NATO figures include only heavy artillery (100mm and over). Soviet forces have these weapons in great abundance to support ground forces. By contrast, NATO has far fewer of these weapons, but large numbers of smaller (below 100mm) weapons that are organic to its ground forces. Soviet data include all artillery regardless of caliber (down to 75mm artillery and 50mm mortars).

Combat Aircraft:

The Soviets insist that NATO has a 1.5:1 advantage in front-line ground attack aircraft. This contrasts with NATO estimates of a 2:1 Warsaw Pact advantage. The discrepancy is explained by Soviet inclusion of NATO's naval aviation able to fight from carrier battle groups in the European theater, and by Soviet definition of ground attack aircraft as "offensive" and fighter interceptor aircraft as "defensive." The Soviet definitions ignore multirole aircraft, exclude Soviet medium-range bombers, and oversimplify the offensive-defensive capabilities of tactical aircraft.

threatening the Soviet military center of gravity in Europe. This requires careful coordination of arms-control-mandated reductions and modernization of conventional forces that will remain to deter war in central Europe.

Gorbachev's incentive for arms control can be seen in the sheer size of his army. As the largest conventional force in the world, it is both militarily impressive and economically stifling. The investment required to maintain and modernize it at current levels makes it impossible for Gorbachev to execute his economic restructuring and domestic reforms. The scope of the problem can be seen in the diversion of resources since the Khrushchev era. At the time of his removal, he bequeathed Brezhnev a force structure of approximately three million men supported by 35,000 tanks, including 26 divisions deployed on foreign soil. Two decades later Gorbachev inherited a

military force of 5.5 million men supported by more than 50,000 tanks, with 40 divisions stationed outside Soviet territory.[6]

There is considerable justification for disproportionate reductions on the Soviet side. Senator Sam Nunn, Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, proposed a strategy that has the appearance of political equality but produces disproportionate reductions in Soviet military forces. Nunn favors a 50-percent reduction of the forward-deployed forces of both superpowers (two-plus US divisions from West Germany for 13-plus Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe). Withdrawn forces would be redeployed to locations that require equal time to return to their forward positions, thus compensating the United States for its geographic disadvantages.[7]

Senator Nunn's proposal highlights the importance of geography to the negotiations. The vast region to be covered by negotiated reductions—from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains (ATTU)—and the Soviet advantage of proximity create challenges that cannot be solved by disproportionate force reductions. One approach is to divide the region by subzones that are each addressed by specific arms control requirements and by unique NATO force modernization requirements. The NATO Plan and the prestigious and often prescient Soviet Academy of Sciences have both proposed to divide the ATTU region into three zones (see map): the central front, a middle or reinforcing zone, and an external or reserve zone.[8] For each zone "parity" is defined in terms of percentage reductions, much like the Nunn proposal, that place the greatest burden on the side with superiority in a given category of weapons. Significantly, aircraft are included only in the total ATTU region because their range and flexibility do not facilitate constraints in narrow geographic areas.

The Nunn proposal and its unofficial Soviet Academy of Sciences counterpart are both more ambitious than the opening NATO position in Vienna. Western negotiators seek parity at ten percent below NATO levels in the most offensively adapted weapons—tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would be permitted to deploy more than 30 percent of these totals (3200 tanks and 1700 artillery pieces) in any one allied country.

The official Soviet proposal was remarkably similar in its approach to initial reductions, but was more ambitious in its scope and long-term objectives. Soviet negotiators opened with a three-stage proposal: (1) a two- to three-year period during which both sides would reduce offensive weapons to levels 10-15 percent below the lowest level possessed by either side. The largest reductions were proposed for the two Germanies, where there would be a total ban on nuclear weapons; (2) a second three-year phase would reduce arms by an additional 25 percent; (3) the final stage lasting to the year 2000 would have both alliances restructuring their forces for "purely" defensive capabilities.[9]

The Soviet proposal is significant for both arms control and NATO conventional modernization strategy. The devil and years of negotiations are in the details, but a final arms control and verification regime must not only reduce instability along the central front, but also in the reinforcing zone

Map by Jim Kistler, USAWC

where forces could be deployed for rapid reinforcement of a surprise attack. Force levels in one zone may be determined to some degree by the ultimate disposition of men and weapons that are removed from another. Will, for example, Soviet troops and divisions be removed from the force structure? Will their weapons and equipment be stored west of the Urals or east of the Urals, or be destroyed? The vague outline of nonoffensive defense has not addressed these specific problems. In anticipation of lengthy negotiations on these and other questions, NATO conventional force modernization should proceed. Many decisions can be made and a considerable degree of modernization precede a conventional arms treaty.

Options described here are not intended to be taken as narrow prescriptions or as criticisms of either side's proposals at the negotiations. There are many possible variants to general principles. One approach, summarized in Figure 2, is to link modernization strategy to arms control zones such as those depicted in the map. Modernization in the central front zone should support conventional strategy and develop maximum firepower and mobility per unit of manpower. Credible conventional deterrence and alternative defensive concepts are needed to exploit Soviet force reductions through maximum deployment of wide-area, high-tech submunitions deliverable from the new Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), aircraft, and the Army's short-range tactical missile system (ATACMS).

These systems, together with other forces deployed during the Reagan buildup (M1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Black Hawk helicopters, and Patriot air defense missiles), more than double the firepower of every American division. "Brilliant" munitions in development and emerging technologies (lasers and kinetic energy weapons) promise, as Marshal Ogarkov predicted, to give conventional forces on the defensive the same degree of lethality as battlefield nuclear weapons.[10]

NATO's theater nuclear weapons have been necessary to threaten critical targets deep in Eastern Europe. Airfields and the rail transshipment points along the Soviet-East European border are especially vital to sustain Soviet military momentum. Rail transshipment points are the bottlenecks created by Soviet construction of tracks that are broader than their European counterparts, an anomaly that requires off-loading Soviet trains and reloading cargoes on European trains. Broad-gauged rails have been erroneously described as an intentional strategic measure to hinder an invasion of Russia. In fact, however, the original recommendation was made by an American technical adviser to the Tsar as the most cost-effective means to support high-volume rolling stock and to ensure stability at high speed. Ironically, the Russian Civil War and World War II demonstrated that while variations in rail gauges did slow the logistical support of rapidly advancing military forces, it

Figure 2. NATO Strategy After Conventional Arms Control

Zone	*Modernization Strategy*	*Deterrence Strategy*
Central Front	Conventional Forces; "Smart Munitions" with Wide Area Coverage	Conventional Deterrence
Deep Central Front	Maintain Existing Theater Nuclear Force; Long-Term R&D for Long-Range Conventional Forces	Flexible Response without Requirement for Nuclear First Use
Reinforcing Zone		Strategic Nuclear Deterrence
Reserve Zone	Strategic Nuclear Modernization with More Emphasis on Survivable Weapons, Less Emphasis on Hard Target Counter-force Capabilities	Flexible Options to Attack Soviet Conventional Forces in the Reinforcing Zone
Continental US		Deter Soviet Use of Strategic and Theater Nuclear Weapons

was easier for invaders from the West to narrow Russian track (by re-laying one rail) than for the Russians to widen European track.[11]

These self-imposed bottlenecks and the long, fixed rail routes through the Soviet Union make their reinforcement of Europe no less arduous than Western defense of sea-lanes, ports, and NATO airfields. A long-range research and development program should be pursued to put these Soviet choke points at risk with conventional weapons. Early use of nuclear weapons on or near the Soviet border in support of AirLand Battle is a potential escalator that may result in political indecisiveness and dangerous delays in striking critical targets. Under such conditions, conventional deterrence is more credible than nuclear deterrence.

The most divisive decision confronting NATO is the modernization of short-range nuclear forces for the European battlefield. The last ground-to-ground nuclear missile, the Lance, will be phased out in the 1990s. The Bush Administration seeks approval of a program to modernize its arsenal of short-range nuclear weapons. The options include: (1) a new ground-launched missile with a range just under the 300-mile ceiling established by the INF Treaty; (2) a new air-launched missile similar to the Short-Range Attack

Missile (SRAM), an air-to-surface missile carried by strategic nuclear bombers; and (3) continued production of modernized nuclear artillery shells.[12]

It is unlikely that either Congress or NATO allies will support full development or deployment of these systems. There is strong political opposition in West Germany along with growing support for triple zero—the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons on the central front. German political rhetoric is illustrative of the problem: the shorter the range of the weapon, the deader the Germans.

Conventional arms control negotiations could be seriously disrupted by a divisive debate within NATO over nuclear modernization. The debate puts the horse before the cart in the sense that the general outcome of an arms control treaty and conventional force modernization should precede a final decision on new nuclear weapons. Reductions of Soviet armored and mechanized divisions and NATO conventional modernization may serve the same strategy that theater nuclear forces once served, that is, to put at risk any Warsaw Pact forces that mass for an attack along the central front. If conventional modernization produces weapons capable of lethality over the breadth and depth of the battlefield in support of NATO's forward defense and AirLand Battle doctrine, the case for nuclear modernization is significantly weakened.

The primary deficiency in current programs is the short range of conventional weapons. They have the lethality to disrupt a Soviet attack, but they lack the range to fully supplement air strikes against Soviet second echelons. Arms control may succeed in reducing these threats, while political will can produce long-range, lethal conventional weapons. Current munitions for the Army's MLRS have a range of 45 kilometers. The new ATACMS will extend that to well over 100 kilometers, coinciding with the 50-150 kilometers prescribed by AirLand Battle doctrine to engage Soviet second echelons. The trade-off between conventional and nuclear modernization should be weighed against both the military requirements for disrupting Soviet momentum on the battlefield and the political requirements for NATO's cohesion. It is by no means clear that nuclear modernization is the best means for accomplishing either objective.

A warning by former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is instructive. Schmidt wrote that he had confidence in conventional defenses, even though

> . . . the strategy of flexible response has always implied a quick escalation toward very early first use of nuclear weapons by the West. But it is unrealistic to believe that West German soldiers would fight after the explosions of the first couple of nuclear weapons on West German soil; the West Germans would certainly not act anymore fanatically or suicidally than the Japanese did in 1945 after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[13]

It is difficult to find a more eloquent argument for conventional deterrence in central Europe. Schmidt concluded that nuclear weapons are valuable only to deter Soviet nuclear use, not as instruments to deter limited war or even large-scale conventional attack.

Antinuclear sentiment has reached a peak under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gensher. Domestic politics in the Federal Republic makes it impossible to modernize short-range nuclear forces (SNF) outside formal Soviet-American negotiations to limit their numbers in the European theater. Veteran US arms control negotiator Paul Nitze endorsed the German position. He recommended formal negotiations on SNF to achieve a balance in a category of weapons in which the Soviets are dominant and to avoid exacerbating political divisions in Germany at a time of growing impatience with the extraordinary concentration of foreign armies and weapons on their soil.[14]

Political pressure from the Germans resulted in a compromise similar to the Nitze proposal. President Bush's broad arms control offensive at the 40th NATO anniversary summit in Brussels opened the door to a compromise solution to the SNF issue.[15] In their joint communique of 31 May 1989, NATO heads of state reaffirmed their commitment to a "strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces." At the same time, the allies stipulated that "negotiated reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried out until the results of these negotiations (CFE) have been implemented."[16] The compromise language rules out for the immediate future the "triple zero" option preferred by the Germans.[17]

The problem that hangs over the negotiations, however, is the extent to which the Soviets will continue to press the Germans on the issue of SNF. The Soviets' German strategy is tied to the broader objective of a denuclearized Europe (i.e. removal of all land-based systems, including dual-capable aircraft). The strategy exploits German fears of "singularization," the term used to describe the German geographic predicament of being the battlefield for a majority of nuclear weapons that were not eliminated by the INF Treaty (Lance missiles and artillery nuclear projectiles). The fact that these weapons are "German killers" (in the geographic sense) is a source of great discomfort to our most important NATO ally, and no doubt a source of some cynical pleasure in the minds of Soviet strategists.

During a visit to Bonn soon after the signing of the INF Treaty, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze pressed his German hosts for their support of the Soviet "triple zero" proposal. Triple zero appeals to Germans wary of singularization, but it could result in a more credible Soviet conventional war option in Europe.[18] For that reason, neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administration has been willing to accept the triple zero option prior to firm

Soviet agreements on conventional reductions. Over the long term, however, German domestic politics may demand triple zero for land-based nuclear missiles and artillery.

The remaining geographic zones can be defended with discriminate strategies and forces. NATO's northern and southern flanks (primarily Norway and Turkey) should, like the central front, depend on conventional deterrence that is decoupled from threats to set off a rapid chain of nuclear escalation. Strategy in the reinforcing zones—Great Britain, France, and Italy on the one side and the Soviet military districts adjacent to Eastern Europe on the other—should remain independent of conventional deterrence in the central zone. Deterrence in the reinforcing zones should rest unambiguously on theater and strategic nuclear forces. Escalation of war to these zones risks full-scale theater strategic war and must be deterred by the same levels of threat used to deter intercontinental nuclear war.

Linking arms control and conventional and strategic nuclear modernization to specific zones in the Atlantic to the Urals region does not mean that the US commitment to extended deterrence varies from one ally to another. The distinctions mean that conventional deterrence is possible far below the nuclear threshold.

Ironically, if negotiations produce a treaty, US conventional forces will become strategically more important. If their redeployment to the United States results in demobilization, conventional deterrence will be weakened. Total manpower may decline, but the number of army divisions (18 active and ten reserve) should be retained or even expanded through organizational devices similar to the Soviet practice of maintaining ground forces at various readiness levels. These categories range from full-strength, combat-ready divisions, to incompletely manned divisions with less than 50 percent of their required manpower, on down to small divisional custodial cadres for weapons and equipment. National mobilization and training are required to bring them to full strength, but even on paper they broadcast to the world a level of commitment and a corresponding component in the structure of deterrence.

Land power is unique in the level of national will and commitment it reflects. Naval and air power are certainly essential components in US defense posture and conventional deterrence, but they are also the symbols of limited commitment. They sooner lend themselves to the substitution of service-specific strategies—air power or maritime strategy—for national strategy. Land power, in contrast, is more closely identified with and dependent on national strategy because it is the symbol of the nation's highest commitment of military power short of nuclear weapons.[19] When the nation commits its army, the commitment is nearly always total, and the cost of failure far more damaging to national prestige.

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The Soviet problem is more economic than military. Soviet military forces must be reduced to finance economic reform. Skeptics in the West should not underestimate the risks this entails for Gorbachev. The Soviet Union depends disproportionately on its military might for superpower status. Previous Soviet leaders have assumed the convertibility of military assets to diplomatic, economic, and psychological gains consistent with Soviet desires to extend their influence. The size and sophistication of Soviet forces are the most visible product of industrial modernization. They convey the trappings of success. In Soviet eyes, respect and authority must certainly spill over to their political and ideological claims. Gorbachev is openly challenging these sacred assumptions. Security, he has argued, and by inference superpower status, cannot rest on military power alone. Political and economic cooperation with the West is an essential part of state security in the nuclear age. His recognition of the limited utility of military power is a giant step toward a credible conventional deterrent in Europe.

Yet Europe remains the most militarized zone in the world. There is growing fear among Europeans that preparations for war and the infrastructure of deterrence itself have become the greater threat. Mutual disengagement with disproportionate reductions on the Soviet side can reduce the political tensions that have persisted since two powerful allies met on the Elbe in 1945. The continued presence of American and Soviet armies in central Europe for more than 45 years after World War II is neither inevitable nor a natural part of international politics. Powerful allies in Western Europe and Gorbachev's revolutionary attempts to reform the Soviet Union are dramatic symbols of success for American postwar strategy in Europe. The challenge in the next century is learning how to live with that success.

NOTES

1. Philip A. Karber, "Conventional Arms Control, or Why Nunn is Better Than None," in *Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe*, ed. Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thompson (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), p. 174.

2. Delegates from the 35 members of the Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreed on several on-site inspection provisions in 1986. NATO and Warsaw Pact military commanders may not train or exercise units in excess of 300 tanks or 13,000 personnel without prior notification. When exercises exceed 17,000 personnel, military representatives from the other side must be allowed on-site observation of the exercise. Under CDE provisions, American and British personnel have observed Warsaw Pact exercises in the Soviet Union, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic. Soviet personnel have been present during NATO exercises in West Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Great Britain. See Don O. Stovall, "A Participant's View of On-Site Inspections," *Parameters*, 19 (June 1989), 2-17.

3. Michael Moodie, "Conventional Arms Control: An Analytical Survey of Recent Literature," *The Washington Quarterly*, 12 (Winter 1989), 189-201.

4. Bill Keller, "East Bloc Gives First Arms Tally," *The New York Times*, 31 January 1989, p. A6.

5. *Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE)*, Progress Report, August 1986, Requirements and Resources Directorate, US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, pp. 3-20.

6. Philip A. Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1989, pp. 54-64.

7. Sam Nunn, "NATO Challenges and Opportunities: A Three-Track Approach," *NATO Review*, 35 (June 1987), 1-7.

8. The Soviet zones are described by Oleg Amirov et al., "Conventional War: Strategic Concepts," *Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1988), pp. 395-400. The NATO Plan is described in Tom Donnelly, "If Threat Ends, What Then?" *Army Times*, 8 May 1989, p. 16. The map with this article is derived from both proposals, which vary slightly in their zonal boundaries.

9. The initial proposals by NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the Conventional Forces in Europe Negotiations (CFE) are summarized in Peter Adams and Harold Briley, "Conventional Convergence in Vienna," *Defense News*, 13 March 1989, p. 1.

10. N. V. Ogarkov, "Reliable Defense to Peace," *Red Star*, 23 September 1983, p. 2; and "The Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and the Present," *Red Star*, 9 May 1984, p. 3.

11. J. N. Westwood, *A History of Russian Railways* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), pp. 29-31 and 237-41. Soviet rails are gauged five feet apart. Their European counterparts are four feet, eight and a half inches. The three and a half inches have great strategic significance.

12. Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Looks to Newer, Fewer Arms," *The New York Times*, 19 April 1989, p. A8. See also Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Nuclear Modernization: No Transition Hitch," *The Washington Post*, 3 February 1989, p. A25.

13. Helmut Schmidt, "The Zero Option: On Equilibrium in Arms Control," *Fort Worth Telegram and Star*, 3 May 1987, p. AA3, reprinted in DOD, *Current News*, 15 July 1987, p. 11.

14. Michael R. Gordon, "Reagan Arms Adviser Says Bush Is Wrong on Short-Range Missiles," *The New York Times*, 3 May 1989, p. 1. Mr. Nitze's views were expressed in a press conference on his final day of service in the Bush Administration.

15. The President reversed American opposition to cutting aircraft and troop strength. He offered to bring 30,000 US troops home, leaving 275,000 in Europe, if the Soviets would reduce their European forces to an equal number. Troop cuts would be accompanied by a 15-percent cut below current NATO levels in all types of aircraft. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Bush Wins Backing for His Arms Plan from NATO Allies," *The New York Times*, 30 May 1989, p. 1.

16. "Joint Communique," *The New York Times*, 31 May 1989, p. A15.

17. A public opinion poll taken prior to the NATO summit found that 89.1 percent of those Germans questioned opposed American short-range nuclear weapons. Serge Schmemann, "Bonn Reported Split on NATO Arms," *The New York Times*, 27 May 1989, p. 6.

18. German fears have been voiced on many occasions by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and members of his government. One advisor has suggested reducing warheads for battlefield nuclear weapons by 50 percent, with the majority of cuts coming from *short-range* nuclear artillery. The emphasis on short-range weapons illustrates German sensitivities on where the battlefield will be. See Robert J. McCartney, "Bonn Presses for NATO Agreement on Plans to Upgrade Nuclear Arms," *The Washington Post*, 27 February 1988, p. A13. For this reason, the Germans are unlikely to support Soviet calls for eliminating nuclear weapons carried on tactical aircraft. See the joint Soviet-Czechoslovak communique printed in FBIS, 15 April 1987, p. F20. It is also worth noting that "nonoffensive defense" is rooted in the German peace movement. For examples of literature from the German Peace Movement see *The Journal of Peace Research*, 24 (March 1987).

19. The author is grateful to Carl H. Builder for these interservice comparisons. See his *The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1987), chaps. 3, 4, and 6.

The Military Meaning of the New Soviet Doctrine

JEFFREY W. LEGRO

The current ferment in Soviet military doctrine has led to uncertainty and debate over its implications. On one hand, Gorbachev's peaceful rhetoric, backed by force reductions, is competing with the Bolshoi's ballerinas for favorable Western press reviews. Public opinion—and many public officials—perceive a reduced military threat from the Soviet army. On the other hand, skeptics believe that recent doctrinal changes are compatible with a modernized, more efficient Soviet military machine. In their view, the Soviet army is definitely changing, but the threat will not. A review of the operational implications of the new Soviet security themes indicates that neither the optimist nor pessimist is wholly justified. The effect on the military situation in Europe will be mixed: some changes appear to benefit NATO's position, while others suggest new challenges. Understanding the specifics of this evolution is crucial for determining how the West should respond.

Gorbachev's new thinking in security affairs has promised radical change, but its development has thus far seen greatest elaboration at the socio-political level of doctrine, which addresses the nature, objectives, and initiation of war. The focus in this article, however, will be on the military-technical aspect of change: how have the plans and operations of the Soviet army evolved under the "new thinking"? Because doctrinal developments take time to affect military operations, this is necessarily a speculative venture. Nonetheless, high-level Soviet officials have begun to speak out publicly and they deserve a measured hearing.

The Nature of Military-Technical Change

Although much of the doctrinal reformulation under Gorbachev is linked to political posturing, several of the declaratory themes appear to have consequences at the military-technical level. Three of the most prominent,

which will be addressed in turn, are defense dominance, quality over quantity, and prevention of war.

Defense Dominance. The central theme of the USSR's new security policy is that Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine is now defense-oriented. Soviet declaratory doctrine has always been defensive at the socio-political level, but now it is alleged that such will also hold true at the military-technical level.[1] Gorbachev and others have called for a strategy and posture that would exclude the possibility of offensive operations. While this outcome is to be the result of negotiations, the Soviets also maintain that they are unilaterally developing a defensive doctrine. A brief review of what "defense" means, the sources of military interest in it, and the nature of the changes occurring will help to illuminate the significance of this "new" orientation.

Soviet military officials have put forward different conceptions of the "defensive" doctrine. At one extreme is the view that it is simply implies non-aggression; the USSR claims it will not attack anyone and therefore it has a defensive doctrine.[2] Apparent Soviet plans to fight a war through massive offensive operations aimed at deep penetration of enemy territory are brushed aside—after all, such options would be implemented only in the event that the USSR is attacked. The implication of this usage is that no substantial changes in military posture are needed. At the other extreme, the shift to defense suggests that Soviet strategy will be dominated by defensive operations and will demand only capabilities that permit the army to counterattack to regain the Warsaw Pact's own lost territory.[3] In this version, the war is fought primarily in Eastern Europe.

The middle position (which appears most authoritative) is that the new focus on defense means (1) greater attention to how defensive battles will be fought, and (2) emphasis upon defensive operations at the *beginning* period of war, but (3) ultimate dominance of the offense within the full range of military operations.[4] While the magnitude of the counteroffensive after the initial defensive stage is left undefined, the goal is to destroy the enemy's forces.[5] The implication of this formulation is that significant dynamic capabilities are still required and the battle will be taken to the enemy's territory.

Jeffrey W. Legro is a Fellow at the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at UCLA. From 1987 until early 1989, he was a Research Fellow with Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs. He holds a B.A. from Middlebury College with majors in economics and Russian; an M.A. from UCLA; and a certificate in Soviet culture and Russian language studies from the Pushkin Institute in Moscow. His most recent publication was the article "Soviet Crisis Decisionmaking and the Gorbachev Reforms" in the July/August 1989 issue of *Survival*. The author would like to thank the Ford Foundation for financial support during the preparation of this article.

The degree of military attention to defense cannot be completely separated from current political and economic needs, yet its roots predate Gorbachev and relate also to developments in military technology.[6] A key source of interest in defense is the perceived threat from Western high-technology nuclear and conventional weapons which challenge the efficacy of the USSR's theater offensive. In particular, the Soviets fear that enhanced reconnaissance capabilities and high-accuracy munitions will allow NATO to disrupt the concentration of forces in the forward battle area and neutralize second-echelon forces that are moving up to the front.[7]

Also spurring attention to defense is uncertainty about how the next war will begin. More specifically, military authorities realize there is no guarantee that either the situation or political leaders will allow them to seize the initiative and implement an offensive at the start of a war, even if "purely" military factors demand such action.[8] The historical analogy used is Stalin's choice at the beginning of World War II when "the political measures that were taken to avoid war were not correctly linked with concern over maintaining the armed forces at a high state of readiness."[9] Like it or not, defensive operations may be a necessity. Finally, defensive operations remain important as a part of the overall strategic offensive plan. They would provide time to marshal forces to shift to the offense, hold ground in secondary sectors, or protect the flanks of the strategic offensive sector from counterattacks.[10]

Defense-mindedness is apparently leading to institutional and operational modifications. One of the alleged purposes of Soviet force reduction is to demonstrate that the USSR's divisions in East Europe are no longer offense-oriented. Over the next two years, the number of tanks will be reduced by 40 percent in motor rifle divisions and 20 percent in tank divisions located in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Independent tank regiments in the Central Group of Forces are to be converted into motorized infantry units, cutting the number of tanks by 60 to 80 percent. In addition, assault landing and assault crossing units will be withdrawn with all their equipment. Meanwhile the number of antitank, engineering, and air defense systems is to be increased, giving the units "a clear-cut defensive structure."[11] It remains uncertain how, if at all, forces within the Soviet Union will be restructured.[12]

Aspects of the military educational system are also being brought into line with the defense emphasis. Programs at the military academies have supposedly been overhauled and manuals revised.[13] Military journals and books are pointedly giving more attention to topics related to defense. For example, a generally positive review of the book *Tank Armies on the Offensive* critiques it for not paying enough attention to tank forces as a defensive tool, which would have strengthened the "up-to date tone" of the study.[14] At a conference in Moscow, a Soviet analyst proudly displayed a copy of the January 1989 issue of the restricted-circulation publication *Military Thought*,

in which most of the articles were devoted to defense.[15] Thus it may be that attitudes and attention to defense will be strengthened by reforms in the way soldiers are taught to think, and encouraged to write, about military affairs.

Military authorities contend that defense awareness will indeed lead to operational modifications. One important area is military exercises. One article has stated that training on defensive operations will be increased to 50 percent of the time allocated, with offensive maneuvers receiving the remainder.[16] Marshal Akhromeyev asserted that the Soviet army now plans to remain on the defensive for three weeks at the beginning of a war, a revision which is supposedly reflected in the USSR's exercises.[17] In addition, all moving-target tank gunnery ranges and troop firing ranges have allegedly been reequipped in line with the demands of the defensive doctrine.[18]

Despite these claims, many reports of observers of Pact maneuvers have questioned their defensive nature.[19] Not all accounts, however, have been skeptical. Admiral William Crowe, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recounted seeing exercises and wargames that were "truly defensive" during his June 1989 visit.[20] These differing reports suggest either that the defensive shift is just starting to take hold, that Crowe was shown "Potemkin" maneuvers which do not reflect overall training, or that it is simply difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive maneuvers.

Ironically, Soviet plans for the defense appear to include concepts traditionally linked with the offense, such as preemption. Several military authors, including Marshal Akhromeyev, have noted that while the defensive orientation is being realized at the operational level, it will not be passive, but an active, aggressive defense. In the Soviet *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, however, "defense activeness" (*aktivnost' oborony*) includes "hitting the adversary with airstrikes and artillery fire during the time the adversary is preparing for an attack."[21] Indeed, Soviet commentaries have specifically stated that new technologies allow the defense to take the initiative and defeat an offensive *before* it is launched.[22] Thus, while preemption appears to have been downgraded relative to its previous prominent role in the theater offensive, Soviet writings still allow for it.

One of the most important implications of a defensive orientation is the perceived need to increase readiness. This involves both combat readiness and mobilization readiness. Combat readiness is seen as necessary because if the aggressor can make preparations covertly and has the advantage of seizing the initiative, the defender must be constantly prepared to neutralize the attack. Soviet force reductions have also heightened military interest in enhancing readiness.[23] Improving mobilization readiness—which apparently refers to the ability to field reserves quickly—has received less attention, but the chief of the General Staff, M. A. Moiseyev, has repeatedly mentioned it along with combat readiness.[24]



DOD

Smoke veils a Soviet soldier during a tactical exercise witnessed by US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci at the Taman Division Garrison Facility, near Moscow, on 2 August 1988.

A final implication of the defensive orientation is an emphasis on mobility, particularly that of strategic reserves. Mobility is supposedly needed for transferring forces rapidly to areas of enemy attack where additional troops may be required.[25] Of course, mobility is also useful for rapid offensives.

Quality Over Quantity. The notion that force generation should be guided by qualitative rather than quantitative criteria received great attention beginning in the summer of 1988 following the 19th Party Conference and has been a central principle in Yazov's and other high military officials' speeches and writings.[26] The term "quality" is no stranger to Soviet military discourse. In the early 1960s when the Soviets lagged the United States in numbers of ICBMs, they emphasized that the quality of the rockets was more important than the quantity.[27] In the first part of the 1980s, Marshal Ogarkov was an outspoken proponent of the importance of qualitative improvements in weapons. Nonetheless, the degree to which the quality theme has been emphasized since the Party Conference and the explanation for this emphasis suggest that it could be particularly important in the way the military operates in the future.

The sources of Soviet interest in military quality are tied to economic, foreign policy, and military considerations. Reductions in troops and military expenditures will allegedly free resources for socio-economic development.[28] Furthermore, these cuts contribute to the "new thinking" foreign policy campaign aimed at changing international perceptions of the Soviet threat and slowing the arms race. The Soviet Union's economic restructuring is predicated on a placid external environment.[29] The goal of the quality campaign in the military sphere (as is the case for the economy as a whole) is to switch to intensive development: try to get more out of what is being produced rather than just producing more. The past emphasis on building large numbers of weapons and maintaining a massive standing army is eschewed because it provokes an international reaction (e.g. anti-Soviet coalition) and is expensive.[30]

From the military viewpoint, "quality" makes sense for several reasons. One is combat effectiveness. As Yazov has proclaimed, quantitative indicators are becoming less effective even in strictly military terms.[31] Although he does not fully explain this idea, the tenor of other military writings suggests that he is referring to the increased range and accuracy of high-technology weapons which could help numerically inferior troops defeat larger forces.[32] This, of course, would be a challenge to a Soviet strategy based in part on taking advantage of superior quantities of "low-tech" tanks and artillery to overwhelm a Western defense.[33] The stress on economical quality, alongside commentaries on the importance of new types of weapons, suggests that the Soviet Union, and especially the military, is practicing deferred gratification: economizing is accepted now so that in the longer run systems suited for the modern battlefield will be available.[34]

Gorbachev's reduction of the military forces is another factor that military personnel refer to when emphasizing quality. In fact, even before the reduction plan was announced, quality was cited as especially significant if troop levels were lowered.[35] With Gorbachev's cuts, the armed forces foresee a period of trial when quality must be sought because, despite smaller numbers, Soviet forces will be expected to fulfill the same tasks.[36]

The new focus on quality also has implications for hardware and training. In terms of hardware, officials imply that there will be a shift away from the traditional Soviet emphasis on quantity of weapons toward fewer systems with greater reliability and technological sophistication. The production plan for both arms and equipment has allegedly been cut in favor of developing weapons that cover the same missions in fewer numbers.[37] At the same time, however, it is not clear how this qualitative shift fits in with the political priority of economic stringency. Soviets reading reports of the United States' $500-million Stealth bomber undoubtedly realize that quality achieved via high technology is not necessarily cheaper. Indeed, in one article, the United States is accused of using the "competitive strategies" concept to drag

the arms race from the quantitative to the qualitative plane in the hope of weakening the Soviet economy by pressuring the USSR to devote more resources to the defense sector.[38]

One of the main areas of expected opportunity in the quality campaign is military training. The Soviets hope to get the most out of available resources by improving personnel skills and combat training. Articles in the Soviet press indicate that Soviet troops are having problems operating the more sophisticated weapons. Soldiers are urged to increase their skill in using and maintaining existing arms so that capabilities can be maximized.[39] Combat training is criticized as too formal and inadequate in scope.[40] Troops are being diverted from training by other duties ranging from helping with the harvest in the fall to pandering to high-level officers during their inspections and visits.[41] The Soviets have announced that they have cut the number of large-scale exercises in order to devote more time to "qualitative" training of sub-units.[42] The army also hopes to enhance training and tactics in field exercises through laser simulation like that used by the US Army's National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California.[43] Perhaps one reason why training is receiving so much attention is that the Soviets feel it can enhance capabilities significantly at low cost.[44]

Prevention of War. According to prominent military figures, the third important new element of Soviet military doctrine is its aim of preventing war.[45] Of course, one might question the novelty of this goal, as the argument has been made since the 1970s that the Soviet Union's military power, especially its strategic nuclear parity with the United States, has been a key factor in preventing war. Today, however, prevention is portrayed not just as a side benefit of building military power, but rather as the primary purpose of the armed forces. Such a change seems largely limited to semantics at the socio-political level of doctrine, but may have some operational consequences.

An aspect that bridges the socio-political and military-technical levels is the explicit Soviet pledge not to initiate hostilities, including the foregoing of preemptive attacks, a calling card of the Soviet operational modus operandi.[46] It is of course questionable that such pledges would be honored if conflict threatened. For example, it is unclear whether a Soviet reaction based on a perception that the other side is preparing for war would fall under the rubric of initiating hostilities.[47] If so, such definitional gymnastics would allow the East to strike at NATO even if the latter's actions were merely a precaution.

Perhaps spurred on by their "no first use of nuclear weapons" and "no initiation of hostilities" promises, the Soviets also aim to reduce the vulnerability of the army. The goal is not merely to limit casualties and equipment loss during the course of a conflict. The perception of vulnerability in this case results from the declared intention to absorb the first blow in a

war. The problem of protecting forces when restricted to defensive maneuvers is viewed as particularly challenging.[48]

Another implication of the prevention-of-war theme is continuing attention to avoiding inadvertent use of forces with strong escalatory potential, especially nuclear weapons. The doctrine's practical implementation will be more rigorous control over tactical and strategic nuclear munitions to avoid unauthorized use.[49] Again, however, interest in this area predates Gorbachev. Then Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov noted in 1982 that preventing a nuclear war would demand tighter control to exclude unauthorized release.[50]

The Meaning of Military-Technical Change

The implications of the new doctrine can be assessed in terms of the components of its military-technical level, including (1) the nature of the military threat, (2) force structure, (3) force employment concepts and strategy, and (4) the preparation of the armed forces.[51] Let us examine each of these four elements, highlighting where appropriate the effect of the new thinking on the USSR's ability to attack NATO successfully.

Military Threat. The political leadership has stressed inadvertent war as one of the primary threats to peace, thus downgrading a calculated NATO attack and providing a doctrinal basis for reducing defense spending and seeking arms control. While the military has paid lip service to this theme, prominent officers appear to put much greater emphasis on the purposeful aggressive actions of the West as the most important challenge to Soviet security. If anything, military officials see the peril from NATO growing as new systems are modernized and Western military strategy becomes more "offensive."[52]

The results of a threat assessment that endows the West with considerable high-tech capabilities are mixed. On the one hand, it strengthens deterrence if the Soviets believe that new types of weapons endanger the viability of the their offensive. On the other hand, traditional military interests will undoubtedly try to use this threat to build an internal consensus for quickening the development of new weapon systems to negate Western advantages.

Force Structure. Gorbachev's plan to restructure forces in Europe—if carried out as announced[53]—should benefit NATO security because it decreases the likelihood of a successful Soviet short-warning attack.[54] Even so, the Soviet Union is left with considerable forces capable of conducting offensive operations against NATO after mobilization.

A potential negative implication from the Western perspective is the desire on the part of some Soviet military leaders to produce improved high-technology weapons. Of course, it is not realistic to expect zero modernization or production of new systems. The real issues thus are the types of weapons built and the quantities and rates of production. If the systems are primarily suited for offensive operations or the pace of production is rapid

Gorbachev's plan to restructure forces in Europe should benefit NATO security. . . . Even so, the Soviets will be left with considerable forces capable of conducting offensive operations.

and the quantity large, the threat would obviously increase. The types of weapons produced would also influence which scenario is most affected. For example, if accurate long-range missiles, strike aircraft, or attack helicopters were to appear in greater numbers, the possibility of an effective short-warning attack might increase. On the other hand, if the quantity of tank transporters jumps or airlift capacity is expanded, then a mobilized attack would gain credibility. Despite the desires of Soviet professional soldiers, however, there is little in military writings to suggest that weapons development will receive resource priority. The mood conveyed is one of having to accept less in resources, at least in the short run.

Also related to force structure is the emphasis on creating highly mobile reserves for rapid maneuvers, which if realized would pose a challenge to NATO capabilities. Mobility might be necessary to secure a lengthy frontier against a foe with superior forces whose main breakthrough sites could not be predicted. However, increasing the mobility of the USSR's strategic reserve, which has easier access to central Europe than NATO's US-based reserves, could represent a serious danger. Soviet forces would be able to move from the rear to the front and concentrate near the FEBA more rapidly, thus enhancing the possibility of a successful mobilized attack.

Employment Concepts. In the category of force employment concepts, doctrinal developments indicate both positive and negative consequences for Western security. A positive, albeit superficial, effect is the Soviet promise not to initiate hostilities nor launch preemptive attacks. If honored, these pledges would directly undercut key elements of the Soviet theater offensive: preemption of NATO's airfields, nuclear weapons, and storage sites; and seizing the initiative. Pledges such as these would be mostly relevant to a short-warning attack, since after a mobilization they would have even less credibility. The obvious problem here is that talk is cheap. Declaratory statements can easily be retracted in the heat of the moment and could have little bearing on Soviet military actions. This is particularly true since preemptive options appear to have been subsumed under "defensive" plans.

The new emphasis on defensive operations may also have mixed implications for Soviet capabilities. The upside is that the Soviet Union is devoting more attention to the defense and is intent on developing a strategic

defensive option. This means that in a crunch Soviet leaders will have other choices besides the deep-strike offensive. There is, however, a downside. Although more attention will be given to defense, offensive potential and plans (e.g. the "counteroffensive") are not disappearing. The possibility arises, then, that the USSR will improve its capabilities in combating NATO's plans (e.g. FOFA) but also maintain its deep offensive operation potential, particularly after mobilization occurs.

Preparation of Forces. Here, defensive military exercises, improved combat and mobilization readiness, and improved training come into play. One good omen is the Soviet claim that its exercises will now be defense-oriented. As noted, however, there is no evidence yet of any widespread shift and it is unclear how defense can be practiced without exercising some offense.

So far as military readiness is concerned, it is understandable why with smaller forces the Soviets feel the need for higher readiness. But the USSR's reduction of forces still leaves the East with important advantages in some major ground systems in central Europe (e.g. artillery). Even more disturbing, however, would be the improved combat readiness of Category I and II troops in the western USSR. These troops become more significant if the Soviets also improve their mobilization readiness, which—via the USSR's geographic advantage of land lines of communication—would increase the chance of a successful reinforced Warsaw Pact attack.

Finally we may note the disadvantages for NATO in the event of improved technical knowledge and training of Soviet soldiers. General Yazov's repetition of Lenin's dictum, "Better less, but better," is comforting only if the "less" is somewhat more than the troops and systems that Gorbachev has already offered to cut. However, personnel skills and training have long been an area of concern in the USSR's conscription army and it is unclear how easily they can be enhanced even with renewed efforts.

Conclusion

It is difficult to disagree with the notion that the predominant themes of the new Soviet doctrine are preferable to past rhetoric. However, when one focuses on how these general declaratory principles of national security policy will be implemented in terms of day-to-day military operations and plans for war, the picture shows mixed results. The USSR's reduction of forces in Eastern Europe, especially their mobile firepower, would benefit Western security because it lessens Soviet capabilities for a standing-start attack. Furthermore, increased Soviet attention to the defense—in training, academic programs, and military research—is positive because it means that other options besides a quick offensive based on preemption are being actively considered. Thus, in a crisis, the East will not be backed into a corner where its security is perceived as dependent on striking massively and early.

While acknowledging the positive, the West must also confront the potentially threatening aspects of current changes. First, Soviet military officials remain interested in the capability to conduct deep offensive operations. The leaders of the Soviet army recognize the political and military need to pay attention to defensive operations, but their discussions are generally crafted in a way that continues to recognize the offensive as the dominant form of operations. It may be that the forward-based, standing-start threat has decreased, yet the USSR will continue to maintain a powerful force potential on its territory. Furthermore, their declared aim is to increase the readiness and mobility of such forces. If these goals are met, the Soviet Union will retain the capabilities and plans to conduct significant offensive operations against NATO. This suggests that the West should respond, through arms control and/or force improvements, to Soviet mobilization and reinforcement advantages that will become increasingly important to military stability in Europe.

NOTES

1. General Colonel Makhmut Gareyev, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 44 (December 1988), 31. Gareyev is a deputy chief of the General Staff and the foremost Soviet authority on military science.

2. See the remarks of General Colonel V. N. Lobov, first deputy chief of the General Staff on the TV program "Studio 9," 15 October 1988; translated in *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (hereinafter cited as *DR:SU*), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS), 18 October 1988, p. 84.

3. Andrei Kokoshin and General Major V. V. Larionov, "Protivostoianie sil obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obecnecheniia stratigicheskoi stabil'nosti" (The Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Strategic Stability), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (June 1988), pp. 23-31.

4. See General Colonel M. Gareyev, "The Armed Forces in the Condition of Glasnost," *Argumenty i fakty*, 24-30 September 1988, pp. 4-5. Gareyev continually stresses that defensive operations will dominate the beginning of war—a phrasing that allows for offensive operations to dominate the remainder. In one of the most extensive recent discussions of defense at the operational and tactical levels, it is still described as subordinate to the offensive. See Colonel G. Ionin, "Osnovy sovremennogo oboronitel'nogo boia" (Foundations of Modern Defensive Battle), *Voennyi vestnik*, 3 (March 1988), 18-21.

5. For example, see Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov, *V zashchite sotsialisma i mira* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), pp. 30-32.

6. This was evident in the writings of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former chief of the General Staff. See Dale Herspring, "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," *Comparative Strategy*, 6 (No. 1, 1987), 29-60.

7. For a detailed Soviet view of the threat based upon their analysis of NATO's deep-strike concepts, see General Lieutenant I. Perov, "Agressivnaia sushchnost' novykh kontseptsii SShA i NATO" (The Aggressive Essence of the New Concepts of the USA and NATO), *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (February 1988), pp. 7-17. Also see the discussion in Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, "A New Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications," *Strategic Review*, 16 (Summer 1988), 17.

8. General Colonel M. A. Gareyev, *M. V. Frunze—Voennyi teoretik* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 242.

9. General Lieutenant of Aviation V. Serebriannikov, "Sootnoshenie politicheskikh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsializma" (Correlating the Political and Military Methods in the Defense of Socialism), *Kommunist v vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 18 (September 1987), 12-13.

10. Ionin, p. 20. This point is made by historical analogy in General Colonel V. N. Lobov, "Aktual'nie voprosi razvitiia Sovetskoi teorii voennoi strategii 20-kh—serediny 30-kh godov" (Actual Questions in the Development of the Soviet Theory of Military Strategy from the 1920s to the mid-1930s), *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (February 1989), 43-44.

11. D. T. Yazov, "Na nachalakh realizma i balansa interesov" (Based on Principles of Realism and a Balance of Interests), *Pravda*, 9 February 1989, p. 4; interview with USSR Defense Minister Army General D. T. Yazov, "V interesakh obshchei bezopasnosti i mira" (In the Interests of Universal Security and Peace),

Izvestiia, 27 February 1989, p. 3; M. A. Moiseyev, "Sokrashchenie vooruzhennykh sil i vooruzhenii—garantia bezopastnosti dlia vsekh i dlia kazhdogo" (Reduction of the Armed Forces and Armaments is the Guarantee of Security for Each and Everyone), *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (August 1989), 3-4.

12. Some analysts speculate that the Soviet army will shift to a corps/brigade structure. See David M. Glantz, "Force Structure: Meeting Contemporary Requirements," *Military Review*, 68 (December 1988), 58-70; David Eshel, "Soviet Force Reductions: Eyewash or Reality," *Defense Update*, April 1989, p. 18. Of course, macro-organizational changes have been made, including the removal of the border, internal, and railway troops from the control of the armed forces and the merging of several military districts. In addition, a hot debate continues over whether the Soviet Union should shift from a conscript army to a professional or militia-style one.

13. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 32.

14. Marshal of Tank Forces O. Losik's review of I. M. Ananev's *Tankovye armii v nastuplenii* (Voenizdat, 1988), in *Krasnaia zvezda*, 8 March 1988, p. 2.

15. The titles included 'Several Questions on the Preparation and Conduct of Counterstrikes in Defensive Operations," "Maneuver in Defensive Operations," "Tactical Defense," and "The Problem of Raising the Survivability of the PVO Forces in Defensive Operations." At least one analyst has noted a similar trend in the non-classified Soviet military literature. See Edward Warner III, "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet Defense Policy," *Survival*, 31 (January/February 1989), 25.

16. See Colonel G. Miranovich and Colonel V. Shitarenko, "Chem sil'na oborona?" (How Is the Defense Strong?), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 December 1987, p. 2.

17. See William Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs*, 67 (Winter 1988/1989), 130.

18. Interview with Army General B. Snetkov, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, "V usloviakh sokrashcheniia" (In the Conditions of Cuts), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 23 March 1989, p. 2.

19. Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Maneuvers: A New Strategy?" *The New York Times*, 4 November 1988, p. A8. Also see "The Soviets Practiced Only Attack Type Combat," *Die Welt*, 12-13 November 1988, p. 4, as translated in *Daily Report: Western Europe*, FBIS, 16 November 1988, p. 11; and Don O. Stovall, "A Participant's View of On-Site Inspections," *Parameters*, 19 (June 1989), 14-15.

20. Interview on "Good Morning America," 21 June 1989, as reported in DOD, *Current News*, 23 June 1989, p. A2; Michael Dobbs, "Joint Chiefs View Soviet Weaponry," *The Washington Post*, 19 April 1989, pp. A1, A23.

21. Marshal Akhromeyev, ed., *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), pp. 496-97.

22. Ionin, p. 18.

23. Army General D. T. Yazov, Minister of Defense, stated on TV, "One of the main tasks of this doctrine is the prevention of war, followed by the maintenance of military readiness, repulsion of aggressive intrigues, and so forth." See "I Serve the Soviet Union" program, 29 October 1988; as translated in *DR:SU*, FBIS, 1 November 1988, p. 89; Army General M. Sorokin, "S tochki zreniia inspektsii" (From the Inspectorate's Point of View), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 6 September 1989, p. 2; Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5.

24. Report on a meeting of General Colonel Moiseyev with Communist Party members of the General Staff, "S pozitsii oboronitel'noi doktriny" (From Defensive Doctrine Positions), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 10 February 1989, pp. 1-2; Army General Moiseyev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard for Peace and Socialism), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 23 February 1989, p. 2.

25. See Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31. For a historical analysis emphasizing the importance of maneuver and mobility, see Lobov (February 1989), pp. 44, 48.

26. The first appearance of this theme was a major article by Yazov in August 1988, "Kachestvennye parametry oboronnogo stroitel'stva" (The Qualitative Parameters of Defense Building), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 9 August 1988, pp. 1-2. Also see Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5; General Colonel V. Lobov, first deputy of the General Staff, "Vysokoe kachestvo—glavnyi kriterii boevoi podgotovki" (High Quality—The Main Criteria of Military Training), *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (January 1989), 12-18.

27. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine," in *Comparative Defense Policy*, eds. Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson, Edward L. Warner III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), p. 203.

28. Army General D. T. Yazov, "Armiia naroda" (The Army of the People), *Pravda*, 23 February 1989, p. 3.

29. Yazov (9 August 1988), p. 1, explicitly says, "The acceleration of the country's socio-economic development and the revolutionary restructuring and renewal of society are pinned on peace."

30. See the speech of Foreign Minister Shevardnaze delivered at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1988, in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, 15 (August 1988), esp. 32-33. Also relevant are the remarks of V. Falin, head of the CPSU's International Department on the TV show "Studio 9," 15 October 1988; see note 2.

31. Yazov (9 August 1988), p. 2.

32. For example, see Ionin, p. 18.

33. For example, Soviet plans rely on being able to push fresh units into the battle when others are used up as opposed to reconstituting them as is the case with NATO. Should new weapons threaten these forces, the chances of Soviet strategy's succeeding would be reduced.

34. "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" (On Guard for Peace and Socialism), in *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie* (January 1988), 3-8, notes that the CPSU's focus on boosting economic development will contribute to enhancing the military's combat power.

35. Yugoslavian newspaper interview with D. T. Yazov, "We Are Not Hawks," *Danas*, 15 November 1988, pp. 54-58; translated in *DR:SU*, FBIS, 22 November 1988, p. 73. Yazov says, "The process of perfecting the quality of combat techniques is accompanied by certain reductions in their total quality."

36. Report on comments by D. T. Yazov, "Po strogomu schetu" (Strict Accountability), *Pravda*, 22 January 1989, p. 8. Also see Lobov (January 1989), p. 13.

37. Army General V. Shabanov, Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, "Novye podchody" (New Approaches), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 18 August 1989, p. 2; Army General M. Moiseyev, "Sovetskaia voennaia doktrina: realizatsiia ee oboronitel'noi napravlennosti" (Soviet Military Doctrine: Realization of its Defensive Thrust), *Pravda*, 13 March 1989, p. 5.

38. General Liutenant V. Pavlov, "I vot teper' 'strategii konkurentsii'" (And Now "Competitive Strategies"), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 30 November 1988, p. 5.

39. See Lobov (January 1989), pp. 12-18; Moiseyev (23 February 1989), p. 12. For a specific example of concern over low technical skill levels of Soviet soldiers, see Jeanette Voas's analysis of General Lieutenant R. Akchurin, "From Technology and Armaments—The Maximum Possible," *Vestnik protivovozdushnoi oborony*, 11 (November 1987), 33-36, in *Soviet Defense Notes*, 1 (May 1989), 6-7.

40. Army General D. Yazov, "Voennoi shkole—novoe kachestvo" (New Quality in Military Education), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 27 January 1989, p. 1.

41. Lobov (January 1989), p. 15.; Yazov (22 January 1989), p. 8.

42. Interview with Snetkov, 23 March 1989, p. 2.

43. Discussion with General Lieutenant V. Khazirkov, deputy chief of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces, "Vozrodit' kak iskusstvo" (To Regenerate as an Art), *Krasnaia zvezda*, 7 January 1989, pp. 1-2.

44. See Gareyev (September 1988), pp. 4-5; Defense Minister Yazov is quoted as saying that officer cadres' training is "one of the key sources for enhancing the armed forces' qualitative condition while incurring virtually no additional costs. Full use must be made of this source." See Yazov (27 January 1989), p. 1.

45. For example, see Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, "The Doctrine of Preventing War, Defending Peace and Socialism," *World Marxist Review* (December 1987), 40; in Russian see *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (December 1987).

46. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31, states, "In other words, Soviet military strategy completely rules out the possibility of launching a preemptive or preventive strike, no matter what the political circumstances."

47. For example, Ionin, p. 18, states that defense in combined arms battle can be used to "break an offensive being prepared by the enemy."

48. Gareyev (December 1988), p. 30.

49. D. T. Yazov, "Voennaia doktrina Varshavskogo vora—doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma" (The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is the Doctrine of Peace and Socialism), *Pravda*, 27 July 1987, p. 5. Also see Yazov (15 November 1988), p. 74.

50. D. F. Ustinov, *Otvesti ugrozu iadernoi voiny* (To Repel the Threat of Nuclear War) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), p. 6.

51. These four areas are listed in Gareyev (December 1988), p. 31.

52. For example, see Moiseyev (13 March), p. 5; interview with General Lieutenant V. Achalov, Commander of the Airborne Troops, "Golubie berety" (Blue Berets), *Pravda*, 3 August 1989, p. 3.

53. It is unclear how faithfully the force reduction will be implemented. One report from a US congressional group maintains that the Soviets are shifting soldiers and equipment from disbanded units to remaining forces. See Michael R. Gordon, "Congress Inspects a Soviet Pullback," *The New York Times*, 9 August 1989, p. A10.

54. Phillip A. Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1989, pp. 54-64. Karber, part of the congressional delegation (see preceding note), has scaled back his optimistic January estimate, concluding that Soviet units in Europe have "by no means made the transfer to a strictly defensive force," but nonetheless are still less capable than before the reductions. (See Peter Almond, "Experts Say Soviets Play Old Shell Game," *Washington Times*, 14 September 1989, p. 5.) Some believe that even if the reduction is carried out, the Soviet short-warning threat will remain and could increase. Eshel (see note 12) makes this case.

View From the Fourth Estate

No Exit: The Errors of Endism

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

For a second year, serious discussion of international affairs has been dominated by a major theoretical and academic issue. In 1988 the issue was whether America was declining as a great power. This year, declinism has been displaced by endism, the central element of which is that bad things are coming to an end.

Endism manifests itself in at least three ways. Most specifically, it hails the end of the Cold War. At a second, more academic level, it proposes that wars among nation states—at least among developed nation states—are ending. Endism's third and most extreme formulation was advanced brilliantly this summer in an article in *The National Interest* by Francis Fukuyama, which celebrated "the end of history as such." This results from the "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism" and the "exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives." Wars may occur among Third World states still caught up in the historical process, but for the developed countries and the Soviet Union and China, history is at an end.

Endism contrasts dramatically with declinism. Declinism is conditionally pessimistic. It is rooted in the study of history and draws on the parallels between the United States in the late 20th century, Britain in the 19th century, and France, Spain, and other powers in earlier centuries. Endism is oriented to the future rather than the past and is unabashedly optimistic. In its most developed form, as with Fukuyama, it is rooted in philosophical speculation rather than historical analysis. Declinism, in its extreme form, is historically deterministic: Nations evolve through phases of rise, expansion, and decline. They are caught in the inexorable grip of history. In the extreme form of endism, nations escape from history.

The message of declinism for Americans is, "We're losing"; the message of endism is, "We won!" Declinism performs a useful function: It provides a warning and a goad to action to head off the decline it says is taking place. Endism provides not a warning of danger but an illusion of well-being. It invites not corrective action but relaxed complacency. The consequences of its thesis being in error are far more dangerous than those that would result if the declinist thesis should be wrong.

The End of the Cold War?

"The Cold War is over!" was the prevailing cry this past spring. Is it true? The easing in Soviet-American relations in the late 1950s was followed by the Berlin and Cuban crises; detente in the 1970s was followed by Angola and Afghanistan. How do we know that the current relaxation is not simply another swing of the cycle? One answer is that the changes occurring within the Soviet Union are far more fundamental than those that occurred in the past. The price of any attempt to reverse these changes increases daily, but it would be rash to conclude that they are as yet irreversible, and the cost of reversing them could decline in the future.

Let us, however, concede that in some meaningful and not transitory sense, the Cold War is over. How do the proponents of this thesis see the post-Cold War world? George Kennan, for one, alleges that the Soviet Union "should now be regarded essentially as another great power, like other great powers." Its interests may differ from ours, but these differences can be "adjusted by the normal means of compromise and accommodation."

Russia was, however, just "another great power" for several centuries before it became a communist state. As a great power, it frequently deployed its armies into Europe and repeatedly crushed popular uprisings in central Europe. In pursuit of Russia's interests as a great power, Russian troops appeared many places where as yet Soviet troops have not. In 1914 Nicholas II directly ruled more of Europe (including most of Poland) than Gorbachev does today.

Some suggest that the liberalizing and democratizing trends in the Soviet Union will prevent that country from bludgeoning other countries in the manner of the czars. One cannot assume, Fukuyama argues, that "the evolution of human consciousness has stood still," and that the Soviets will return to foreign policy views a century out of date in the rest of Europe. Fukuyama is right; one cannot assume that the Soviets will return to the bad old ways of the past. One also cannot assume that they will not. Gorbachev may be able to discard communism, but he cannot discard geography and the geopolitical imperatives that have shaped Russian and Soviet behavior for centuries.

The End of War?

A second manifestation of endism postulates the end of war between democratic nations. A number of authors have pointed to the fact that no significant wars have occurred between democratic regimes since the emergence of such regimes in the early 19th century. Given the large number of wars between nondemocratic regimes, and between democratic regimes and nondemocratic regimes, the almost total absence of armed conflict between democratic regimes is indeed striking.

This absence of war may stem from the nature of the regime. Democracy is a means for the peaceful resolution of disputes, involving negotiation and compromise as well as elections and voting. The leaders of democracies may well expect that they ought to be able to resolve through peaceful means their differences with the leaders of other democracies.

The democratic "zone of peace" is a dramatic historical phenomenon. If that relationship continues to hold and if democracy continues to spread, wars should

become less frequent in the future. This is one endist argument that has a strong empirical base. Three qualifications have to be noted, however, to its implications for the end of war.

First, democracies are still a minority among the world's regimes. The 1989 Freedom House survey classified 60 out of 167 sovereign states as "free" according to its rather generous definition of freedom. Multiple possibilities for war thus continue to exist.

Second, the number of democratic states has been growing, but it tends to grow irregularly in a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern. A major wave of democratization occurred in the 19th century, but then significant reversions to authoritarianism took place in the 1920s and 1930s. A second wave of democratization after World War II was followed by several reversions in the 1960s and 1970s. A third such wave began in 1974, with 15 to 20 countries shifting in a democratic direction. If the previous pattern prevails, some of these new democracies are likely to revert. Hence the possibility of war could increase rather than decrease in the immediate future, although remaining less than it was prior to 1974.

Finally, peace among democratic states could be related to extraneous accidental factors and not to the nature of democracy. In the 19th century, for instance, wars tended to occur between geographical neighbors. Democratic states were few in number and seldom bordered on each other. Hence the absence of war could be caused by the absence of propinquity. Since World War II, most democratic countries have been members of a US-led alliance, within which the leadership position of the United States has precluded war between other alliance members (e.g. between Greece and Turkey). If the alliance loosens, the probability of war between its erstwhile members, democratic or otherwise, could well increase.

A more general problem may also exist with the end-of-war or even a decline-in-war thesis. As Michimi Muranushi of Yale has pointed out, peace can be self-limiting rather than cumulative. If relations between two countries become more peaceful, this may, in some circumstances, increase the probability that either or both of those countries will go to war with a third country. The Hitler-Stalin pact paved the way for the attacks on Poland; normalization of US-China relations precipitated China's war with Vietnam. If the Soviet threat disappears, so also does an inhibitor of Greek-Turkish war.

In addition, if more countries become like Denmark, forswearing war and committing themselves to material comfort, that in itself may produce a situation which other countries may wish to exploit.

The End of History?

The heart of Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" argument is an alleged change in political consciousness throughout the principal societies in the world and the emergence of a pervasive consensus on liberal-democratic principles. It posits the triumph of one ideology and the consequent end of ideology and ideological conflict as significant factors in human existence. It is erroneous, however, to jump from the decline of communism, as Fukuyama does, to the global triumph of liberalism and the disappearance of ideology as a force in world affairs.

First, revivals are possible. From the 1940s to the 1960s, the dominant forces in economic thinking were Keynesianism, welfare statism, social democracy, and planning. It was hard to find much support for classical economic liberalism. By the late 1970s, however, the latter had staged an amazing comeback. Somewhat similarly, social scientists in the decades immediately after World War II argued that religion, ethnic consciousness, and nationalism would all be done in by economic development and modernization. But in the 1980s, these have been the dominant bases of political action in most societies. Communism may be down for the moment, but it is rash to assume that it is out for all time.

Second, the universal acceptance of liberal democracy does not preclude conflicts within liberalism. The history of ideology is the history of schism. Struggles between those professing different versions of a common ideology are often more intense and vicious than struggles between those espousing entirely different ideologies. To a believer, the heretic is worse than the nonbeliever. Protestants and Catholics, socialists and communists, Trotskyites and Leninists, Shi'ites and Sunnis have all treated each other in violent fashion.

Third, the triumph of one ideology does not preclude the emergence of new ideologies. Nations and societies presumably will continue to evolve. New challenges to human well-being will emerge, and people will develop new concepts, theories, and ideologies as to how those challenges should be met. Unless all social, economic, and political distinctions disappear, people will also develop belief systems that legitimate what they have and justify getting more. Among its other functions, for instance, communism historically legitimized the power of intellectuals and bureaucrats. If it is gone for good, it seems highly likely that intellectuals and bureaucrats will develop new sets of ideas to rationalize their claims to power and wealth.

Fourth, has liberal democracy really triumphed? If any one trend is operative in the world today, it is for societies to turn back toward their traditional culture, values, and patterns of behavior. This trend is manifest in the revival of traditional identities and characters of Eastern European countries, escaping from the deadly uniformity of Soviet-imposed communism, and also in the increasing differentiation among the republics within the Soviet Union itself.

More generally, Fukuyama's thesis itself reflects not the disappearance of Marxism but its pervasiveness. His image of the end of history is straight from Marx. The struggles of history, Fukuyama says, "will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands." Engels said it even more succinctly: "The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production." Fukuyama says liberalism is the end of history. Marx says communism "is the solution to the riddle of history." They are basically saying the same thing and, most importantly, they are thinking the same way. Marxist ideology is alive and well in Fukuyama's arguments to refute it.

Ultimately, endism, in its more extensive formulations, suffers from two basic fallacies. First, endism overemphasizes the predictability of history and the permanence of the moment. Second, endism tends to ignore the weakness and irrationality of human nature. Human beings are at times rational, generous, creative, and wise, but they are also stupid, selfish, cruel, and sinful. The struggle that is history

is rooted in human nature. In history there may be total defeats, but there are no final solutions. So long as human beings exist, there is no exit from the traumas of history.

To hope for the benign end of history is human. To expect it to happen is unrealistic. To plan on it happening is disastrous.

—*Professor Samuel P. Huntington is Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard. He is the author of some 17 books, including the classic* The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (1957). The present article is reprinted as it appeared in The Washington Post, under the title "Repent! The End Is Not Near" (24 September 1989, p. B3). The Post*'s text is a slightly condensed version of the original, which appeared in* The National Interest *(No. 17, Fall 1989, pp. 3-16) under the title used here. We gratefully acknowledge the reprint permission of* The National Interest.

Commentary & Reply

OF SPIT, SHINE, SIN, AND DROMES

To the Editor:

Regarding Colonel Mark Hamilton's June 1989 review of my book, *The Spit-Shine Syndrome: Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army*, such fulsome praise deserves a response.

I am sorry that Colonel Hamilton succumbed so completely to his emotions in reviewing my book. I realize that my criticisms of the Army's organizational methods are blunt and in some cases incendiary. The subject of military reform is a gut issue, and those of us who care deeply about the Army and about the nation's security are apt to state our feelings strongly.

Nonetheless, writers of book reviews are expected to review the book the author has written; this requires treatment of the text proper. Instead, exhibiting a true instinct for the capillaries, Hamilton has focused on the footnotes. He has ignored the substance of the book. Concerning the single instance where he addresses a substantive issue (COHORT), he is striking into thin air. The problem is not that I avoided any serious thinking but that Hamilton did not do any serious reading; the proposal he criticizes is not the one I put forward.

First, the footnote issues. I did not say that there were between 800 and 1000 suspected fragging incidents in Vietnam. I noted that there were that many reported, but within statistical parameters that made the data worthless. The statistics cited were in fact DOD-wide, not Army only. Based on those statistics, 52.4 percent (not 31.3 percent) were aimed at officers and NCOs. This, given the rank distribution at the time, indicated a significant trend—or would have if the basic data were more trustworthy. The larger point was that the reality of "fragging," the actual extent of which is now undiscoverable, has become a fixed truth in the popular media and elsewhere because of widespread distrust of our military leadership. That distrust is rooted in clear ethical failures like those involving the body-count, which are much better documented.

Concerning the statistics on whether the "bold, creative officer" could survive in the Army, I did not question whether 51 percent makes a majority, but whether "survive" is equivalent to "grow and develop," and whether those statistics can be treated as a source of optimism. On a more titillating subject, since prostitution is legal in Korea and the girls are government-registered, the source of that data is no great mystery (and is cited in the book).

Major US training operations in Europe do stop in bad weather. That is simple fact, and the point was made legitimately in relation to the usefulness of major exercises like REFORGER in terms of actual troop training. The underlying reasons were explained in a footnote because they were not relevant to the discussion at that point in the text. Footnotes do not exist to hide anything; quite the opposite. The larger point was that our forward-deployed units are the most poorly trained.

All of us are, of course, dependent on the integrity of the sources we use. That can be a problem in this business, as the recent revelations about S. L. A. Marshall have shown. Misinformation flows freely on both sides of the reform issue. Although I was openly critical of Richard Gabriel's proposals (a point Hamilton neglects to mention), I did indeed cite that author's works. Unlike many reform writers, Gabriel does have military experience; I have found challengeable data but no fabrications in his books, and I have found no reason to question his honesty. I cited his works, along with those of many others, in part because he is the only one working in certain areas. For example, I tried to get better numbers on officer assassinations from the Army's Center of Military History; they had no internal data on the topic, and sent me figures that had been compiled by various writers, some of them foreign or political radicals. Gabriel's were by far the least damaging to the Army's image.

On more significant issues, Hamilton is right that I see nothing wrong with the officers and men of the Army. Why does he view this argument with such suspicion? Perhaps he prefers reformers who describe the army's personnel as a bunch of dunderheads. The fact is that soldiers are pretty normal people, and they react in a perfectly sensible way to foolish management methods. When you punish them for being honest and reward them for distorting the truth, they are generally willing to play your silly little game. You pay the price when the shooting starts.

I make no claim to omniscience, but the Army's blend-o-matic approach to personnel management does have the saving grace of making its units pretty homogeneous. It takes no brilliance to see that the Army's management methods have failed to tap fully the tremendous resources the nation has put at its disposal. My personal experiences (many of which are documented) are cited not as proof of problems but only as worm's-eye-view illustrations, as I stated at the outset. The proof lies in the last 50 years of our military history. In essence, Hamilton's argument boils down to a blanket charge that company-grade officers don't know anything. I'll let that theory stand or fall on its own merits. Despite his claims to be open-minded, he clearly isn't listening.

Hamilton's points on COHORT are important, although, given his background, he makes a surprising error in equating cohesion with mere personnel stability. He also has completely misread the text. I argued that stabilized company-sized units are the maximum that can be achieved; in my view, even battalion COHORT is unrealistic, and the division-sized operations proposed by some are indeed fantasy. Creation of the Divisional Command Packages would involve the forming of only six roughly company-sized units per year and would require only a temporary diversion of people who are already in the system. This is hardly a project on the scale of SDI. Thus the "pulse" he describes would not materialize. Under the system I proposed, enlistment cycles would coincide with unit cycles, so the problem he mentions concerning terms of enlistment would not be a major difficulty.

The attrition problem is real, as it would be in time of war. I am willing to accept a fairly high level of uncorrected attrition, especially if TO&Es could be made more realistic. It would be preferable to see severely run-down units combined rather than simply reinforced, but I have no objection to using individual replacements for key specialists. I object only to the absurd levels of turbulence caused by pulling replacements from Peter to replace troops pulled from Paul to

replace troops taken from Mary, etc., and to destroying units to facilitate paperwork. Units, not flow, are what armies are all about.

I have no sympathy for DOD's attempts to run a democracy for bureaucrats. The detailed backward planning that Hamilton describes in connection with COHORT is, in fact, a Rube Goldberg-style attempt to achieve personnel stability without disrupting the Army's unrealistically intricate bureaucratic machine. That machine has made stability impossible and the subject of cohesion a matter of little interest to much of our leadership.

We must establish a clear priority, something that no essentially bureaucratic organization wants to do. Unit stability is not the answer to our problems, nor is it the key thrust of my book, but we are not going anywhere until it is achieved. My proposal to force-feed the new system is intended to stress, indeed, to break, the Army's current personnel management system. That system is inherently antithetical to the achievement of real personnel stability and will quickly cease to function in the event of a real national emergency. My advice is to first establish stability through practical, commonsense methods, and then to build a new paper system compatible with it.

In any case, the question of COHORT and personnel stability is an old one and the changes I proposed are merely incremental. The core arguments of the book concern the distorted relationship between the field forces and the military bureaucracy, and how the distortions can be rectified. I argue that the Army's current input-based bureaucratic approach to organization should be replaced by what is in essence an output-oriented market analogue. Your reviewer does not even mention this topic.

I don't apologize for having written a bitterly critical appraisal of the Army's management methods. They don't work and the present system cannot be fine-tuned. If Hamilton thinks it does work, let him present the evidence. We have the most expensive military forces in history, and there is nothing wrong with our people as individuals. So where are the wars we've won, the slick, professionally executed operations? Where are the American equivalents of Entebbe, Malaya, the Falklands campaign? Instead, we have Korea, Vietnam, Sontay, Mayaguez, Pueblo, the Iran raid, Beirut, Stark, Vincennes, Grenada. Not much comfort there.

Our problems lie in deeply rooted, historically derived, but dysfunctional organizational precepts. I offered a radical but practical set of alternatives. Obviously, such an effort must be somewhat oversimplified, but it was designed to provoke a debate in which specific questions could emerge and be thrashed out. If Colonel Hamilton wants to write a considered critique of the book I actually wrote, I would be eager to see it. His comments on COHORT showed some promise, but mostly he just worked himself into a rage against his nightmare image of the generic military reformer.

Christopher Bassford
Purdue University

The Reviewer Replies:

In reviewing a book, one is confined, for the most part, to the text at hand. I continue to insist that the reviewer be allowed to question sources and read the

footnotes. It is a special delight to examine additional evidence from the author which sheds light on his intent or mindset or motivation. Mr. Bassford has provided some evidence which helps explain why criticism he meant to be "blunt and incendiary" seemed to me to be dull and smoldering.

His initial reference to my "instinct for the capillaries" tempts a medical conceit to illustrate our fundamental difference concerning the role of reform critics. I expect incision for the purpose of expunging or expurgating the melanomas which most certainly exist in the Army's corporate body. Mr. Bassford is a prober of scars, excusing his uncertain diagnosis of the "fragging" incidents on the basis of "statistical parameters that made the data worthless," while himself wishing that "the basic data were more trustworthy." His reported "larger point was that the reality of 'fragging,' the actual extent of which is now undiscoverable, has become a fixed truth in the popular media and elsewhere because of widespread distrust of our military leadership." The reality of fragging has little to do with the media. Fragging happened. Some alarming number of soldiers planned and conspired to kill their leaders. That is a scar. I have not personally met anyone who does not believe that reality. If that was the larger point, imagine my disappointment with the smaller point. I dare to suggest that the distrust was based on the "fixed truth," not vice versa. In point of fact, the entire paragraph in question was a discussion of the extent of fragging. A subsequent paragraph goes on to compare the extent and circumstances of our fragging experiences with those of other armies. If the message was to be that the Army did things which caused distrust, then the discussion ought not to have focused on the actual extent of something the author believes to be "undiscoverable."

Mr. Bassford is correct that his discussion of the bold and creative officer data made the clear and valid point that "survive" is not the equivalent of "grow and develop." My emphasis on the majority issue served as a lead-in to the fragging data above, and did not attempt to represent his thrust. As to the subject of prostitutes, Mr. Bassford chooses to defend one of the multiple levels of insight he reported, but I will quarrel with none. Apparently he knows his B-girls. As to REFORGER stopping for the rain, his point and his larger point are poppycock. The statement was made in a paragraph that highlighted endurance and pace and collapse. The fact that it was misleading must have occurred to Mr. Bassford, as he began his footnote with the words, "That is not to say that the Army does not like bad weather." The absurd contention that it was part of a larger point that forward-deployed units are poorly trained strains credibility and logic.

Mr. Bassford's remarkable logic is as evident in his letter as in his book. In regard to Mr. Gabriel, he admits that he is openly critical of Mr. Gabriel's proposals but still cited his works often. Should there not be a relationship between the data used and the conclusions drawn? Apparently not, in Mr. Bassford's view, because "misinformation flows freely on both sides of the reform issue." Mr. Bassford himself has found "challengeable data but no fabrications in [Gabriel's] books." We are supposed to feel well served as a reading public because Mr. Bassford "tried to get better numbers" and better served as an Army because "Gabriel's were by far the least damaging to the Army's image." I do not feel well served. Multiple citations of an author whose conclusions one does not share and

whose data one finds challengeable are irresponsible scholarship and research. This may be, however, an insight to another area of "suspicion."

Mr. Bassford insists he sees nothing wrong with the officers and men of the Army. My confusion stems from his references to "serious ethical problems in the officer corps," "a fatal level of dishonesty," and numerous other slurs in addition to those presented in my review. Our difference is apparent and perhaps illustrated in the paragraph above. Mr. Bassford's view is that the Army is full of great guys who lie and cheat because they are forced to by the "system." It seems analogous to the serious reformer who uses trash for documentary support because "misinformation flows freely." I view both with suspicion. At issue is the apparent helplessness of those who refuse to do anything for themselves. Individuals are either guiltless victims of a corrupt system which forces their dishonesty, or they are responsible for their own integrity. Mr. Bassford may believe the former; I believe the latter. The fact that there are marginal soldiers or reformers (the categories are not mutually exclusive) who are seduced by convenience proves neither case.

On the subject of omniscience, Mr. Bassford has abandoned logic yet again. My complaints about his book—which elicit his humble admission to lacking omniscience—do not "boil down to a blanket charge that company-grade officers don't know anything." We have a couple of undistributed middle terms lost in that syllogistic boiling. Actually, I said that Mr. Bassford *was* omniscient, but he saw through that as fulsome praise.

I'm not certain Mr. Bassford knows what his own proposal is for fixing the turmoil he describes. He says in the book, "If the Army's divisions were standardized and interchangeable, the ideal solution would be to create COHORT divisions." He notes later, however, that "it is not practical in the near term because the army's divisions are not standardized and cannot replace each other on a one-for-one basis." Again he notes, "Considering the current diversity of American divisions, the creation of a simple divisional shell game would be extremely difficult to achieve in any reasonable time frame." That sounds to me as though he would like to have divisional COHORT, but is stymied by lack of standardization. My review highlighted the reality that there are other problems far more restrictive. If all units in the Army were exactly alike, his proposal would still be useless. Mr. Bassford is laboring under the delusion that somehow this will boil down to "a simple divisional shell game." My review highlights the reality. In his letter, he proposes only the Divisional Command Package of six roughly company-sized units. In the book he says, "A command instrument is not worth much without units to command." He then proposes a system which closely follows current COHORT procedures, "so that each division has an equal spread of one-, two-, and three-year sub-units." I submit that the command package plus the units adds up to a division. Eighteen divisions, each with an equal spread of one-, two-, and three-year COHORTS, is exactly the ill-considered proposal that he suggested and I critiqued. The proposal in the letter is a modest shadow of the proposal in the book.

Mr. Bassford's primary error is a failure to research either his sources or his own proposals. This allows him the free-flowing criticism of everything and the proposal of anything. To Mr. Bassford, detailed backward planning is "a Rube Goldberg-style attempt to achieve personnel stability." Rube Goldberg is most noted for creating complicated mechanisms to do simple things. To Mr. Bassford,

personnel stability, and indeed reform, is a simple thing. Further, he says, it is "a gut issue." No, the issue doesn't lie in the gut. The issue and the answers are to be found instead in the midst of the enormously difficult and complicated *details*—the capillaries if you will. Mr. Bassford will find the truly serious reformers directing their attention to the capillaries. That is the place in both our personal and corporate bodies where metabolism takes place, where we are revitalized, and, in the case of *The Spit-Shine Syndrome*, where waste products are discarded.

Colonel Mark Hamilton

"LET'S GO DOWN TO THE SEA AGAIN . . ."

To the Editor:

I agree with Captain Richard D. Hooker, Jr. ("NATO's Northern Flank: A Critique of the Maritime Strategy," *Parameters*, June 1989) that some naval advocates have made too much of the capabilities of sea power and of the Maritime Strategy. But there are several critical points concerning a prospective campaign on the Northern Flank that Hooker either distorts, confuses, or fails to address.

On the first page, Hooker repeats what has become an old canard: "In the scramble for defense resources each service advanced its own interests, but the sea services emerged clear winners." In fact, between fiscal 1983 and 1989 the Navy's share of the defense budget (in constant 1988 dollars) fell from 34 percent to 33.6 percent. The Navy's funding increased by $10 billion, the Army's by $13.5 billion, and the Air Force's, by $18.5 billion. (See SecDef Annual Report for Fiscal 1988, p. 326.)

Hooker is correct to point out that the "survivability" of the carrier group has priority over its offensive function, but I assume that the survivability of NATO air bases in central Europe also has priority over offensive action.

Hooker states that after "Pacific deployments, routine maintenance, and barrier operations," 30 American attack submarines would remain to be deployed in the northeastern Atlantic to face the Soviet Northern Fleet's 119 attack and cruise missile submarines at odds of 1:5 [30:119=1:4]. What about our NATO allies? The British and Norwegians have over a score of capable submarines that would be deployed in the Norwegian Sea. Would not some of the Soviets' 119 submarines be in maintenance? And what about the Northern Fleet's additional responsibilities? It must supply submarines for the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the South Atlantic, North Atlantic operations south of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, and protection of SSBNs. Hooker dismisses the importance to the Soviets of SSBN protection, yet paradoxically writes that American SSNs operating under the ice against Soviet SSBNs would have to "discriminate between the target SSBNs and the Soviet attack submarines escorting them." Clearly, while NATO would probably find itself outnumbered in an undersea duel in the Norwegian Sea, the odds would not be as long as Captain Hooker suggests.

Hooker's scenario for an attack against the Kola is also weak. He correctly postulates that such an offensive would occur only after Soviet naval forces had been destroyed during earlier engagements fought as the American battle force moved north. But such engagements would also deplete Soviet air assets in the

Kola. Nevertheless, Hooker pits 160 carrier battle group attack assets against a still full-strength contingent of "more than 225 modern Soviet air defense fighters," supplemented by "land-based bombers and fighters of Soviet naval aviation." Soviet naval aviation deploys only two dozen mediocre Yak-38 Forgers, hardly a threat to American aircraft. And if NATO had won the battle of the Norwegian Sea, a necessary prerequisite for an attack on the Kola, it would also probably have retained control of the airfields in north Norway; ground-based aircraft would in that case be available (as they were in Sir John Hackett's *August 1985: The Third World War,* written ten years ago) to support the offensive. In fact, it is not difficult to construct a scenario in which NATO would hold numerical parity or even superiority in fighter bomber/attack types in the far north.

Hooker's analysis contains yet another contradiction. He dismisses the notion that naval operations on the northern flank could "relieve the pressure on the Central Front." Yet he states that if threatened, Soviet air assets in the Kola could be "stiffened considerably," observing in his note that the number of Russian aircraft could be doubled on short notice. From where would these reinforcing planes come? Would not American naval offensives in the far north, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Pacific at least engage Soviet forces on the flanks and prevent their move to the Central Front? While it is true that the Soviet army is concentrated in Central Europe, Soviet air and naval forces are predominantly deployed on the flanks. In fact, on a dollar/ruble basis, the Soviets probably spend more defending their imperial periphery than they do the Central Front.

Hooker also appears to overestimate the number of troops the Soviets could profitably deploy in north Norway. It is true that the Leningrad Military District controls "11 heavy divisions," but few of these divisions are deployed in the Kola. The Soviets have two motor rifle divisions, a naval infantry brigade, and an airmobile formation deployed for operations in north Norway. The 76th Guards Airborne Division (one of six in the Soviet order of battle) at Pskov could, and perhaps would, also be deployed in the theater. It is unreasonable to expect that the Soviets would send more than a pair of divisions overland into north Norway, where they would have to operate in Arctic terrain traversed by one road.

Moreover, limitations on the number of Soviet troops that could move into north Norway, combined with the extensiveness of the Norwegian coast (Norway's total coastline is over 12,000 miles in extent), raise the likelihood that the US Marine Corps could find an undefended or weakly defended spot to land. And a Marine contribution (ten American Marine battalions and three British-Dutch that would reach Norway by sea and air) combined with the over two dozen Norwegian battalions available for operations in the far north, and other reinforcements such as the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, could easily bring NATO troop strength close to 40 battalions, a force equal numerically, and perhaps superior qualitatively, to that of the Soviets. Given the strength of the narrow Norwegian main defense position stretching from the Lyngenfjord to the Swedish border—about 25 miles of nearly mile-high mountains cut by a single road—and the exposed sea flank of the Soviet drive that would stretch back hundreds of miles along a road that runs along the coast, the amphibious contribution to the campaign could be quite impressive.

And finally, Hooker argues that the Navy's plans for the northern flank play to Soviet strength. Certainly, operations on the northern flank would be difficult

and dangerous. But I would ask two questions. First, how does Hooker expect "to ensure continuous resupply by surface shipping to Norway" if the US Navy's carrier battle groups cannot operate in the Norwegian Sea? Does Hooker believe that NATO can supply three to five division equivalents and numerous squadrons of aircraft from southern Norway up a single road—the E-6? If the carriers are unable to brave the Norwegian Sea, how are supply ships expected to reach north Norway? And second, what about the dangers NATO faces on the Central Front? How come sending NATO ships against the Soviet navy in the northeastern Atlantic is considered bad strategy, but sending a handful of American divisions against the bulk of the Soviet army and the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe is not? I would much rather take my chances on a carrier that began the war in the Norwegian Sea than I would in an M-1 tank or a Bradley APC in the Fulda Gap!

The fact is that, given our alliances, the United States is committed to forward defense. A full-scale conventional war against the Soviet Union would be no picnic—at sea, in the air, or on the ground. Yes, the US Navy could suffer defeat in the Norwegian Sea. But the US Army might also find itself driven back over the Rhine. It was not all that long ago that the Army was still debating whether it could hold the line of the Pyrenees.

Michael A. Palmer
Contemporary History Branch
Naval Historical Center

The Author Replies:

I welcome and appreciate the comments of noted historian and author Michael Palmer on my article "NATO's Northern Flank: A Critique of the Maritime Strategy." They represent a considered and constructive contribution to the debate. I note with some regret, however, that Mr. Palmer is less than dispassionate in dissecting my analysis. He consistently minimizes the demonstrated capabilities of the Soviets while artificially maximizing the case for a forward-deployed, offensive naval strategy. In surveying the field, one is struck by how often critics of the Maritime Strategy are accused of "distortion," "confusion," and "failure to address" the pet theories of Maritime Strategy enthusiasts. At least in this respect I find myself in good company.

"There is wine in words," said one famous Supreme Court Justice, and how much more this applies when looking at statistical breakdowns of the defense budget. Mr. Palmer does not reveal exactly how he arrives at his figures or what he is describing (total budget authority? total outlays? R&D vs. procurement? deferred funding or reappropriations?), but his contention that the Department of the Navy has actually been underfunded in relation to the other services is puzzling—or perhaps coy. From 1978 (the start of the defense buildup) to 1983, congressional budget authority for Navy procurement (i.e. combat hardware) increased from $13.7 billion to $33.4 billion per year, totaling $121 billion for the five-year period and outstripping Air Force and Army procurement increases by $19.1 and $62.9 billion respectively. Since then the Air Force has been more competitive (much of the funding for the 600-ship Navy was provided in the early years of the Reagan Administration). The Army, however, has continued to languish in comparison with the Navy,

watching naval procurement budgets consistently double its own. For the period 1978-1988, Navy procurement has slightly exceeded the Air Force's share (by $2.1 billion), but the disparity between Navy and Army figures is a whopping $135.9 billion (excluding USMC procurement funding). There is a little more than "force structure asymmetry" going on here—the fleet has grown from 406 to 573 ships from 1978 to 1989, a level of force structure expansion unthinkable for the other services. As late as FY 1988, procurement funds for the Navy, Air Force, and Army stood at $34.8, $26.7 and $14.9 billion, respectively. Any way one cuts it, the Navy has hardly been neglected.

In attempting to predict Soviet actions at the outset of a superpower clash in Europe, it is not unreasonable to assume that the decision to deploy combat forces and initiate hostilities will be made in the Kremlin and not Washington. Thus it is safe to assume that Soviet surface and submarine combatants will be serviced and deployed before the shooting starts. For this reason, deductions from the Northern Fleet for less important assignments such as the South Atlantic or Eastern Mediterranean or because of scheduled maintenance are not very likely. Mr. Palmer subtracts Soviet SSBNs and their defensive torpedoes from the dangers faced by NATO attack boats in order to improve his submarine ratios—a mistake that their skippers are not likely to make. And because the Soviets may well "surge" first, the voyage from the North Atlantic to the polar ice cap to grapple with Soviet SSBNs will be difficult and dangerous. There is no inherent contradiction in postulating an aggressive Soviet sea denial campaign in the North Atlantic, waged primarily by SSNs and maritime strike aircraft, and conceding that some escort submarines will be left back to screen the SSBNs. Here Mr. Palmer strains to make a point. After all, will the US Navy completely denude the SLOCs to fight forward in the Norwegian Sea?

As Nordic experts are quick to point out, control of the airfields in North Norway is the key to control of the Norwegian Sea. The balance of forces on the ground strongly favors early seizure of these airfields by the Soviets, something slow-moving Marine forces can do little to prevent. Soviet forces in the Northwest TVD are trained, organized, and equipped to move amphibiously, by parachute, and by helicopter; the road and rail networks from the Leningrad Military District are modern, all-weather, and continuously manned by military personnel. Soviet forces in the region can move quickly in large numbers; they will not idly ration out only two divisions and some helicopter troops to attempt the conquest of Norway. NATO forces, on the other hand, are drawn from a bewildering array of services and nations, most of which have multiple missions besides AFNORTH. Their training for arctic warfare is on the whole primitive, and the prospects for successful joint operations are not encouraging.

By placing the Norwegian main defense belt from the Lyngenfjord to the Swedish border, most of North Norway is lost from the outset while the danger of losing the position through seaborne and airborne attacks remains. With the Striking Fleet Atlantic ten days away, and the "ten American Marine battalions" (who will almost certainly not be deployed exclusively in the North, the Baltic Approaches and Iceland having claims on them as well) perhaps another 40 days away, only the Royal Marine Brigade can be counted on to move quickly to the area (the Canadians having dropped their commitment to Norway, with ACE Mobile being only a tripwire force having multiple missions in NATO). In short,

the picture is not nearly so rosy as Mr. Palmer paints it. With Norwegian troop strength for North Norway set at only 12 battalions after mobilization (not 24), outside help is needed urgently. The odds are good it won't arrive in time.

The early loss of the Norwegian airfields in turn threatens carrier operations in the Norwegian Sea and makes attacks against the Kola unlikely. Holding them from the outset improves the outlook for NATO dramatically. The failure of the Maritime Strategy to provide an answer to this dilemma is a major weakness.

Answers to most of Mr. Palmer's other comments can be found by a closer reading of my paper and its accompanying citations, and by applying a modest dose of old-fashioned common sense. Seaborne reinforcement and supply of the Northern Flank is possible if NATO retains control of the air, but problematic if it doesn't, hence the crucial importance of timely ground reinforcement in sufficient numbers. US carrier aircraft would surely be attrited fighting through the Norwegian Sea, and some carriers would probably be disabled or lost, but the air defense fighters on the Kola, which do not attack shipping at sea, would remain largely unscathed. The Forgers of Soviet naval aviation are normally embarked on VSTOL carriers; it is the land-based Bears, Backfires, and Blinders who pose the big threat to carrier groups and the air wings they carry. Reinforcing the air defenses of the Kola from the interior or from the Far East would do nothing to detract from the land campaign in Central Europe. And what could a handful of Marine battalions hope to accomplish by landing on the North Cape, weeks or months after the start of the conflict (assuming they arrived at all, which cannot be taken for granted)? These and other assumptions inherent in Mr. Palmer's critique reflect a contempt for Soviet capabilities and professionalism which stretches credulity beyond the breaking point.

Mr. Palmer admits that "some naval advocates have made too much of the capabilities of sea power and of the Maritime Strategy." He then proceeds to defend, at least by implication, some of its most questionable and controversial points. His concluding remarks about the dicey predicament of US ground forces on the Continent, however, are calculated to arouse the ire of any soldier frustrated by decades of conventional inferiority on the ground in Europe. It is, to borrow a phrase from General "Doc" Bahnsen, "damned objectionable" to be deprived of the resources necessary to mount a credible conventional defense in Europe and then be chided for it—by a supporter of the doctrine primarily responsible for diverting those resources in the first place! It is only fair to note that US ground forces find themselves in their current predicament not because of the prescriptions of a dangerous and unnecessary strategy, but because of a limited and over-tasked force structure. The difference between the two is highly significant.

"Forward Defense" is not a mantra, to be chanted mindlessly as a substitute for clarity and prudence in formulating national military strategy. Seapower exists, or should, to bring about conditions to force a favorable decision on land. This, it seems to me, is the black hole of the Maritime Strategy. No reasonable member of the armed forces wants anything less than a first-class fighting Navy. But neither should we have a strategy, or a military establishment for that matter, that is dangerously out of balance.

Captain Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

LASHING DOWN THAT LOOSE MARBLE

To the Editor:

I'm somewhat perplexed at the incompleteness of James J. Schneider's article ("The Loose Marble—and the Origins of Operational Art," *Parameters*, March 1989) in which he compares Napoleon's "strategy of a single point" with the emerging "operational art" as practiced by U.S. Grant during the American Civil War. One of his key distinctions for the latter was "the employment of several independent field armies distributed in the same theater of operations"—as exemplified by the cooperating commands of Grant in the East and Sherman in the West during 1864-65. This is compared with Napoleon's preference for concentrating his Army corps before a major engagement.

To quote the author, this is indeed "like trying to explain the 'appleness' of an orange." Grant and Sherman were certainly just as concerned as Napoleon in keeping the Army corps under their immediate command well closed up. But Mr. Schneider works on a much smaller map while describing Napoleon's campaigns than while describing the Civil War. During Napoleon's two major campaigns against Austria, his *Grande Armée* in southern Germany was supported by his *Armée d'Italie* advancing out of northern Italy—in exactly the same fashion that Sherman's campaign supported Grant's. Smaller armies or detached corps (Gouvion Saint-Cyr in 1805; Marmont in 1809) performed missions similar to those Grant assigned Butler, Banks, and Sigel—and far more effectively! In 1806, the Dutch army and Mortier operated across north Germany in the same fashion.

Also, I would take dead issue with Mr. Schneider's statement that there was "*still a major transitional pause once [Napoleon's]* corps had concentrated for battle," and that "the corps were never intended for use as independent 'chess pieces.'" Napoleon used them exactly in that fashion during his major advances—to find, fix, or herd the enemy forces. Auerstadt was merely the most famous of the independent corps actions with which his campaigns are studded—try Montebello in 1800; Elchingen, Dürrenstein, and Wischau in 1805; Saalfeld, Saale, Prenzlau, and Lübeck in 1806 against the Prussians; and Kolozomb, Pultusk, and Möhrungen in 1806-1807 against the Russians. Friedland developed out of an independent action by Lannes. And other examples are plentiful: as Napoleon's corps moved forward they were expected to deal with whatever they caught or were caught by.

Strategic cavalry operations generally could occur only when the terrain was favorable and the cavalry possessed weapons (whether the Mongol composite bow or Spencer carbines) that enabled it to deal with large forces of enemy infantry. However, Napoleon's cavalry screen certainly was a strategic—not tactical—employment, as was Murat's long-range pursuit after Jena, and Grouchy's advance in 1812 as a sort of connecting file between Davout and Eugène.

To change hands and throw a few rocks at Mr. Schneider's Civil War coverage, I find myself surprised at his assertion that the "rifled musket . . . drove artillery from the battlefield"—but not nearly as surprised as thousands of Civil War cannon-cockers would have been! It *did* reduce their life expectancy somewhat and make them more careful in selecting positions, but they still went where

they were needed. Even in 1914 in France some artillery on both sides still used direct fire.

And, finally, while Grant was undoubtedly a better general than Lee, what J. F. C. Fuller's slapdash reading never quite brought home to him was that Grant commanded *all* the Federal forces; Lee—at least until February 1865, when it was too late to make a difference—commanded *only* the Army of Northern Virginia. Another "inchness of an ounce"!

Colonel John R. Elting, USA Ret.
Cornwall-on-Hudson, N.Y.

The Author Replies:

The central philosophical point of my article—which Colonel Elting evidently missed—was that incremental changes in warfare can lead *in toto* to a vast qualitative military revolution; and to suggest especially that practitioners in one historical context cannot function effectively when guided by teaching and understanding that flow from another (pre-revolutionary) context. My argument throughout the article is this: the Industrial Revolution rivets a qualitatively new context to the art of war and transforms classical strategy. This new style of military art, which we now call operational art, can no longer be understood in classical terms.

Colonel Elting disputes my point that several field armies did not operate independently in a theater during the time of Napoleon. Not until the Civil War, however—when new rail-based logistics and the telegraph were available—do we see multiple field armies operating consistently *in concert in the same theater of operations*. Napoleon's *Grand Armée* was not in the same theater of operations as Eugene's *Armée d'Italie*, and therefore was not in strategic support: the defeat of one army would not have had a direct and immediate effect on the other. Additionally, Napoleon and Eugene had different bases of operations, indicative of separate theaters of operations.

Colonel Elting makes two charges in his third paragraph. First, he casts doubt on my picture of a transitional pause following concentration of Napoleonic forces prior to battle. Except in meeting engagements, which were relatively rare until the time of the Industrial Revolution, Napoleonic field armies went through a phase that David Chandler, for example, terms "assembly," in which the separate army corps were brought together before the final commitment to battle. The Germans use the term *aufmarsch* to designate this assembly phase. Second, he takes issue with my statement that Napoleon's corps were never used "as independent chess pieces." In the analogy of the chess pieces, I was referring to the permanent distribution of playing pieces, as on a chess board. Napoleonic warfare was predicated upon the final battlefield "crunch" of all pieces *on a single playing square*. The litany of battles that Colonel Elting invokes to support his own contention is, at best, contradictory. I invite the reader to examine these engagements for himself and draw his own conclusions. Personally, I find them exceptions that prove the rule. For instance, Montebello (1800) has an *advanced guard* of 6000 troops under Lannes fighting an independent action *until joined* by the remainder of the army under Victor. Elchingen (1805) is unusual because, contrary to common practice,

the *Grande Armée* was strung out in cordon fashion behind Mack's army at Ulm. In any case, Ney's "independent action" was a consequence of his disobedience to Murat and not a result of any latent *operational* capability of the Napoleonic corps.

Concerning Colonel Elting's insistance on Napoleon's strategic use of cavalry, my point was to show that the *battlefield* usage of that arm had changed qualitatively from its classical employment in behalf of tactical penetration and pursuit to one of operational employment in exploitation and economic destruction. Cavalry has been used in all ages, of course, to provide campaign intelligence.

Colonel Elting, a tanker, is simply wrong with respect to the offensive employment of artillery after the Industrial Revolution, especially when he asserts that, despite an increasingly lethal battlefield, artillerymen "still went where they were needed." This is precisely what did not occur. For example, E. P. Alexander, the Confederate artillery commander at Gettysburg, was ineffectual in bringing up his guns in direct support of Pickett's assault. Following Gettysburg, Lee disbanded his artillery reserve, anticipating by ten years the reorganization in artillery that occurred in Europe after the Franco-Prussian War. After Gettysburg, the days of vulnerable massed artillery employed in a direct fire role were over.

Finally, it is of course true that Grant's scope of command was broader than Lee's, but it is also fairly safe to say that Lee lacked sufficient operational vision even to contemplate command at any level outside of his native Virginia, where he believed the war could be won in Napoleonic fashion. Insofar as Fuller's endorsement of Grant is concerned, perhaps Colonel Elting would be happier with Dwight Eisenhower's compliment to Grant. In 1946, after having read Grant's final report to the Secretary of War, Eisenhower wrote in a letter: "Ever since I read that report my respect for Grant has been high, in spite of [the] many bitter criticisms that I have read."

James J. Schneider

THE COLOR PURPLE

To the Editor:

The article "For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb," by General William E. DePuy (*Parameters*, September 1989), is loaded with useful insights about this important and emerging career area. Last year, when I was Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, our faculty had frequent occasion to grapple with many points related to those General DePuy brings forth with his customary lucidity. The result may be of interest to your readers.

We concluded that "jointness" is fundamentally an attitude or state of mind, and that it includes mutual understanding and respect as well as genuine trust and confidence among the services. This comes from appreciating one another's history, customs, and traditions, including the resulting strengths, weaknesses, and ways of doing business—differences that derive from the separate histories and missions of the services. Jointness can be learned, and it should be inculcated early in the sequence of professional military education if we are to create a cultural change and bring about a fresh generational viewpoint.

From this "attitude of jointness" should come a "perspective of jointness" based on unselfish service and dedication to country. Some of its elements, which would appear to be essential for the joint specialist, are the ability to:

- Be a team player.
- See the picture as a whole.
- Inspire trust and confidence across service lines.
- Get to the heart of interservice issues—and find solutions.
- Listen to other viewpoints and incorporate their essence into the decision-making process.
- Retain objectivity and fair-mindedness when your service fortunes are at stake.
- Place national interests above service and personal interests.
- Be articulate but positive in making timely decisions, realizing there are limits to consensus.
- Strive above all else for "unity of effort" in achieving national goals.

As an illustration of jointness at work, this concept was developed principally by Colonel Jim Velezis (USA) and Colonel Jim Toth (USMC Ret.) of the ICAF faculty.

Major General Albin G. Wheeler
Army Materiel Command

Book Reviews

The Minute Men: The First Fight—Myths and Realities of the American Revolution. By John R. Galvin. 2d ed. rev. Oxford: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989. 274 pages. $24.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer**, Superintendent, US Military Academy, and author of *The Way of the Fox: American Strategy in the War for America, 1775-1783.*

People on the lookout for good buys watch for "twofers." That is, two dinners or tickets or shirts or anything for the same amount of money one normally costs—two "fer" the price of one. Writing a review of *The Minute Men* is a "twofer" of sorts—assessing the book itself, of course, but also addressing the process that brings us the book. Both are most worthy of note.

Let's start with the process. In its nearly 40 years of existence the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) has always had an educational aim, but its approach toward meeting that aim has until recently remained limited. To extend its educational work, AUSA broadened its organization in 1988 by establishing an entity called the Institute of Land Warfare. The Institute sponsors scholarly publications—ranging from essays to books—on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. Topics selected for publication in "An AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Book" include history, policy issues, strategy, and tactics. Books will be both new ones and reprints of works whose value has endured. Not an organization to dawdle, the Institute has already—as of this writing—published seven books. Its first reprint is *The Minute Men.* To be more precise, the book is a revised second edition. It features a new preface by General Galvin, a slightly revised text, and the addition of illustrations, including maps and drawings.

There could not have been a better selection to start the reprint series. To begin with, the choice delivers an implicit but important message. As the dust cover and title page highlight, the author is General John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. When he was writing the first edition of the book in the mid-1960s, Jack Galvin was a major teaching English at West Point. The reemergence of his book should send a sparkling message to today's young officers that being able to write and having a grasp of military history are not impediments to success in the Army.

Beyond that point, however, the Institute of Land Warfare is to be complimented particularly for reviving *The Minute Men.* It was a splendid book when I first read it about 1967; it is even better some two decades later. If the true measure of a book is how it stands up over time, then this one is indeed a classic.

The first part of the book describes the development of the minute man concept. Galvin skillfully and thoroughly traces its growth from origins in 17th-century Colonial America—when selected members of the militia were expected to be able to respond to crises on a minute's notice—to the highly charged spring of 1775. In so doing, the author demolishes one persistent myth. British forces marching to Concord on 19 April were not bloodied by a small, disorganized, poorly-prepared rabble in arms:

"There were actually 14,000 colonials under arms in the militia and Minute Man regiments. They were alerted by organized alarm riders via a system that dated back to the 17th-century wars. They had trained intensively for a year and were armed with the same type weapons as the British."

The book is at its brightest in describing the events of that momentous day along the road from Boston to Concord and back. The excitement so often bleached out of historical writing is here in full color: the fear and fatigue of the British soldiers, the anger and emotion of aroused Americans, the chaos of the running clashes, the consternation of commanders. In short, Galvin has captured the human ingredients of the story, and he portrays them vividly. That is an unusual attribute of his writing, and a good one—the battles were, after all, fought by men.

The study of warfare is a study of how we go to war, how we wage it, and how we end it. This book addresses the first of those three parts better than any work I know on the American Revolution. For that alone it should be read. But there are other reasons. Among them, preparedness: "Readiness means more than keeping one's musket close at hand. It means, as the Minute Men knew, that the ready force must be well-organized, well-equipped, well-trained, and mentally prepared to fight." That was true in 1775, and will be in 1995 as well. Galvin starts his preface by saying, "*The Minute Men* was fun to write." It is fun to read, too. Combining enjoyment in reading with advancement in professional knowledge is another "twofer" of sorts. Don't miss this bargain.

Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army. By George C. Wilson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989. 276 pages. $19.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant General Richard G. Trefry, USA Ret.**, former Inspector General of the Army.

George Wilson, military correspondent for *The Washington Post*, has completed his tour with the Army. After his Navy tour, resulting in the book *Supercarrier*, Wilson took on this latest challenge, that of following a group of recruits in an Army cohort (a cohort is a group of young soldiers who experience basic and advanced training as a group and stay together during their period of enlistment in a designated organization of the Army Regimental System) through basic training at Ft. Benning and through their assignment to Company C, 2/16 Infantry, 1st Infantry Division at Ft. Riley, including a trip to the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin. The total time involved was about two years. As the book ends, C Company is preparing for its overseas rotation to Germany. Although Wilson did not spend the entire period with his soldiers, he achieved a perspective that few authors or reporters experience.

Wilson starts his book with a glance back at the same company, also a cohort unit, in Vietnam in 1969. Since so much of the Army's élan is founded upon tradition, the device of tracing today's unit back to its Vietnam War predecessor was inspired.

The greater part of the book is centered on the experiences of the young men in the contemporary cohort as they transition from civilians to soldiers. The portrayal is accurate, providing few surprises to anyone who has spent a career in the Army. Like most others before him, Wilson is captured, body and soul, by these young recruits. (There are no female soldiers in this cohort because it is an infantry company.) His portrayal is sympathetic and engaging.

Wilson is impressed with the drill sergeants and the company commander during basic training. On the other hand, he is obviously less than impressed with the tactical unit's officers and NCOs whom he meets at Riley. At the end of his book he states that he is concerned about the leadership of the Army between the ranks of drill sergeant at the training post level and the Chief of Staff of the Army at the top level. Without belaboring the obvious, we may note that this is a rather extensive leadership span to be making disparaging generalizations about. We may note too that such obvious exaggerations happen to be useful for selling books.

Drill sergeants are professionals at what they do and in the environment in which they operate. Their focus and their missions are narrowly contained. Line NCOs have much more to cope with in a highly unstructured environment; in all fairness, the same drill sergeant who appears so sharp and exemplary in basic training units may not be as broadly and consistently accomplished serving in line units. The essential thing to remember is that everyone is learning all the time. There are recruits at every rank. The challenges faced by the line units at NTC are quantum leaps from those of the training units at Sand Hill, and this is not to take anything from the fine officers and men who conduct our basic training.

Another unfortunate distraction is Wilson's repeated allegations that the Army leadership is obsessed with *management* as opposed to leadership. Having served in command, management, and leadership positions, I would argue that if we define management as an operative understanding of the processes by which we lead and command, then we have a lot of work to do in accomplishing all three essential elements in this triumvirate of officerly responsibilities. To bludgeon the Army with the "too-much-management" argument is an intellectual and analytical cop-out. An observer of Wilson's stature and experience should be capable of understanding the problem, rather than reinforcing illusions.

Wilson recommends that officers go through basic with their soldiers, concurrently socializing with their families, in order to understand them. As for the former, basic training is too structured and artificial to serve such a purpose meaningfully. As for family socialization, soldiers and their families are not much different from anyone else. It would be interesting to review the social mores and pecking order of the hierarchy between the employees of *The Washington Post* and its middle management. Is there some magic chemistry working there that the Army has not discovered? I doubt it.

Finally, armies train in peace and war to fight. The one constant in war is its inconstancy. No unit ever fights with 100 percent of its people and with no turnover. The concept of the volunteer Army has nothing to do with producing personnel turbulence. The cohort concept was believed to be workable in peacetime for infantry and armor—but only in peacetime and only in those branches. The decision was to try it across the board, however, and the predicted problems did arise. In a perfect world everything is better than what we have. In the real world, however, nothing is easy and nothing is perfect.

Wilson's closing plea and tribute in behalf of the soldier he writes about are moving and appreciated. He should count himself fortunate to have been able to experience with us of the profession, however fleetingly, the privilege of living and sharing with soldiers.

General Maxwell Taylor: The Sword and the Pen. By John M. Taylor. New York: Doubleday, 1989. 457 pages. $22.50. **Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard**, former Chief of the US Army Center of Military History and author of a book in progress on Maxwell Taylor.

The author is the elder son of the principal of this biography. Maxwell Taylor has told his own story in his 1972 autobiography *Swords and Plowshares*, and what his son does is to provide his interpretations concerning Taylor as a senior official. Of particular interest are the two periods by which history will come to judge Maxwell Taylor, his tenure as Chief of Staff in 1955-59, during which he unsuccessfully took on the Eisenhower Administration, and his period of involvement, in diverse roles, in Vietnam decisionmaking from 1961 to 1968.

Taylor came to the Chief of Staff's position with some Washington experience but was relatively unsophisticated in bureaucratic politics at the NSC level. He fully understood, however, the divergency between the Army and President Eisenhower on budgetary and strategic issues. The ambitious goal he brought to his office—of significantly increasing the Army budget—would, if realized, have been a direct threat to the budgetary underpinning of Eisenhower's overall presidential goals.

John Taylor tells in very general terms the story of this four-year struggle, which became for General Taylor a platform for a later return to power. What the author has not done, and this is true throughout the book, is to exploit the vast literature published in the past 15 years concerning the issues and personalities of the period. The Ike he portrays, for example, is the old one of the weak President who delegated matters to his subordinates. This view has so long ago been put to rest based on sound documentation that one scarcely knows how to comment except to point out the superficial nature of the author's research.

Maxwell Taylor's Army career ended with the publication of *The Uncertain Trumpet*, written during his final months as Chief of Staff (not afterward as the author implies). While Taylor did not succeed in getting additional resources for the Army, he did set the stage for the defense debates of the 1960 presidential campaign and, indirectly, for his own return to government in the Kennedy Administration—as Military Representative of the President and later Chairman JCS. Subsequently, under LBJ he was Ambassador to Vietnam and, finally, consultant to the President on Vietnam. This was the most politically important decade of his life—and the decade of Vietnam. Only two episodes of this period can be confronted here: the Taylor-Rostow mission of the fall of 1961, and Taylor's role as Ambassador in the spring of 1965.

The Taylor-Rostow mission occurred when South Vietnam was steadily going to pieces and when Kennedy's foreign policy was running into serious problems, the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Berlin stalemate being the most striking examples. The Taylor-Rostow proposals fixed Vietnam as a place where the United States might "win one." While Kennedy did not promise to prevent South Vietnam's fall, he said no to the notion of a negotiated settlement. Further, while vetoing a small troop commitment proposed by Taylor, he left the possibility open for later ones, and at the same time approved the report's call for a huge increase in advisers and support forces.

John Taylor feels the importance of the mission has been exaggerated, but research makes clear that the opposite is true: the mission, and the presidential decisions that flowed from it, were a turning point in the Kennedy Administration's

commitment to Vietnam. By ignoring the Geneva Accords, Kennedy set in motion a chain of events inevitably leading to further escalation. The Taylor-Rostow mission is one of the five great decisionmaking benchmarks in America's longest and only lost war. In one way or another, Maxwell Taylor was to be involved in three of them. Taylor's stint as Ambassador to Vietnam, occurring in the critical period from mid-1964 to mid-1965, came with an unusually powerful charter. When 1965 began all of LBJ's options were open and Taylor was an influential presidential adviser; by July, LBJ had foreclosed all options except increased military intervention, and Taylor's influence and potential powers had passed to Westmoreland.

There are many lessons here, some of which the author tries, without success, to come to grips with. He would have been well-advised to have broadened considerably his interview base for this period and added some original research as well. In that fateful spring, Westmoreland and Taylor were moving in opposite directions on decisions relating to a US troop commitment, but the Ambassador was being undercut by his Commander in Chief rather than his former protégé. LBJ became a true hawk in the April days. Taylor in the end went along with the President, though he was opposed to the troop commitment. Like so much of Taylor's relationship to Vietnam decisionmaking, the problem was not what he did but what he failed to do—stand up and be counted when in the minority.

What of the book itself? Maxwell Taylor as a subject deserves better. The book is neither adequately researched nor objectively written, and at times the author seems not to understand the issues. There is also a peculiarly flat tone to the book because of the absence of any interplay of the personalities and ideas that framed the background of Maxwell Taylor and his times.

Among 20th-century American military figures, General Taylor is an important personality for researchers. The kinds of questions that need to be confronted, I would suggest, are as follows:

- In what ways did Taylor's career in the interwar Army shape his professional outlook, ambitions, and development as a professional soldier?
- How did Taylor's dramatic experiences as an airborne general in World War II and as the American Army Commander in the Korean War focus his ambition and shape his strategic outlook?
- Why did he fail to achieve his goals for the Army when he held its highest position as Chief of Staff from 1955 to 1959? How did he capitalize on this experience to develop into an adroit political-military figure and thus set the stage for a prominent position in the next administration?
- If it is true, as General Earle Wheeler said, that "Taylor had an influence with President Kennedy that went far beyond military matters; [Kennedy] regarded him as a man of broad knowledge, quick intelligence, and sound judgment"—it raises a fundamental question of civil-military relations. Is there a place in our system for a non-elected, non-congressionally-confirmed military careerist of four-star rank to hold a position as influential as Military Representative of the President?
- What actually was Taylor's influence on presidential decisionmaking in the 1960s concerning Vietnam as Military Representative of the President (1961-62), Chairman JCS (1962-64), Ambassador to Vietnam (1964-65), and Presidential consultant on Vietnam (1965-68)?

• Finally, the central question, and up to now the most elusive concerning Taylor, whose eight-year involvement with Vietnam was longer than that of any other senior American official: How much of the burden of the war must he bear as compared with those whose careers are permanently marked by the tragedy—Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and William Westmoreland?

The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battles of Chancellorsville & Fredericksburg. Edited by Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson. Carlisle, Pa.: South Mountain Press, 1988. 361 pages. $21.95.
Reviewed by Brigadier General Thomas E. Griess, USA Ret., former head of the Department of History at West Point and editor of *The American Civil War.*

Over the years, professional soldiers have studied military battles to help teach themselves something about how war is waged. Many of them have included in such studies on-the-spot examination of battle sites. For example, three prominent World War II leaders—Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell, General George S. Patton, and General Jacob L. Devers—spent profitable hours studying battlefields. Americans are fortunate to have access to well-preserved National Park Service battlefields, particularly ones associated with the Civil War. Examination of the battlefield, however, has not been restricted to professional soldiers. Interested persons from all walks of life, including historians, have crisscrossed battle sites in search of answers or, in some cases, simply to satisfy one's curiosity. Among those historians, Professor Jay Luvaas is preeminent as an explorer and educated observer of battlefields.

Bringing to the situation deep historical and factual understanding, a keen insight, and a determination to learn, Luvaas has guided many persons, civilian and military alike, on intellectually rewarding visits to sites where men have waged war. Indeed, the revival over the last two decades of the staff ride in the United States Army owes much to the influence of Jay Luvaas and his coeditor of the book under review, Colonel Hal Nelson, recently Military History Program Coordinator at the Army War College and now Chief of the US Army Center of Military History. An important element of Luvaas's technique is to require students to read the reports of battle participants both before and during the battlefield tour, searching for insights keyed to those narratives. This procedure is ideal for battlefields of the Civil War, which is voluminously documented in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.* Luvaas and Nelson have judiciously and liberally used extracts from the *Official Records* in compiling their book.

The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battles of Chancellorsville & Fredericksburg is a book that will satisfy battlefield buffs and experts alike. It has been carefully conceived and is easy to use. The editors lay the strategic groundwork for the clash at Fredericksburg and then promptly take the reader to the battlefield, guiding him in turn to a number of viewing points with careful instructions and maps. With respect to the events of the unfolding battle as related to each viewing point, the reader is presented pertinent commentary by the battle participants and, occasionally, by the editors. The same procedure is followed for Chancellorsville. While the book makes a tour by an individual instructive, one can imagine the stimulating discussions that

would take place at the various viewing points among members of a touring group under the guidance of a skillful director.

Anyone, particularly the professional soldier, wanting to gain deeper understanding from a visit to the Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville battlefields will find the Luvaas-Nelson *Guide* an indispensable source. Excellent in its selection of the important viewing sites, accurate in its use of reference material pertaining to those sites, honest in its presentation of evidence and viewpoints related to both sides in the war, and thoughtful in its analysis of why events occurred as they did, this book is much more than a competent tour guide. It contains a short but pertinent introduction that suggests how the reader—but, again, particularly the professional soldier—can learn from his tour and points out why these two battles can be so instructive to the thoughtful student. It also includes a wide-ranging and authoritative essay on the use—or misuse—of military intelligence in the Chancellorsville campaign, a subject of extreme importance to the final result. More subtly, by letting the tourer draw conclusions from his reading of the contemporary reports by the participants, as reinforced by his tour of the battlefield, the editors present an equally important commentary on the moral ascendancy of Robert E. Lee as a leader and the dearth of generalship among a number of the higher-level leaders in the Army of the Potomac. The editors' descriptions that are interwoven with the participants' reports, though brief and few in number, provide information that is helpful in filling the gaps. They help the reader focus on the official reports. Between the two sources of information, the reader is reminded that battles are seldom, if ever, the same in execution as in conception; he can sense how the fog of war ever exerts influence, and perceive how no battlefield is ever very tidy.

There is little of substance to criticize in this book. A selective bibliography would be an enhancing addition, and general orientation maps of each battlefield, such as the National Park Service uses, would be helpful. Perhaps their sizing proved to be a problem. Similarly, on the maps the delineation of numbers that signify "Stop" could have been improved by circling the number. The footnotes for Appendix I would have been more conveniently located immediately after the appendix rather than farther on, just before the Index. Another oversight places the Fredericksburg heading at the top of a group of pages (121-28), where Chancellorsville is more apt. But, as noted above, these are not omissions or errors of substance. Overall, the book serves its purpose admirably, and the editors have provided readers a specialist work of high quality and great utility.

Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973. By Jeffrey J. Clarke. Washington: US Army Center of Military History, 1988. 522 pages. $25.00. **Reviewed by Colonel Paul F. Braim, USA Ret.**, who served four tours in Vietnam.

Jeffrey Clarke, a historian with the US Army's Center of Military History, has written a first-rate history of the advisory effort in Vietnam. Although he examines only part of the US war effort, Clarke encapsulates well the milieu of the American experience, and his critical evaluations of US programs are well-founded and vouchered by primary documentation. (Unfortunately for private researchers, many of these references remain classified.) Clarke carries two theses through his narrative, which tend to bind together the meanderings of US programs in Vietnam: poor Vietnamese

leadership at all levels condemned all our advisory and support programs to failure; and US assistance programs lacked sufficiently firm policy, strategy, and authority to be effective. Clarke shows that our government tried, repeatedly, to prevail in Vietnam "at the margin," to save Vietnam from communism without committing our nation to war. It tried to apply a non-strategy of "incremental escalation" within the confines of self-imposed limitations on our warlike operations, and to keep the war subordinate to the more attractive "War on Poverty" at home.

A keen observer who took part in the advisory effort in Vietnam, Clarke outlines in his preface a difficult task for himself: to explore the complex American advisory and support commitment in Vietnam as a basis for a broader understanding of the American experience in that war. Although chartered to explain the tortuous, often conflicting programs in which the US Army was involved, and the organizations and personalities that drove the emasculated endeavor, Clarke does provide a good basis for understanding the broader American experience in that woeful conflict. Detailing all these activities, however, detracts from the thrust of the latter chapters.

The author leads his readers into the era by describing the fascination of President John Kennedy with "building a democratic nation" in Vietnam (a noble but naive crusade). One hopes for early publication of the Army's text on the Kennedy escalation of the war in Vietnam, for it was "Kennedy's War" that sent Special Forces, helicopter crews, and thousands of advisors into combat in Vietnam. Clarke shows that our assistance to the Mandarin-style political leadership in Vietnam, and to the self-serving, lazy, corrupt, weak-kneed Vietnamese military chain of command, doomed the best, most dedicated US effort. The optimistic US attitude that prevailed in Saigon and Washington was inculcated down the chain of advisors; positive results were highlighted, while advisors who continued to render negative progress reports were considered to be failing in their missions. Although our higher leaders periodically deplored the failures of the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces, we accepted as an article of faith the thesis that—over time, through examples set by advisors, with patience, selflessness, and sacrifice on the part of the Americans—the leadership of South Vietnam would improve. It didn't!

We made other erroneous assumptions. We assumed that the South Vietnamese leadership wanted what we wanted for their people—a free, democratic Vietnam; we assumed there would come an acculturation between the Confucian ethos of the Vietnamese and the Calvinistic work ethic of our leaders. Clarke shows that this did not occur. He cites the penchant of the Vietnamese leadership for defensive operations, and their distrust of any of their own leaders who showed a rare boldness in action. This passivity in leadership was not only a concomitant of the fragile political structure in South Vietnam, it was essential to their culture. One Vietnamese said to me, "You Americans are like the oak tree; you stand strong against the storm. But a violent wind will break you. We are like the bamboo; we bend with the wind. But when the storm is over, we straighten again." However, cultural differences do not fully explain the problems cited by Clarke. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese fought as well as any soldiers in history.

The differences in combat actions were also a result of differing goals of the contesting powers. The enemy soldiers were charged to fight, perhaps to die, to gain a better life for their people; we urged the South Vietnamese to fight to preserve their "way of life." Soldiers seldom fight well to preserve the status quo. Further, we

anointed South Vietnam's military leaders with the accoutrements of power and luxury—radios, jeeps, office furniture, air conditioners, and the paraphernalia of rank and title. Small wonder they were reluctant to risk life and comfort; we gave them their reward, then asked them to fight to earn it.

The author touches all bases in describing the advisory and support programs which descended, like a plague of locusts, upon the South Vietnamese. He cites the penchant of the McNamara Pentagon for technological solutions to problems in the field, for quantification of progress, and for the quick abandonment of a program not immediately productive in favor of another attractive solution. Clarke summarizes the results of most programs in terms of failure. He wonders, as do I, why the American leaders, frustrated by their inability to get the South Vietnamese to fight, did not demand the creation of a unified command in order to give the United States more authority to get on with the war. He does cite the fear in high places in the US government that imposition of such a command would make the struggle an American war. But it was so anyhow, at least after the United States sent combat troops to the theater. As the American advisory effort entered its final years, the advisors sent to Vietnam were less mature and much less experienced than those they advised. As Clarke states, the advisors were less and less able to give advice, and were forced into the tasks of providing artillery and air support (including helilift) for the Vietnamese. The advisors did the "grubby staff work" which the Vietnamese were disinclined to do. Also, by undertaking to provide massive, time-consuming support, they gave the Vietnamese an excuse for delaying their commitment of troops.

In highlighting the advisors' problems, Clarke turns to the report of then Brigadier General Gordon Duquemin, senior advisor of II Corps. It was, thought Duquemin, patently ridiculous for American advisors to give experienced Vietnamese commanders tactical advice, because in most cases we were trying to force the Vietnamese to do something they did not want to do. That something was to seek battle with the North Vietnamese army. Clarke quotes Duquemin: "Most South Vietnamese commanders would rather avoid the enemy than fight him!" My own advisory service under Duquemin at that time leads me to echo his judgments. A remark of my Vietnamese counterpart in the Highlands is apropos: "You [Americans] want to fight; I want to survive. You are here for a year; I am here forever. If I attack the enemy in the jungle, I get no credit from Saigon; but if I lose Ban Me Thuot, I will be relieved!" So much for persuasive American leadership.

I would like to have read more, in this otherwise excellent book, about the duties, techniques, successes, and failures of the advisors in combat. Sometimes our advice was taken—particularly in intensive combat. But I guess there's not much record of such experiences. The author does record, sympathetically, the terrible charter of the advisor, with responsibility for the performance of his counterpart's unit in combat, but lacking the authority to direct any action. Clarke gives examples of advisors demanding that their units engage the enemy more aggressively, and of the failure of the higher US leadership to back these advisors (they were usually transferred with less than excellent efficiency reports).

The author also touches upon civic action, noting that the Vietnamese commanders did it reluctantly and infrequently. However, I believe that this aid to the rural population, though the Americans overdid it, and frequently abandoned it in progress to go after the enemy, contained some of that elusive alchemy which might

have brought the Vietnamese people into partnership with us. We should study this effort, for we may want to use it more efficiently in a future counterguerrilla conflict.

Clarke has traced the responsibility for the failure of our advisory and support programs in Vietnam from the Military Assistance Command back to the Pentagon, to Capitol Hill, and even to the American "heartland" (where there was massive resistance to our support for South Vietnam). America was, at the same time, in the midst of a "societal revolution." It was a bad time to be fighting a distant war—a war that was never justified, nor even explained, in terms of American security or vital interests. Jeffrey Clarke has portrayed well a war the South Vietnamese did not want to fight, and the United States didn't go all-out to win. I recommend this book to all who seek to know what happened to us in Vietnam.

The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. By Carl H. Builder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989. 240 pages. $28.00. **Reviewed by Colonel David G. Hansen**, Chairman of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College.

This is not a book about war. It is a book about sociology. It might even be categorized as an anthropological study. But it is not about war. The subtitle, "American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis," more accurately identifies the author's message. Despite this confusion, the book is important, and you should not hesitate to check it out from the library. This is a book you can return after finishing the first eight chapters if you are a busy person and have lots of other things to read. Actually, you should skip the first chapter, too, because it is confusing, anecdotal, and contradictory. It does not contain the meat of the author's very provocative thesis that each US military service possesses a distinct "personality" which colors how that service understands strategy, procures equipment, develops forces, perceives itself in the prosecution of national objectives, and writes doctrine.

Mr. Builder succinctly, convincingly, and enjoyably argues his thesis in Chapters Two and Three ("Five Faces of the Service Personalities" and "The Service Identities and Behavior"). The fourth chapter, "What is Strategy," is a brilliant essay capsulizing the "ends, ways, means" paradigm known to every recent graduate of the US Army War College. The next four chapters critique each service's parochial attempts to have its own strategy and relates those efforts to the service personalities introduced earlier. Up to this point the book should be required reading for every Army officer who is trying to articulate an "Army" or "Landpower" strategy, because Mr. Builder makes a persuasive case that of all the services, the Army is the least able to advocate a service-specific national military strategy, and should not attempt to do so.

The book's last eight chapters reflect Mr. Builder's training as an analyst as he moves from lucid description to overdrawn prescriptions. This half of the book lacks the originality of the preceding chapters and suffers from assertions that are dated and already overtaken by events. Other parts show an apparent lack of understanding of current DOD policies and recent changes, not the least of which is the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, which is mentioned only in passing. However, if you have the time and inclination, you should dig into these chapters for there are some hidden morsels on which to chew. In all probability, though, you've read or heard most of it before.

Throughout the book Mr. Builder makes an effort to be equally critical of each military service (except the Marines, which he properly considers part of the Navy and doesn't address separately). The Army comes off as the least parochial and most selfless of the lot but does receive its share of negative criticism. In the later chapters it is convicted of an excessive focus on a future central European conflict to the detriment of other, more probable scenarios. The Navy and Air Force also take their lumps, as Mr. Builder postulates how each of the military services' personalities dominates the planning in various operational theaters.

Although *Masks of War* suffers from mistitling, some uneven writing, an occasional flippant passage, and sweeping conclusions which will frustrate the reader, it is the most important discussion of service cultures since Huntington's 1957 classic, *The Soldier and the State*. As the nation and its military services move toward the next century and an environment of constrained resources, possible retrenchment from worldwide military commitments, and potentially new international alignments, Mr. Builder's book is an important contribution in helping the services to identify realistically national military security objectives and recognize their own ultimately detrimental service parochialism. The trick will be for professional military leaders, and the civilians who direct them, to read his book and believe it.

Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz. By David Mets. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988. 405 pages. $18.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF**, author of *Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General.*

Carl Spaatz was the top American air commander of the Second World War, with both Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley rating him the best combat leader in the European Theater. After the war, he became the first chief of staff of the newly independent Air Force. Yet few today remember this hero. David Mets attempts to redress this deficiency, but despite extensive use of Spaatz's papers and dozens of interviews, the airman's personality remains elusive. We are provided a survey of American air power's evolution through World War II rather than an in-depth look at the man who mastered the new air weapon.

Spaatz is portrayed as a doer and problem-solver who achieved results. He was an outstanding pilot, and that was a crucial skill. Air leaders were expected to be technical experts; they had to know the air. It was not unusual during World War II for major generals to fly combat missions and perform the same physical duties as men half their age. That was the way respect was won.

Carl Spaatz served as the prototype for such a leader. Graduating from West Point in 1914, he joined the Signal Corps and became a flier. During World War I he commanded the training base at Issoudun, France, and spent a valuable few days at the front, where he shot down three aircraft (his own plus two Germans as he later wrote) and won the DSC. After the war he commanded the 1st Pursuit Group—the *only* pursuit group in the Air Service—and flew aboard the *Question Mark* in the 1929 record-breaking flight that demonstrated the potential of aerial refueling. More important, Spaatz became close friends with "Hap" Arnold, soon to become Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.

When war broke out in 1939, Spaatz became Arnold's chief planner. He was remarkably capable and earned Arnold's complete trust, probably the only airman to do so. As a result, he was sent to command the Eighth Air Force in England. He remained Arnold's top air leader in Europe for the next three years, and upon Germany's surrender assumed a similar post in the Pacific. After the war he succeeded Arnold, and upon unification in 1947 became the first Air Force chief of staff.

Mets narrates these events well, but Spaatz's personality and character could be more fully examined. One suspects an over-zealous editor has done Mets a disservice by excising anecdotes and insights that would have brought Spaatz, a fascinating though taciturn man, to life. There is also over-reliance on Spaatz's papers to the exclusion of other collections, thus introducing distortion. For example, the severe and debilitating personality problems between Spaatz and his British allies, especially with Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, are hinted at but not developed. Spaatz greatly resented the authority Leigh-Mallory was given over American strategic bombers before Overlord. So when Major General Hoyt Vandenberg was appointed Leigh-Mallory's deputy in March 1944, Spaatz gave him clear orders that the safeguarding of American interests was his top priority. Spaatz directed Vandenberg to notify him whenever Leigh-Mallory initiated actions that were contrary to American interests. Spaatz would then take steps to undermine the air marshal's intended actions. Such machinations were hardly conducive to effective Allied collaboration.

Nevertheless, Dave Mets has performed a valuable and long overdue service by giving us this biography of one of America's greatest soldiers. Mets' highly readable account finally rescues this premier airman from the shadows where he seemed destined to dwell.

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From the Archives

Leo Tolstoy: Soldier's Writer, Writer's Soldier

War and Peace (1869), set against the backdrop of Napoleon's invasion of Mother Russia, is arguably the greatest novel of world literature. Such is common knowledge. What is less commonly known, however, is that the author of *War and Peace*, Leo Tolstoy, was himself a soldier of incredible combativeness and courage.

As a civilian in the Caucasus in 1851, he volunteered to participate in a raid by Russian army units against a village of the Chechenian hill tribes, who were resisting the extension of government sovereignty into outlying regions. Afterwards, the Russian commander praised Tolstoy for "his courageous bearing under fire in the face of mortal danger," and urged him to enter the army. Tolstoy took up this offer with enthusiasm, enlisting as a noncommissioned officer in a battery of the 20th Artillery Brigade. In February 1852, during several days of fierce fighting against the Chechenians, an enemy shell struck the wheel of an artillery piece he was aiming, but he miraculously escaped serious injury. During this campaign, he was twice submitted for the coveted Cross of St. George for heroism. Brutal fighting resumed in early 1853, with Tolstoy in the thick of it, and he was twice more recommended for the Cross of St. George. In the latter instance, he declined the medal in favor of an old enlisted man for whom such an award meant a lifetime pension. Later in the year, he barely escaped capture by a Chechenian band after a hair-raising mounted flight astride a borrowed horse.

When Russia declared war against Turkey in 1854, Tolstoy asked to be transferred to the new scene of action on the Danube. Now commissioned as an ensign and serving on the staff, he participated in the siege against the Turks at Silistria in May of that year. Upon Russia's withdrawal to its frontier, Tolstoy again requested transfer to a more active front. England and France soon accommodated him. Entering the war on the side of Turkey, they invaded the Crimea and by the end of the year began to close on Sevastopol, the Russian Black Sea naval base. As the allied siege of Sevastopol began to form, Tolstoy requested and received a transfer into the invested city itself. From 3 April to 15 May 1855, he commanded with distinction a battery of guns defending a miserably exposed portion of the Sevastopol earthworks which were under heavy and continual bombardment. On withdrawal to an area outside the city, he participated in an unsuccessful Russian counterattack on the Chernaya River on 4 August, but was back in Sevastopol at the end of the month and assisted in the last defenses prior to the city's fall.

Though as an older man Tolstoy would have harsh things to say about the nature of war, he was never able to conceal his pride in having fought at Sevastopol. Prior to leaving the army to pursue a literary career full-time, he was promoted for "distinguished bravery and courage" in the action on the Chernaya.

Source: Based upon information in Ernest J. Simmons, *Leo Tolstoy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1946), pp. 80-121.